



Australian Government

**Australian Customs and
Border Protection Service**

Department of Defence

**Australian Maritime
Force**

Internal Review of the Maritime Incidents of 21 and 27 June 2012

VERSION 1.1



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Executive summary

The task

1. This report responds to directions from the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Acting CEO of Australian Customs and Border Protection Service (Customs and Border Protection) that an Internal Review ('the Review') be conducted into the whole of government response to search and rescue incidents 4106/2012 and 4259/2012. The Review has been supported by the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) and Department of Defence (Defence).
2. In summary the work of the internal review involved four elements:
 - (i) Collect all documents relating to the two incidents;
 - (ii) Prepare a chronology and narrative for each incident;
 - (iii) Identify the relevant policies, processes and procedures – determining whether they were applied, whether they were effective and whether any changes are required; and
 - (iv) Identify those issues requiring further analysis.
3. Senior officers from the three organisations were asked to verify the chronologies and narratives. They were also provided with an opportunity to comment on the remainder of the report.

The narratives

4. The Review received in excess of five thousand documents and related media from the three agencies. This material was used to generate key events chronologies (Attachments B and C) and narratives for each incident (Chapters 2 and 3). Short one page summaries for each incident appear on the following two pages.

Review of the policies, processes and procedures

5. The Review went about this part of its role through two approaches. The first was an 'audit like' assessment as to whether there had been compliance with the relevant policies, processes and procedures. The conclusion drawn from this work was that Customs and Border Protection (including Border Protection Command), AMSA and Defence substantially complied with all identified policies, processes and procedures. Minor non-compliances did not materially affect the outcome of the search and rescue efforts.
6. In terms of the policies requiring revision only one particular document stood out. This was the 'Protocol for Vessels with a Changed State'. Although generally sound, this document would benefit from revision to reflect the lessons learned from the recent Safety Of Life At Sea (SOLAS) events. Revisions to the document were being finalised at the time of writing this report.
7. The second and more substantial approach to this part of the review of policies, processes and procedures was the exploration of the key issues arising from the two search and rescue incidents. This approach allowed for a more careful assessment as to the effectiveness of each of the policies, processes and procedures and what changes might be recommended. This work comprised the bulk of the effort for the Review.

Summary of key events for SAR 2012/4106

- [REDACTED]
- On Tuesday 19 June at 2152 AEST, AMSA's Rescue Coordination Centre (RCC Australia) started to receive a series of calls from a vessel indicating it was experiencing difficulties.
 - Shortly thereafter (0004 AEST 20 June 2012) AMSA informed BASARNAS of the calls from the vessel.
 - On Wednesday 20 June 2012 at 0106 – 0128 AEST, AMSA received further calls from the SIEV and a GPS location was obtained. The vessel was about 40 nm from Indonesia. AMSA advised the vessel to return to Indonesia if it was experiencing difficulty. AMSA provided this information to BASARNAS which subsequently accepted coordination responsibility.
 - During the course of Wednesday 20 June, the vessel made further calls to RCC Australia indicating it needed assistance – although it continued to make steady progress southward.

[REDACTED] At 1715 AEST a Customs and Border Protection surveillance aircraft sighted the vessel heading due south at about 4 knots. Australian agencies collectively assessed that the vessel was not in distress at that time. AMSA reported the vessel's position to BASARNAS.

- At 0047 AEST on Thursday 21 June, BASARNAS advised RCC Australia that an Indonesian Navy vessel had departed at 1800 AEST on 20 June and was proceeding to the area.
- At approximately 0800 AEST the boat began taking on water from one side. Many people panicked and rushed to one side of the vessel causing it to capsize.

- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- In response, Border Protection Command (BPC) confirmed that its scheduled 1300 AEST surveillance flight should relocate the vessel. At 1453 AEST the Customs and Border Protection Dash-8 sighted the vessel 113nm NNW of Christmas Island with approximately 75 people in the water and on the upturned hull. Some of the people were as far as 3 nm from the vessel. Some had life vests and some did not. This information was conveyed to BPC and RCC Australia which commenced Mayday relays to shipping.
 - The Customs and Border Protection aircraft continued to monitor the situation. A Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) AP-3C Orion (AP-3C Orion) maritime patrol aircraft was diverted to attend the scene. The RAAF aircraft arrived at approximately 1700 AEST and commenced dropping air sea rescue kits (life rafts).
 - The first vessel to arrive at the scene was a merchant vessel at approx 1730 AEST. This was shortly followed by two more merchant vessels responding to the RCC Australia request for assistance. HMAS *Larrakia* and *Wollangong* arrived on the scene at approximately 1920 AEST, joining in the search and rescue operations.
 - At 2221 AEST 21 June AMSA assumed responsibility for the search and rescue at the request of BASARNAS. The search and rescue operation continued another two days.
 - Calls from the vessel had included a claim that there were 204 persons on board. The search and recovery effort saw the rescue of 110 survivors (all males) and the recovery of 17 deceased men. There were approximately 75 people unaccounted for.
 - The survivors are predominately Pakistanis and Afghans with two Indonesian crew members.

[illegible]

8. The Review identified six key issues arising from these two incidents. A brief explanation of these issues and the Review's findings are set out below. Recommendations in relation to these issues are grouped into related themes and appear in the last Section.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Issue 2: Search and rescue assets

12. The second issue examined the positioning of assets such as vessels, aircraft and life rafts for the search and rescue efforts north of Christmas Island.
13. The Review concluded that BPC assets were appropriately located consistent with their civil maritime security mission and to support the two SAR incidents. The short term variations against the Commander's quarterly plan increased BPC's capacity to respond. These variations reflected both good intelligence and good judgement on the part of BPC officers.
14. The positioning of the AMSA aviation search and rescue capability has not been formally reassessed during the period of the increased SOLAS risk in relation to SIEVs approaching from the north-west of Australia. The review makes a recommendation concerning the need for such an assessment.
15. The Review looked at the use of life rafts off Christmas Island, and identified two concerns:
 - (i) the limited numbers of aircraft that are capable of deploying them; and
 - (ii) the limited numbers of available life rafts.
16. On the first matter, the Review makes a recommendation concerning the installation of In-flight Operable Doors into the Customs and Border Protection Dash-8s. On the second matter, AMSA advised that it has recently prepositioned twelve life rafts to Christmas Island.
17. The Review was informed of a number of concerns regarding space limitations at Christmas Island airport and the risks that this poses for periods of intense activity such as search and rescue incidents. A recommendation is made in relation to these concerns.

Issue 3: SIEVs making unnecessary calls

18. The third issue concerns SIEVs claiming to be in distress whilst continuing to make good progress towards Australia. SIEVs do not meet any of the most basic requirements that a passenger vessel (more than 12 passengers) would be required to meet under the SOLAS Convention in the way of safety, survivability, and emergency communications. In contrast they are overloaded, under-equipped, under-skilled and they act contrary to safe practice. This complicates judgements about what are necessary or unnecessary calls for assistance. Examining the statistics in relation to these incidents suggests that the number of unnecessary alerts has increased in 2012 (in line with the increased number of SIEVs), but the proportion of unnecessary alerts has not.
19. The statistics also reveal that the percentage of search and rescue incidents where SIEVs have initiated communication with Australian authorities has steadily increased over the last three years. The vast majority of all maritime SIEV SAR incidents are now being self reported.
20. The Review considered the possibility of developing guidelines to help distinguish a genuine or false request for assistance. This would be an extremely difficult and hazardous exercise which would introduce new risks of such guidance being used too simplistically. The development of such "guidance" is not supported.

- [REDACTED]
21. Another possible response to SIEVs seeking assistance is for AMSA to task commercial vessels to undertake some form of 'health check' on SIEVs. This is already an option for AMSA where they are coordinating the response. However, this option presents a number of practical difficulties such as language barriers, lack of SIEV communications equipment, lack of ability to assist in some cases (eg the design of a vessel may prevent access) and the risks associated with large vessels approaching a SIEV that may be low in the water. These practical difficulties mean that the tasking of commercial vessels to check on SIEVs is unlikely to be a common solution to the problem.
- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The conclusion drawn was that the information known on the material state of the 4106 vessel prior to being found capsized was almost the same at RCC Australia, BPC [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

24. The situational awareness pictures on both incidents varied between BPC operations centres, RCC Australia and BASARNAS because of their varying functions and access to classified systems. However, the differences in situational awareness between agencies did not have a material effect on the outcome of either SAR.
- [REDACTED]

Issue 6: Appropriateness and timeliness of the Australian response

27. This issue involved examining the appropriateness and timeliness of all other aspects of the Australian response to SAR 4106 and SAR 4259 – other than those already addressed in previous issue.
28. The Review concluded that the timeliness of the response by BPC, RCC Australia [REDACTED] was reasonable. Although some actions could have taken place earlier, this would have been unlikely to have accelerated the critical path for the arrival of search and rescue assets. The one exception to this conclusion was the time taken to relocate the 4106 vessel after a heightened level of concern was established. The time taken could have been reduced by 30-60 minutes had the Dash-8 been tasked to proceed immediately to relocating the vessel rather than being allowed to continue with its scheduled flight plan.
29. The Review concluded that whilst the handover of SAR 4106 to BASARNAS was appropriate on 20 June, it would also have been appropriate for RCC Australia to have adopted a more forward leaning posture in assisting BASARNAS in areas where they lacked capability. For example RCC Australia could have assisted BASARNAS in making an 'Urgency Broadcast' to commercial vessels that were likely to be beyond the reach of Indonesian coastal radio.
30. The Review considered that the surveillance undertaken by BPC on 20 June was a reasonable course of action. The Review concluded that the actions of BPC in not searching for the 4106 vessel any earlier on 21 June were also reasonable.

Recommendations

Support to Indonesian Authorities

[REDACTED] This capability would be substantially enhanced by the following measures:

Recommendation 5.1

Subject to funding being provided, Australia assist BASARNAS by providing support for greater access to a maritime shipping picture and Inmarsat satellite communications capability through capacity building.

Recommendation 5.2

Pending Indonesia obtaining the enhanced capability referred to in Recommendation 5.1, RCC Australia should be pro-active in offering and making Inmarsat satellite broadcasts when the circumstances of the SAR incident dictate that it is the appropriate action.

Recommendation 5.4

Subject to funding being provided, the operational exchange program be expanded between BASARNAS and RCC Australia.

Recommendation 10.3

Up until and following the transfer of SAR coordination to BASARNAS, RCC Australia should proactively provide support to BASARNAS in areas of capability not held by Indonesian authorities, such as broadcasts to shipping and contacting the telecommunications provider.

Improved Operational Communications

The Review identified a number of areas in which agencies' operational communications could be improved. These areas included:

Recommendation 5.3

The Customs and Border Protection Jakarta Post be given a formal authorisation by AMSA to serve as a local point of liaison during SAR incidents of concern to Australia.

Recommendation 5.5

AMSA, Customs and Border Protection and Defence should work with BASARNAS and other Indonesian agencies as appropriate to establish an Indonesian process to provide rapid clearance for SAR aircraft to refuel at Indonesian airports during SAR operations. This process should apply to both ADF and State aircraft.

Recommendation 8.1

The Department of Defence and AMSA should explore the options available for providing AMSA with greater awareness about the location of relevant Defence assets during search and rescue incidents.

[REDACTED]

Recommendation 10.4

AMSA should put in place arrangements for Senior Executives to approve the transfer or acceptance of SAR coordination between RCC Australia and BASARNAS for SIEVs requesting assistance in the Indonesian SRR - both during and after normal working hours. Part of these arrangements should include collaboration with BPC [REDACTED]

Recommendation 10.5

AMSA should proactively attempt to communicate with SIEVs requesting assistance or where this is not possible, to locate the SIEVs using arrangements with telecommunications providers.

Improved Search and Rescue Capability

The Review considered that the search and rescue capability north of Christmas Island would be marginally improved by undertaking the following measures:

Recommendation 4.1

The Department of Defence and Customs and Border Protection should produce Standard Operating Procedures for dealing with the recovery of bodies from the water and their storage.

Recommendation 6.1

AMSA should reassess whether its aviation search and rescue capabilities are appropriately located having regard to the workloads, the risks associated with SIEVs and the potential impact on other SAR operations within Australia.

Recommendation 6.2

Subject to funding being provided, Customs and Border Protection should proceed with the installation of In-flight Operable Doors into its Dash-8s in support of search and rescue activity.

Recommendation 6.3

Customs and Border Protection and AMSA should enter into discussions with Regional Australia in order to address the concerns identified by the acting IOT Program Manager regarding space limitations at Christmas Island airport.

Recommendation 8.5

AMSA should investigate improved teleconferencing arrangements during calls for assistance.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Recommendation 8.2

[REDACTED]

Recommendation 8.3

[REDACTED]

Recommendation 8.4

[REDACTED]

Recommendation 9.1

[REDACTED]

Recommendation 10.1

[REDACTED]

Recommendation 10.2

[REDACTED]

Introduction

Terms of reference

1. On 21 June 2012, a vessel carrying approximately 204 persons experienced distress and subsequently capsized approximately 110 nm north of Christmas Island. Whilst 110 people survived, and 17 bodies were recovered, the remainder were unaccounted for. This incident has become known as Search and Rescue 2012/4106 (SAR 4106).
2. On 25 June 2012, the CEO of Customs and Border Protection, Mr Michael Carmody, directed the reviewing officer, Mr Jeff Buckpitt to conduct an internal review of the response to SAR 4106. His direction was with the support and endorsement of the Secretary of Defence, Chief of the Defence Force and CEO of AMSA.
3. On 27 June 2012, another vessel known as SAR 2012/4259 experienced distress and sank north of Christmas Island. On 29 June 2012, Acting CEO of Customs and Border Protection, Mr Michael Pezzullo, directed that the terms of reference be expanded to include this additional incident. While there were a number of people from this vessel that were rescued, there was at least one life lost. The terms of reference for the expanded internal review were supported and endorsed by the Secretary of Defence, Chief of the Defence Force and CEO of AMSA.
4. [REDACTED]
5. This review was not intended to be a substitute for a detailed external investigation or coronial inquiry. the reviewing officer was therefore asked to ensure that all reasonable measures were taken to ensure that there was no conflict between the review and those potential enquiries.
6. The Terms of Reference originally stated a final report should be provided on or before Friday 3 August 2012. In view of the extensions to the terms of reference the due date was extended to 27 August 2012. The original Terms of Reference and the subsequent amendments appear at Attachment A.

Constraints and limitations

7. This examination of the response to the search and rescue incidents SAR 4106 and 4259 has been conducted, in a short timeframe, as a review rather than an in-depth inquiry. By examining the facts and circumstances surrounding the response to the two incidents, it is intended to provide a narrative for each incident from the time that the first information of each venture was received to the point when search and recovery operations ceased ('the period').
8. The review draws from documentary material from all available Commonwealth Government sources, namely Customs and Border Protection, including BPC, Defence, AMSA, and other relevant Federal Government agencies with any relevant material, appropriately verified by relevant senior officials. The review team considered some draft unsettled witness statements, and had access to a small number of interviews conducted by the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC) on Christmas Island, but did not seek to have witness statements available to it. The review team relied on the documentary material and answers provided by agencies in response to specific questions raised. The narrative drafted for this review outlines those events that are relevant to the review, which can be drawn from key documentary material. This was considered sufficient for the purposes of this review and was not intended to be a conclusive finding of facts.
9. The review took into account that the events will be the subject of a coronial investigation and therefore makes no findings about the conduct of individuals or agencies. The report identifies only issues surrounding the response to the two incidents which can be identified from the material provided.

Methodology

10. Given the constraints and limitations detailed above, the following approach was taken to report against the Terms of Reference.
11. A review team comprising a total of five officers from Customs and Border Protection, Defence and AMSA was established on Wednesday 27 June 2012 and commenced work immediately. The review team was supported by a coordination team, comprising a total of four officers from various Divisions within Customs and Border Protection, also established on 27 June 2012. Nominees from Defence and AMSA represented their agencies by way of consultation and support to the reviewing officer in conducting the review.
12. The first step for the Review was to collect up all of the relevant documents and related media for each incident. Requests were sent to BPC, Intelligence and Targeting Division of Customs and Border Protection, AMSA, Defence, AFP and DIAC. In response the Review received in excess of 5,000 documents and related media. All documents received by the Review were registered, allocated a reference number and stored in a secure location in Customs and Border Protection offices.
13. Upon receipt of the documents, the focus of the review was separated into four elements - preparation of a key events chronology for each incident; preparation of a narrative for each incident; an audit of policies, processes and procedures relevant to the two incidents; and exploration of the issues identified as requiring further investigation or analysis by the review team.
14. The key events chronologies were developed following a review of each agency's chronologies and relevant documents. Key events were extracted and included in an overarching chronology for each incident.
15. Development of each narrative drew upon the overarching key events chronology as supported by the underlying source documents from each agency.
16. The relevant policies, processes and procedures applicable to the response to each incident were provided to the review team from Defence, AMSA and appropriate areas of Customs and Border Protection, including BPC. These documents were registered, allocated a reference number and stored in a secure location in Customs and Border Protection offices. A list of relevant non-national security classified policies, processes and procedures considered are set out at Attachment D. [REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]
17. The Review Team considered each of the identified policies, processes and procedures and determined a prioritisation based on applicability to the response to the two incidents. An assessment was then made as to whether application of the document would make a material difference in the outcome of the incidents. Compliance with 'Very High' priority documents was carefully assessed on a clause by clause basis, with a reducing scale of scrutiny for High, Medium and Low priorities. The purpose of this exercise was to ascertain whether these policies and procedures had been applied and taking into consideration their effectiveness to identify opportunities for improvement.
 18. The review team identified six issues requiring further investigation. Each of these issues is addressed in a separate chapter of the report:
 - the Indonesian response;
 - the positioning of assets for the search and rescue;
 - the incidence of Suspected Irregular Entry Vessels (SIEVs) issuing distress calls whilst still capable of travelling under their own steam;
 - the extent to which a fused approach to information sharing was in place for the purpose of search and rescue efforts;
 - [REDACTED] and
 - the timeliness and appropriateness of all other aspects of the Australian response.

Key source documents for the chronology and narrative

19. The narrative and chronology of key events, communications and actions for each incident was compiled from the following source documents and records:

Customs and Border Protection

- BPC Intelligence Centre Log
- BPC Operations Incident Log
- Email Communications
- People Smuggling Intelligence Analysis Team Chronology
- Australian Maritime Security Operations Centre (AMSOC) Files
- AMSOC Voice Recordings

Defence

- Logs
- Situation Reports
- Headquarters Joint Task Force 639 (HQJTF639) Watch keeper Narrative (Operations Log)
- Email Communications
- ADF Messages
- Wyvern Log

AMSA

- AMSA Incident Timeline
- Excerpts from the AMSA RCC Australia Log
- Email Communications
- Voice Recordings AMSA

Other

- AFP Watch floor records in relation to SAR 4259, including telephone calls

Consultation

20. Senior officers from relevant agencies were provided with a draft of the key events chronology and narrative for each incident. They were asked to verify the accuracy of the entries and if necessary suggest amendments. The final verified chronologies for SAR 4106 and 4259 (the Chronologies) appear at Attachments B and C of this Report. The final verified narratives appear as Chapters 2 and 3 of this report.
21. Senior officers were also provided with the opportunity to comment on a draft copy of each of the issues chapters. Although their contributions have been taken into consideration in finalising these papers, it cannot be said that they are agreed documents in every case.

Timings

22. All time references are to Australian Eastern Standard Time (AEST ie Coordinated Universal Time +10 hours), which is 3 hours ahead of local Christmas Island Time (CXT) (Coordinated Universal Time +7). Many of the events, notifications and communications referred to in the narrative of events are based on more than one source record. For example, the time of a single phone call may have been recorded and logged by the maker of the call, the receiver of the call and by electronic means. The recorded times of some calls vary by up to two or three minutes due to differences in time pieces, whether the time noted was at the beginning or end of a call and the duration of the call. For the purposes of developing the narrative of events, a single indicative time has been specified for any communication to best reflect the overall sequence of events.

Chapter 2: Narrative for the venture of 21 June 2012 – SAR 2012/4106

1.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

2.

[REDACTED]


The first series of calls from the vessel – 19 June

3. Starting at 2152 AEST on 19 June AMSA received the first of a series of seven telephone calls from the vessel. The caller was difficult to understand and the quality of the line was very poor with the noise of wind in the background. Over a period of nearly an hour, the caller communicated:
- No life jackets;
 - "No good conditions";
 - No water;
 - Don't know where we are;
 - Danger;
 - Don't have much time;
 - "Help me, help me";
 - Come from Indonesia;
 - 250 people in small boat;

4. AMSA's Rescue and Coordination Centre (RCC Australia) advised BPC at 2221 AEST that they had received a number of calls from a vessel indicating it was in distress. At 0004 AEST 20 June, a message was also sent to BASARNAS, informing them of the content of the calls received. The message asked BASARNAS to provide information regarding any vessel departures which may fit this description of the vessel. They were also asked to acknowledge receipt of the communication – [REDACTED]

The second series of calls – 20 June

5. Between 0106 and 0128 AEST on 20 June RCC Australia received two more calls from a different person on the vessel indicating that:
- We are in trouble;
 - Ship is broken on one side;
 - 204 people on board;
 - Lot of water in the boat;
 - Three days from Jakarta;
 - Help me;
 - No women or children – all men;
 - I speak Persian;
 - Don't know number of phone;
 - Situation bad;
 - Water high, water coming into ship;
 - Will ask captain for GPS and call you back;
 - Vessel position is 07 27.873 South 105 07.481 East. *First known position of 4106 vessel.*



- [REDACTED]
6. During this series of calls RCC Australia unsuccessfully attempted to use the services of a translator on two occasions. These attempts involved RCC Australia placing the caller on hold for periods of three minutes and one minute 13 seconds by which time the caller from the boat had disconnected.
 7. In response to the information concerning the location of the vessel, RCC Australia advised the caller that the vessel was still in Indonesian waters and that they needed to turn back. The caller responded with the words "ok, ok, ok" and then hung up.
 8. At 0131 AEST RCC Australia advised BPC that it had received further calls from a vessel claiming to be in distress.

BASARNAS takes responsibility for the incident

9. At 0200 AEST RCC Australia sent an email to the Jakarta First Secretary from Customs and Border Protection suggesting that he 'contact people you know and push where you can'.
10. At 0201 AEST on 20 June AMSA sent BASARNAS a message containing the latest details received about the vessel including its location. AMSA formally requested that BASARNAS take coordination of the incident given that it was within their search and rescue region. Five minutes later an officer from BASARNAS rang to advise that he needed to confirm with his supervisor about acceptance of the incident. The RCC Australia log indicates that the officer advised that confirmation would be provided by email or facsimile.

- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
13. At 0501 AEST on 20 June RCC Australia sent a second message to BASARNAS asking for their confirmation of acceptance of the incident. BASARNAS responded by telephone at 0745 and 0831 AEST. The RCC Australia log indicates that BASARNAS verbally confirmed that they would be coordinating the search and rescue response to the incident at 0745 AEST. A facsimile was subsequently received from BASARNAS at 0900 on 20 June AEST. It stated that:

"Ref all your information Augar [sic] 2012/4106 about distress vessel, was following BASARNAS action:- give urgency broadcast to all vessel closed [sic] the distress position by Indonesia Coast Radio Station, Navy and Marine Police.

BASARNAS still investigate this position and take coordination for this vessel and request your assistance if the distress vessel is going to Christmast [sic] Island closely."

Two more calls from the vessel on 20 June

14. At 0521 and 0650 AEST 20 June RCC Australia received two more calls from the vessel. The caller provided updated coordinates for the vessel (42 nautical miles south of the Sunda Strait) and again indicated that the boat was "going down in the water" and "slow because of water". The caller also stated that he didn't know the number of the phone that he was calling from. This information (including the updated coordinates) was sent to BASARNAS at 0615 AEST following the 0521 AEST phone call.
15. [REDACTED]

A vessel in distress – Or is it?

16.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

17. At 1316 AEST on 20 June RCC Australia received another call from the vessel providing an update as to its location and indicating that it was taking on water and people were crying. The updated coordinates were emailed and faxed to BASARNAS at 1345 AEST.

18.

[REDACTED]

At 1715 AEST on 20 June a Customs and Border Protection Dash-8 surveillance aircraft reported that the vessel was heading due south at four knots. The position of the vessel indicated that it had been travelling at an average speed of 2.6 knots. At 1731 AEST the Customs and Border Protection Dash-8 contacted BPC to advise that the aircraft had obtained an image of the vessel but it was difficult to assess. At that point the aircraft had remained at a covert position of five nm from the vessel. BPC directed the aircraft obtain a clearer image, and get as close as possible without being overt. By 1746 AEST the Customs and Border Protection aircraft had manoeuvred to a different position and obtained three additional still images which were returned to BPC in real time for assessment. The aircraft also advised that the vessel was low in the water, that a person was observed climbing onto the roof of the vessel, and that the vessel was heading in a southerly direction at approximately four knots. The Information concerning the location and passage of the vessel was conveyed by AMSA to BASARNAS at 1819 AEST.

19. A meeting of the People Smuggling Operations Group chaired by Customs and Border Protection collectively assessed that the vessel was not in immediate need of assistance on 20 June.
20. At 2012, 2027, 2033 and 2049 AEST on 20 June RCC Australia received four more calls from the vessel – all of which were very difficult to hear the caller – largely due to the loud humming of what sounded like an engine in the background. The caller indicated that their vessel was taking on water and that they had no (drinking) water. He indicated that they were heading to Christmas Island and that there were 206 persons

[REDACTED]

on board. On the second occasion the caller provided their phone number, which was repeated by RCC Australia. The caller said "can you please searching" and "are we now in Australian waters?" RCC Australia advised the caller that they were not in Australian waters and that they needed to come further south. The call ended abruptly. RCC Australia then attempted (2058 AEST) to ring the caller back – but without any answer.

[REDACTED] The information related to the attempt to call was conveyed to BASARNAS at 2129 AEST along with an offer to issue a maritime broadcast to shipping on HF DSC and INMARSAT C Safety Net. Later advice from BASARNAS indicated that they too had attempted to ring the vessel on the number provided by RCC Australia – but without success. (RCC Australia's next logged attempt to ring the vessel was at 1432 AEST on 21 June – again with no response.)

21. In summary the information received during the course of 20 June was anything but consistent. On the one hand calls from the vessel consistently indicated a state of distress whereas the vessel's slow but steady rate of progress, the humming of an engine in the background [REDACTED] suggested that such claims were either exaggerated or simply untrue. In addition, imagery from the Dash-8 did not indicate the vessel was in distress. The other consideration was the incidence of similar ventures where distress claims had been made – although they were able to continue to make their way towards Australia.

Communications with BASARNAS

22. Based on the facsimile message received by RCC Australia from BASARNAS and an earlier telephone call, the AMSA log was recorded as showing that BASARNAS accepted responsibility for the search and rescue effort at 0745 AEST on 20 June.
23. As previously noted RCC Australia provided BASARNAS with regular updates of information received – including sighting of the vessel by a Customs and Border Protection aircraft on 20 June, positional details, details of the calls received from the vessel (including the telephone number) and the projected routes as of 21 June. BASARNAS advised at 2018 AEST on 20 June that they had been unable to contact the vessel and that they had initiated coordination with BAKORKAMLA and the Indonesian Navy.
24. At 0047 AEST on 21 June BASARNAS rang RCC Australia on two occasions to advise that an Indonesian Navy vessel had departed at 1800 AEST (ie 1500 local time) on 20 June and was proceeding to the search area. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

25. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

26. [REDACTED]

Deployment of assets

27. [REDACTED]

As a consequence, a Dash-8 flight had been scheduled to conduct routine surveillance of approaches to Christmas Island [REDACTED]. At 1138 AEST a pre-mission brief was held between BPC AMSOC and the Dash-8 with directions to conduct normal surveillance of the [REDACTED] region and overtly relocate the vessel reported to be in distress which was sighted the previous day. By 1300 AEST the Dash-8 was already in pre flight preparations, departing Christmas Island at approximately 1321 AEST and was expected in the area of the vessel reported to be in distress at approximately 1430 AEST.

28. Informed by a heightened level of concern following a briefing from BPC Intelligence staff, Commander BPC at approximately 1300 AEST directed, that the two Christmas Island response vessels pre-position towards the northern area of the Contiguous Zone, in order to be immediately available for SAR tasking if required. This direction was provided in advance of confirmation on the status of the reported vessel in distress and in advance of any request for assets from RCC Australia.

The lead up to 21 June at Christmas Island

In the 36 hours prior to 21 June, HMAS *Wollongong* and HMAS *Larrakia* were busy responding to SIEVs in the vicinity of Christmas Island.

On 20 June HMAS *Wollongong* and *Larrakia* intercepted three SIEVs (354 - 356) carrying a total of 249 people. The associated patrolling, interception, boarding and transportation back to Christmas Island required the two vessels to work around the clock. By the time they completed transferring the people onboard the third vessel it was 0230 AEST on Thursday 21 June.

Following the offload of passengers from SIEV 356 at Christmas Island HMAS *Wollongong* was positioned [REDACTED]

29. By 1305 AEST both HMA Ships *Wollongong* and *Larrakia* had been tasked by HQJTF639 to proceed to the edge of the Contiguous Zone. Up until this point HMAS *Wollongong* and *Larrakia* had been dealing with the work associated with three SIEV interceptions on the previous day.

30. At 1250 AEST BPC requested the AMSA RCC Australia liaison officer to attend BPC for a [REDACTED] briefing. This briefing took place at 1330 AEST.

Sighting of the vessel and subsequent response on 21 June

31. At 1321 AEST the Dash-8 surveillance aircraft took off from Christmas Island to undertake its programmed surveillance of the [REDACTED] area – as well as to locate the vessel.

32. At 1458 AEST 21 June the Dash-8 located the vessel 113nm NNW of Christmas Island capsized with approximately 75 people in the water and on the upturned hull. The vessel was 109 nautical miles (ie about 200 kms) south of the Sunda Strait which is within the Indonesian Search and Rescue Region. The Dash-8 located a large number of groups of people (one being as large as 10 people) and individuals in the water in approximately a three nautical mile radius. Some groups and individuals were wearing life jackets and some were not. Some were clinging to floating debris.

- [REDACTED]
33. After several photo passes the Dash-8 aircraft tried to alert an Indonesian fishing vessel that was approximately three nm to the north. The aircraft conducted several passes at 200 ft near the vessel in the direction of the up-turned hull whilst rocking its wings to draw attention to the aircraft. Despite seeing the aircraft the foreign fishing vessel did not respond to the attempts to hail it. The Dash-8 reported all of this to BPC AMSOC. AMSA was advised of the capsized at 1500 AEST.
 34. The Customs and Border Protection surveillance aircraft remained in the search area and HMAS *Wollongong* and *Larrakia* were tasked by HQJTF639 at 1505 AEST to proceed to the location at best speed.
 35. At 1514 AEST Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQJOC) advised ROC Australia that HMAS *Wollongong* and *Larrakia* would not be able to pick up all persons onboard the vessel and requested confirmation from ROC Australia that they were sending a broadcast to merchant vessels (MV). They also requested that ROC Australia provide a tasking should they end up coordinating the incident. ROC Australia provided a verbal request for HMAS *Wollongong* and *Larrakia* and one AP-3C Orion at 1520 AEST.
 36. The Customs and Border Protection Dash-8 aircraft reported to BPC AMSOC at 1522 AEST that MVs *Cape Oceania* and *WSA Dragon* were nearby and that *Cape Oceania* was waiting for authorisation from AMSA to assist.
 37. Details of the sighting were passed by AMSA to BASARNAS at 1523 AEST including a request for details regarding any Indonesian assets that may be en route to the incident. ROC Australia also issued its first distress broadcast request to shipping at 1529 AEST 21 June. In response to the broadcast three merchant vessels responded – the container vessel *WSA Dragon* at 1540 (ETA approximately two hours), the bulk carrier *Cape Oceania* at 1616 (ETA of 1945 AEST) and the container vessel JPO *Vulpecula* at 1635 (ETA of approximately 3 hours).
 38. By 1522 AEST it was being reported that there were people up to four nautical miles from the hull. From this fact alone, it was clear that an enduring search and rescue effort would be required. A map showing the course taken by the vessel and its final location appears below.
 39. At 1552 AEST an AP-3C Orion en route to Townsville was diverted by HQJOC to assist with the SAR.



[REDACTED]

40. At 1611 AEST RCC Australia made a formal request to Defence for assistance in relation to the air and sea assets, having been re-directed from a routine surveillance task, that were by now already on their way. By 1630 AEST an AP-3C Orion (Rescue 253) had arrived on scene. This aircraft commenced the search and subsequently dropped two Air and Sea Rescue Kits (ASRKs), each containing two life rafts at 1703 and 1733 AEST.

41. By 1750 AEST the first merchant vessel, *WSA Dragon* had arrived at the scene of the incident and commenced rescuing people.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

43. At approximately 1920 AEST HMAS *Wollongong* arrived at the scene and commenced recovery operations, closely followed by HMAS *Larrakia* at 1929 AEST. HMAS *Wollongong* was designated on scene commander. An AMSA Dornier aircraft and a RAAF AP-3C Orion provided assistance throughout the night. The AMSA Dornier dropped a fifth life raft at approximately 0027 AEST on 22 June.

44. Over the period 1750 AEST to 2155 AEST 21 June HMAS *Wollongong*, HMAS *Larrakia*, merchant vessels *WSA Dragon*, *Vulpecula* and *Cape Oceania* and aircraft provided by Customs and Border Protection, RAAF and AMSA were involved in searching for survivors in the vicinity of the upturned hull.

45. At 1956 AEST on 21 June BASARNAS sent RCC Australia a facsimile message that read:

'Ref your fax No R 210542Z dated 21 June 2012 Subject SIEV with 206 POB, BASARNAS suggest to AMSA to declare a joint SAR operation with some conditions as follows:

- The main SMC is RCC Australia
- The supporting SMC is RCC Jakarta [REDACTED]
- OSC is Australian asset
- BASARNAS will facilitate to arrange flight approval SAR assets from Australian that deployed to search area.'

46. The RCC Australia response was sent at 2221 AEST accepting overall coordination for this SAR incident. As part of this response, RCC Australia again sought advice as to any Indonesian vessel may be heading for the search and rescue area, including estimated time of arrival. No response was received.

47. By 2140 AEST 110 survivors and three deceased persons had been recovered. The breakdown of these numbers was:

- HMAS *Wollongong* – 55 or 54 survivors and one deceased

note: HMAS *Wollongong* reported 54 survivors however DIAC records 55 survivors following post incident processing on Christmas Island. The correct number has not been reconciled between the two agencies;

- HMAS *Larrakia* - 16 survivors and two deceased;
- *Cape Oceania* - four survivors;
- *WSA Dragon* - eight survivors; and
- *JPO Vulpecula* - 27 survivors (including with two injuries).

48. At 2155 AEST all vessels involved in the rescue, other than HMAS *Larakia* were released from search and rescue tasking to proceed directly to Christmas Island to land the survivors and deceased.

49. [REDACTED]

22 June and thereafter

50. Early on 22 June, RCC Australia tasked four merchant vessels to relocate to the search area and to assist in the search and rescue effort (the container vessel *Margaret River Bridge*, the Bulk Carrier *Conti Selenit*, the general cargo vessel *BBC Iceland* and gas carrier *Gaschem Pacific*). Two searches were undertaken that day:
- the first involving three aircraft (the AMSA Dornier, one AP-3C Orion and a civilian aircraft VH - FMG), HMAS *Larrakia* and the four merchant vessels. The search achieved coverage of 1298 square nautical miles (Sq nm) of the 1946 Sq nm allocated to the search area as the Dornier and AP- 3C were not able to complete their search areas due to multiple sightings; and
 - the second involving six aircraft (the AMSA Dornier, one AP-3C Orion and three civilian aircraft VH-RCA, VH-TGG, VH-FMG and one Customs Dash-8) HMAS *Larrakia* and HMAS *Wollongong* and the four merchant vessels. The search achieved coverage of 1100 Sq nm of the 1227 sq nm allocated search area.
51. At 1443 AEST Jakarta First Secretary was advised by BASARANS that TNI-AL had deployed a vessel that was en route to the SAR location. This information was passed onto RCC Australia.
52. The search on the second day included checks to see whether there was any sign of life from within the capsized hull. These checks identified "many cracks running along (the) bottom of (the) hull with significant amounts of water coming out of them indicating that the hull is completely full of water" and "one side of (the) hull is damaged but not necessarily missing". Water ingress was evident through cracks in the hull planking.
53. On 23 June RCC Australia continued the search effort with another two extensive searches:
- The first involving five aircraft, HMAS *Wollongong* and two merchant vessels. It covered an area of 1500 square nautical miles; and
 - The second involving two aircraft, HMAS *Wollongong* and HMAS *Larrakia* and the two merchant vessels. It covered an area of 683 square nautical miles.
54. Weather conditions deteriorated during the search period (ie increasing wind and swell) - although the aviation search conditions were assessed as good. This assessment was based on the number of sightings reported of life jackets, debris, marine life and deceased persons. Unfortunately there were no further sightings of survivors on either 22 or 23 June.
55. Throughout this part of the search, the focus was on saving people still alive rather than retrieving the deceased. Deceased persons were only being recovered where safe to do so as part of the planned search effort. No bodies were recovered on 22 June. On 23 June HMAS *Wollongong* recovered eight bodies and HMAS *Larrakia* recovered six - bringing the total across the three day period to 17 bodies recovered. By the third day the physical condition of the bodies was quickly deteriorating, making their recovery a difficult exercise for the crew of the two navy vessels.

- [REDACTED]
56. Advice was sought from medical authorities concerning the likelihood of surviving in these conditions. That advice indicated that the chances of survival were good on 21 and 22 June with a limited chance of survival by 0600 AEST on 23 June. They assessed that there was no prospect of survival past last light on 23 June 2012. Last light at search and rescue location was 2004 AEST.
 57. AMSA suspended the search at 2015 AEST on 23 June 2012. The Defence assets were formally released from the SAR at 2306 AEST.
 58. In summary the search and rescue effort located 110 male survivors and 17 deceased persons, with approximately 75 people unaccounted for.

What we have subsequently learnt about the venture

59. Interviews of the survivors have confirmed this account – but with the following additions:
 - The vessel was heavily overloaded and this was a cause of great concern to both the crew and many of the passengers;
 - The vessel experienced problems within days of its departure and was taking on water. However, the bilge pumps were able to successfully pump water from the vessel;
 - At around 0800 AEST 21 June the boat began taking on a lot of water from one side. Many people panicked and rushed to the other side of the vessel causing it to capsize;
 - From the time that they knew that they were in trouble it took only a few minutes for the boat to capsize;
 - The passengers were in the water for around eight or nine hours before they saw a plane fly overhead. It was about another four or five hours before the boats came and rescued them;
 - The survivors from the vessel included 83 Pakistanis, 24 Afghans, one Iranian and two Indonesians.


Pages 23-24 have been redacted in full.

15:00 - 16:30 21 June 2012

☐ TRANSIT ☐ ON-STATION ☐ RETURN TRANSIT

21 JUNE

0558 v104f M520Ar



15:30 15:35 15:40 15:45 15:50 15:55 16:00 16:05 16:10 16:15 16:20 16:25 16:30

AMSA RCC-A advises First Secretary, Jakarta, ACBPS of the vessel capsizing.

Log time
15:30
Merchant Vessel WSA
DRAGON responds to
broadcast.

Images of
survivors post
to AMSA RCC-A
from BPC
(AMSOQ).

On time
15:42

Log time
15:45

AMSA RCC-A request release of
(BPC Dash B) aircraft in support of SAR
subsequently released.

Log time
15:47

BPC
(AMSOQ) is
advised of
the revised
arrival time
of RAAS
multi-me
aircraft -
ETA 16:50
AEST.

Log time
15:51

Log time
15:51

Log time
15:51

Log time
15:51

BPC SEV SITREP:
No location multi group
BPC (AMSOQ) released SITREP: 1 vessel in
distress, 11 down NW of Christmas Island.

AMSA RCC-A requests First Secretary,
Jakarta, ACBPS to travel to BASARNAS
to assist with operational coordination.

Phone call
15:59

Log time
16:13
Merchant Vessel Cape
Oceania responds to
broadcast, ETA 19:45 AEST.

First Secretary, Jakarta, ACBPS contacts BASARNAS and
advises them of situation (including coordinates) and makes
arrangements for meeting.

Log time
16:17

Phone call
16:17
AMSOQ

BPC Dash B advised Merchant Vessel CAPE OCEANIA is not responding. Merchant Vessel
WSA DRAGON is travelling toward the SAR incident. ETA approximately 1 hour. All possible rescue
actions initiated and being carried out. They have sent photos to BPC (AMSOQ).

BPC (AMSOQ)
BPC Dash B
advises they will be
PLE 17:50 AEST.

Log time
15:52
AMSOQ

UNKNOWN RECEIVER
BASARNAS (AARAGAS) and (AELIOMZING)
down force assigned for SAR.

Phone call
15:50
PSMAT

PSMAT advises First Secretary, Jakarta,
ACBPS of the vessel capsizing.

Phone call
15:57
First Secretary,
Jakarta, ACBPS

BASARNAS
AMSA RCC-A requests
approval for Australia SAR
assets to operate within
the Indonesian defence
identification zone.

Phone call
16:05
First Secretary,
Jakarta, ACBPS

BANORANILA
advised of the vessel
capsizing.

Phone call
16:05
First Secretary,
Jakarta, ACBPS

Phone call
16:15
First Secretary, Jakarta, ACBPS

RCC-A advises First Secretary, Jakarta,
ACBPS of coordinates of SAR incident and
requests the bases with BASARNAS to
ascertain actions taken being taken.

Phone call
16:25
First Secretary,
Jakarta, ACBPS

First Secretary, Jakarta,
ACBPS advises BAS Jakarta
Taskforce representatives the
coordinates of SAR incident.

22 JUNE

23:00

21:00

04:00

02:00

01:00

24:00

25:00

26:00

27:00

Pages 27-36 are in relation to SAR 2012/4259.

Chapter 4: Assessment against policies, processes and procedures

Findings

Customs and Border Protection, AMSA and Defence substantially complied with all identified policies, processes and procedures. Minor non-compliances did not materially affect the outcome of the search and rescue efforts.

The Protocol for Vessels with a Changed State, although generally sound, would benefit from revision to reflect the lessons learned from the recent SAR events. Revisions to the document were being finalised at the time of writing this report.

Navy crew members retrieving deceased bodies from the water were potentially put at risk by the lack of standard operating procedures for this activity. These personnel would benefit from the documentation of a suitable procedure addressing psychological screening, techniques and equipment for recovering bodies from the water and their storage.

Introduction

1. The Review's Terms of Reference (paragraphs 4b, c and d) require that an assessment be made as to whether the relevant policies, processes and procedures were applied during the two incidents, whether they were effective, and whether any changes should be made so as to improve the response to any future similar occurrences.
2. The Review went about this part of its role through two separate approaches. The first approach was to undertake an 'audit like' assessment as to whether there had been compliance with the relevant policies, processes and procedures. The second approach was to examine the major issues that were clearly relevant to the two incidents. The purpose of this chapter is to report on the first of these two approaches. The result of the second approach is reported in Chapters 5 to 10 of the Report.
3. The Reviewing officer requested Customs and Border Protection, the Defence and the AMSA provide all relevant policies, processes and procedures applicable to the search and rescue and response operations. Those considered relevant to the Review are listed in Attachment D.
4. The Review considered each of the identified policies, processes and procedures and determined a prioritisation based on applicability to the response to the two incidents. An assessment of whether application of the document would make a material difference to the outcomes from the incidents was made. Compliance with very high priority documents was assessed on a clause by clause basis, with a reducing level of scrutiny for high, medium and low priorities.

Very high importance policies, processes and procedures

5. The policies, processes and procedures assessed as 'very high' direct the required responses to SAR 4106 and 4259. The level of compliance with key requirements from these documents directly influenced the likelihood of a successful search and rescue operation. These documents comprised:
 - Australia's National Search and Rescue Manual NATSARMAN;
 - Defence SAR Instructions: AFTP1(C) Chapter 205 and DI(G) OPS 47-1;
 - Arrangement between Australia and Indonesia for the Coordination of Search and Rescue Services; and
 - Classified Information Management Procedures including Protocol for Vessels with a Changed State – [REDACTED] SOLAS Situations.
6. International experience in maritime search and rescue over many years has been distilled into NATSARMAN. It is a key document for AMSA, Customs and Border Protection and Defence, either directly or indirectly as reflected in supporting documents such as Chapter 205 of AFTP1(C) 'Search and Rescue and Salvage' and some of Customs and Border Protection Instructions and Guidelines. NATSARMAN and these associated documents prescribe well proven and standardised procedures, authority chains, and techniques that provide the most effective and timely response practices, compliant with international and Australian law and agreements. They seek to minimise confusion by standardising terminology and minimising duplication or nugatory effort through clearly defined roles and responsibilities.
7. An assessment of the three main response agencies (AMSA, Customs and Border Protection and Defence) determined a high degree of compliance with NATSARMAN and each organisation's associated documents. Minor non-compliances were identified in reporting and record keeping, but these were assessed as not having a material outcome on the events.
8. The document 'Arrangement between Australia and Indonesia for the Coordination of Search and Rescue Services' was assessed as being of very high importance as it is intended to facilitate timely coordination and response to search and rescue incidents. Australian authorities were assessed as largely compliant with the agreement. Records of communication from BASARNAS suggest BASARNAS personnel sought to comply with the agreement by accepting coordination responsibility of SAR 4106 from RCC Australia and consequently requesting assistance from suitable Indonesian rescue assets. As the relationship between AMSA and BASARNAS is considered critical to search and rescue efforts north of Christmas Island, this issue is considered in detail in Chapter 5.
9. The chance of a successful outcome of a search and rescue operation significantly reduces with the passage of time, making the speed with which an operation is planned and carried out critical. The flow of important information from disparate sources is therefore critical if delays are to be avoided. Consequently, Defence and Customs and Border Protection processes and policies associated with information flows are considered to be of very high importance. These include the *Protocol for Vessels with a Changed State* – [REDACTED] [REDACTED] SOLAS Situations, and two relevant Defence Classified Information Management Procedures.
10. The *Protocol for Vessels with a Changed State* – [REDACTED] SOLAS Situations was written with the aim of ensuring that information giving rise to an apprehension or concern for the safety of a vessel is appropriately communicated to AMSA as soon as possible. The Protocol [REDACTED] [REDACTED] contains both a set of principles and a detailed checklist of communications that should be observed [REDACTED]

11. [REDACTED] The Internal Review found that the agencies involved were mostly compliant with the Protocol. To the extent that there were differences, these were not material in terms of the actual outcome. Areas of incomplete compliance included:
- Some of the logs and records of the incident were relatively basic lacking some of the detail that has subsequently been identified; and
 - AMSA did not categorise the information concerning a change of state into one of the three search and rescue definitions (Distress/Alert/Uncertainty) at the time that the information was received. AMSA considers that the categorisation information serves no useful purpose in the context of the protocol and has recommended its removal.
12. Although generally sound, the Protocol would benefit from revision to reflect the lessons learned from the recent SAR events. The Review provided BPC with a number of suggestions as to how the Protocol could be enhanced. Revisions to the document were being finalised at the time of writing this report.
13. The Review also assessed the actions of relevant agencies sharing important information [REDACTED] leading up to and during the incidents against other policies, processes and procedures, and concluded they materially complied with the policies identified as relevant.
14. On the issue of timeliness, [REDACTED] the speed with which BPC conveyed this information to AMSA were considered appropriate. No evidence was found of significant delays that could have been avoided by closer compliance or improved policies. A more detailed assessment of the flow of information between agencies is provided in Chapter 9.

High priority policies, processes and procedures

15. AMSA, Customs and Border Protection and Defence each have numerous instructions and procedures that define responsibilities and internal processes associated with maritime search and rescue. These documents were carefully assessed, recognising that their application usually requires a level of individual judgement.
16. Only minor non-compliances against the various relevant Customs and Border Protection (including BPC) Instructions and Guidelines were identified. These included deficiencies such as dates, times, names or other details required by instructions and guidelines missing from message pads, communication records or logs. The review team determined these omissions as not having a material impact on the outcome of the search and rescue in the SAR 4106 or 4259. It was noted that Customs National Operations Centre (CNOC) has recognised the possibility of key information being lost through poor recording of phone calls and has recently upgraded their phone recording system to allow immediate review. A CNOC officer can now immediately review the recording for information that might be relevant to a judgement about ship distress procedures being initiated.
17. Defence elements, such as the Joint Command Centre (JCC) in HQJCC use internal procedures to simplify application of more formal defence instruction (such as the DI(G) OPS and AFTP1(C) series. JCC Bench Level Instructions (BLI) 135 -- Search and Rescue Operations, and JPRO Checklist are examples of these. No significant non-compliances from these documents were identified, nor were any inconsistencies identified with the associated formal instructions.
18. AMSA uses an electronic Emergency Procedures Manual (EPM) as its reference for SAR related procedures and checklists. Eighteen (18) of these documents were assessed as relevant to the two incidents, of which the Review considered 14 in some detail. [REDACTED] and a small number of other minor non-compliances. It was assessed that none of these issues had a material impact on the SAR operations.

Medium and low priority policies, processes and procedures

19. A large number of policies, processes and procedures were assessed as medium or low importance to these search and rescue incidents, including policies of a general nature with limited relevance to the review, or that identified organisational responsibilities but provided limited specific direction.
20. The Guide to Australian Maritime Security Arrangements (GAMSA) documents Australian Governments' responsibilities for managing security maritime threats, and only peripherally mentions responsibilities for SOLAS or search and rescue. Customs and Border Protection (including BPC) and other agencies responsibilities for managing Irregular Maritime Arrivals (IMA) are identified, and the Review Team assessed that these responsibilities were met during these incidents. Similarly, the Agreement between Australia and the Republic of Indonesia on the Framework for Security Cooperation only peripherally mentions maritime safety, with its primary focus on security.

Additional policies, processes and procedures

21. The Review also considered whether additional Policies, Processes or Procedures should be developed to benefit the response to future incidents.
22. The Review noted that in SAR 4106 the recovery of deceased bodies from the water and their temporary storage potential exposed ships' crews to a number of risks. These risks should be mitigated with suitably documented Standard Operating Procedures addressing psychological screening to determine crew suitability for operations that might require this activity, as well as techniques, equipment and supplies suitable for recovering and storing deceased bodies.

Recommendation 4.1

It is recommended the Department of Defence and Customs and Border Protection should produce Standard Operating Procedures for dealing with the recovery of bodies from the water and their storage.

Chapter 5: The Indonesian response

Findings

Although BASARNAS accepted coordination of SAR 4106 from 0745 AEST on 20 June to 2221 AEST on 21 June,

Introduction

1. Understanding the Indonesian search and rescue capability is important for two reasons. Firstly, Christmas Island is geographically located within Indonesia's SRR. Although AMSA and BASARNAS have an understanding (set out in the SAR Arrangement) that Australia will plan for local SAR response at Christmas Island – this does not extend much beyond the territorial waters surrounding Christmas Island. Secondly, the Indonesian authorities accepted responsibility for the search and rescue efforts in relation to SAR 4106 for the most critical period of recovery activity. The same cannot be said of SAR 4259; although the Indonesians did play a very small part.
2. This chapter examines the Indonesian response to the SARs 4106 and 4259. It commences by explaining the similarities and differences between Australian and Indonesian search and rescue capabilities and then examines Indonesia's response to the two incidents.

Comparison of the Australian and Indonesian search and rescue capabilities

The similarities

3. AMSA and BASARNAS, the Australian and Indonesian search and rescue agencies operate under a common international framework for maritime search and rescue. Specifically the rendering of assistance to mariners in distress is managed within a number of international conventions, including:
 - the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, 1979 (the SAR Convention) (ch 2 2.1), to which AMSA is a signatory; Indonesia is not a signatory to this convention;
 - the International Convention for the SOLAS 1974 (as amended) (the SOLAS Convention). Both Australia and Indonesia are signatories to this convention; and
 - the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS) (see article 98).
4. Australia is a Party to all these Conventions. Indonesia is a Party to SOLAS and UNCLOS but not the Maritime SAR Convention (although it is understood that they now intend acceding to this Convention.) The Maritime SAR Convention is much more specific about national responsibilities and operating requirements for rescue coordination centres (RCCs).

- [REDACTED]
5. Consistent with these Conventions, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) sponsor the International Aviation and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual (IAMSAR). This manual sets the international standard for search and rescue. Both Australia and Indonesia have developed national procedures consistent with IAMSAR.
 6. A key document governing the Indonesian/Australian SAR relationship is the SAR Arrangement. Australia aims to have a SAR Arrangement with which each country that it shares a common SAR coordination boundary. The SAR Arrangement is developed consistent with the Maritime SAR Convention and is used to confirm the coordinates of the SAR coordination boundary and to define coordination arrangements for incidents on or near the boundary. The document also sets out how the two nations will cooperate in SAR operations and support each other when requested.
 7. The arrangements between Indonesia and Australia require that the first SAR authority to learn of a distress situation retains coordination and commences response action until coordination is passed to the SAR authority responsible for the SRR. For incidents on or near the SRR boundary, it is to be resolved through discussion between Search and Rescue Mission Coordinators (SMCs) which SAR authority is best placed to take overall coordination with the other SAR authority acting in support.

The differences

8. The mandate for BASARNAS is much broader than that of AMSA search and rescue program. Their main focus is local emergency service activities much like our State Emergency Services. This is reflected in the BASARNAS focus, provincial structure, equipment and capabilities.
9. BASARNAS has many thousands of personnel spread across the provinces. Their organisation is postured to respond to natural disasters rather than maritime and aviation SAR. Although the BASARNAS headquarters has some operational capability, the normal practice is to delegate SAR response to one of the many (20+) rescue coordination centres (RCCs) or rescue sub-centres (RSCs) spread across the country. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

How AMSA and BASARNAS work together

15. Communications during a SAR incident take place by telephone between the RCC Australia SMC and Headquarters BASARNAS. To overcome any confusion or misunderstanding each communication is followed by a facsimile message confirming the conversation. RCC Australia has pre-formatted messages which are used for this purpose.
16. The relationship with BASARNAS is positive and has developed over many years. AMSA has been involved in running SAR training courses in Indonesia since the late 1990s. More recently the SAR projects sponsored by the Indonesian Transport Safety Assistance Package (ITSAP) since 2007 have added to our mutual understanding and cooperation. The ITSAP programme has provided capacity building activities with AMSA providing technical assistance.
17. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Recommendation 5.1

Subject to funding being provided, Australia assist BASARNAS by providing support for greater access to a maritime shipping picture and Inmarsat satellite communications capability through capacity building.

Recommendation 5.2

Pending Indonesia obtaining the enhanced capability referred to in Recommendation 5.1 it is recommended that RCC Australia should be pro-active in offering and making Inmarsat satellite broadcasts when the circumstances of the SAR incident dictate that it is the appropriate action.

Liaison arrangements

26. Throughout SAR 4106 RCC Australia kept BASARNAS informed of all new information which came to hand including sighting reports and information from telephone calls. RCC Australia used the assistance of a Customs and Border Protection officer at the Australian Embassy Jakarta to communicate with BASARNAS and other Indonesian agencies throughout the incident. The initial communication to this officer provided details of the incident and a request for assistance from BASARNAS. The involvement of this officer was an informal arrangement, but one that was highly appropriate to a post such as Jakarta. Given the patchy nature of the workload for an AMSA liaison role at Jakarta, it would be appropriate that this task be formally adopted by an agency already located at the Jakarta Post. The relationships that Customs and Border Protection has in Indonesia would make it well placed to serve this role.


Recommendation 5.3

That the Customs and Border Protection Jakarta Post be given a formal authorisation by AMSA to serve as a local point of liaison during SAR incidents of concern to Australia.

27. More effective coordination between BASARNAS and RCC Australia during SAR operations could also be promoted by the exchange and embedding of operational SAR personnel. These personnel could have a real impact during SAR operations, enhancing communications and mutual understanding. Additionally, these officers can participate in a mentoring and information exchange program.

Recommendation 5.4

It is recommended that, subject to funding being provided, the operational exchange program be expanded between BASARNAS and RCC Australia.

28. The Review is aware that some of these proposals are also being considered as part of a separate exercise aimed at developing a package of capacity building measures for Indonesian search and rescue activities. The Review has not been involved in that work, but is supportive of the initiatives under consideration.
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Recommendation 5.5

It is recommended that AMSA, Customs and Border Protection and Defence should work with BASARNAS and other Indonesian agencies as appropriate to establish an Indonesian process to provide rapid clearance for SAR aircraft to refuel at Indonesian airports during SAR operations. This process should apply to both ADF and State aircraft.

SAR 4259 – Indonesian actions

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Chapter 6:

Positioning of assets for search and rescue

Findings

The Review finds that the BPC assets were appropriately located consistent with their mission and to support the two SAR incidents, and the short term variations against the Commander BPC's quarterly plan increased BPC's capacity to respond. These variations reflected both good intelligence and good judgement on the part of BPC officers.

In view of these findings the Review makes no recommendations concerning the positioning of BPC assets.

The positioning of the AMSA aviation search and rescue capability has not been formally reassessed during the period of the increased risk in relation to SIEVs approaching from the north west of Australia.

Introduction

1. This paper considers the assets available to respond to search and rescue requests north of Christmas Island. The paper is structured in three parts:
 - The assets available to be tasked with search and rescue support north of Christmas Island;
 - The positioning and use of assets for SARs 4106 and 4259; and
 - Other related issues requiring comment.

PART ONE – The assets available for search and rescue activity north of Christmas Island

2. Figure 1 shows the incidence of SIEVs in distress or potential SOLAS situations as determined from BPC records. Of particular note is the increasing number of SOLAS incidents in the vicinity of Christmas Island as shown by the larger proportion of incidents in 2012 as compared to previous years.
3. Responsibility for coordination of maritime search and rescue lies with local authorities (such as the AFP) for incidents in the vicinity of port limits, with AMSA within Australia's SRR and BASARNAS within Indonesia's SRR. However, the arrangements between Australia and Indonesia for the coordination of search and rescue services recognises that one or other Rescue Coordination Centre may be more favourably placed by reason of better communications, proximity to the search area, more readily available SAR units or facilities, or any other reasons, even when it is not in their SRR, and this RCC Australia should control the mission. It should be noted that the vast majority of the area north of Christmas Island is within the Indonesian Search and Rescue Region (as shown in figure 1).
4. By virtue of the limited time window available to effect a successful search and rescue, the assets for any search and rescue activity north of Christmas Island will be the assets in the vicinity and will often include:
 - (i) Commercial vessels and aircraft;
 - (ii) ADF and Customs and Border Protection vessels conducting Border Protection tasks;
 - (iii) ADF and Customs and Border Protection aircraft conducting Border Protection Tasks;
 - (iv) AMSA Dornier aircraft; and
 - (v) Indonesian Government vessels and aircraft.




Figure 1 – SIEV Potential SOLAS or Vessel in Distress 2010-2012

(i) Commercial vessels

5. Maritime people smuggling ventures targeting Christmas Island typically transit in the vicinity of major shipping routes. Hundreds of merchant vessels transit through Sunda Strait to Western Australia every year. Numerous fishing vessels are also typically located in the vicinity.
6. In the event of a SAR incident in the vicinity of Christmas Island, AMSA requests the assistance of merchant vessels through a broadcast to shipping in the area of interest by both INMARSAT (International Maritime Satellite) and HF radio.
7. The International Maritime Organization's SOLAS Convention obliges merchant vessels in the vicinity of a SOLAS incident to render assistance. Countries that have ratified the United Nations Conventions on the Law of the Sea and the SOLAS Conventions are able to prosecute their flagged ships that fail to render assistance.
8. Despite a general obligation under the SOLAS Convention, not all nearby merchant vessels will render assistance in a SAR incident. The associated costs and time involved with assisting in SAR incidents are often large deterrents. Negative experiences, such as those of *MV Sea Fortune* in July 2012 (see the explanation in the box below), will likely elevate these concerns.

On 16 July 2012, MV *Sea Fortune* responded to a request for assistance issued by AMSA's RCC Australia. The MV *Sea Fortune* rescued 11 Sri Lankan nationals from their sinking fishing boat in the Indian Ocean.

The MV *Sea Fortune* was carrying a full load of 65,000 mt of soya beans from Argentina, destined for China. The intermediate bunkering port was Singapore – where the MV *Sea Fortune* arrived on 22 July 2012.

Upon arrival in Singapore, a Sri Lankan consul official and the Singapore Immigration Authority interviewed the Sri Lankan nationals and issued them with passports to Sri Lanka. The Sri Lankan nationals however refused to go back to their country, seeking political asylum.

The Sri Lankan nationals were consequently prohibited from disembarking, and the MV *Sea Fortune* was told to set sail. The vessel's crew and ship security and safety was jeopardised, and remained in port suffering financial losses with each day it remained stationary.

MV *Sea Fortune* remained in port for many days longer than it had originally intended.

(ii) ADF and Customs and Border Protection vessels

9. Although BPC has no defined responsibility for coordination of search and rescue responses, its vessels respond to safety incidents at sea in accordance with the IMO SOLAS convention. This is reflected in its Practice Statement PS2012/03 which reads:

"The surveillance conducted by BPC is for law enforcement purposes and not as a safety monitoring measure for ships at sea, nor for aviation security regulation purposes. ... BPC does not coordinate search and rescue (SAR) response, but its assets do respond to emergencies at sea in accordance with international obligations. When this occurs, BPC response assets are under the control of the AMSA, who have statutory responsibility for coordination of SAR."

10. BPC utilises vessels which are assigned from the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and Customs and Border Protection for the purpose of conducting civil maritime security operations throughout the Australian maritime domain (including the Southern Ocean). These vessels comprise:
- Eight Bay Class vessels funded for 2400 patrol days per year;
 - ACV *Ashmore Guardian* providing a near permanent presence at Ashmore Reef;
 - ACV *Triton* funded for 240 days patrol in northern waters;
 - ACV *Ocean Protector* funded for 120 patrol days;
 - Seven *Armidale* Class Patrol Boats (ACPB) per day surging to nine (currently six are assigned due to a temporary but dedicated ACPB maintenance regime).
11. From time to time, ADF also assigns other surface assets, such as Hydrographic Ships (HS), Mine Hunter Coastals (MHC) or major fleet units (such as ANZAC Class frigates or Amphibious Ships) when required due to non-availability of ACPBs or high operational tempo, predominantly for long haul transport to Christmas Island.

12. The number and location of the assets that will be positioned in the vicinity of Christmas Island during any period is determined by an assessment of threat and documented in the Commander BPC's Scheme of Manoeuvre. Planning commences up to nine months in advance based on input from BPC's 26 client agencies regarding threats and priorities in the various areas. This information is collated with vessel, aircraft and crew requirements (including maintenance periods) and the plans are agreed with client agencies. From this, BPC Commander's Scheme of Manoeuvre (Intent) is developed to form the basis for short term planning and daily positioning of ships and aircraft. The March 2012 Scheme of Manoeuvre states:

[REDACTED]

13. The transit time for ships from Darwin to Christmas Island is four to five days. Consequently, it is necessary to plan well in advance for operations out of Christmas Island which substantially reduce the capability to provide surface vessel presence in other areas. The combination of transit time, maintenance and crewing requirements means that in order to have one vessel continuously on station at Christmas Island, a total of up to three vessels have to be dedicated to this activity. Similarly up to six vessels are required to maintain a presence of two vessels at Christmas Island.


The ADF is required to provide one aircraft at 12 hours notice to move (NTM) for national SAR duties. These duties rotate between C-130s and AP-3C Orions. Any need for more than one SAR capable aircraft is above the national SAR responsibilities and those stipulated within the relevant ADF preparedness directives. A C-130 response is normally from RAAF Richmond, so for a SAR North of Christmas Island, the crew would struggle to make it without a refuel and would provide minimal on-station time (if any) before they run out of crew duty.

(iii) ADF and Customs and Border Protection aircraft assigned to BPC

14. Air surveillance and response assets currently available to BPC include ADF's AP-3C Orion maritime surveillance and response aircraft (ADF assigns three AP-3C Orion aircraft and two crews to BPC) and Customs and Border Protection leased Dash-8 surveillance aircraft.
15. Customs and Border Protection contracts surveillance services from Cobham Aviation Services using ten Dash-8 aircraft. These aircraft are assigned to BPC for the purpose of conducting civil maritime security tasking and are normally based in Cairns, Broome and Darwin. Surveillance flights to the north of Christmas Island are currently scheduled on a near daily basis in accordance with Commander BPC's Scheme of Manoeuvre and daily threat assessment. The relevant part of Commander BPC Scheme of Manoeuvre (Q2 (Apr-Jun) 2012 - COMBPC Intent - Aerial Surveillance) states:

[REDACTED]

16. Note that [REDACTED] is one of the Designated Surveillance Areas (DSAs) as shown in figure 2.



(iv) AMSA Dornier aircraft

17. AMSA leases five dedicated Dornier 328 turbo-prop aircraft from AeroRescue. These aircraft are based in Perth, Darwin, Melbourne, Cairns and Brisbane. They provide dedicated SAR services contracted to be available at 30 minutes notice in daytime, one hour at night. They carry a standard load of SAR equipment that includes two life rafts that can be air dropped to the distressed vessels and survivors. AMSA also has arrangements with other aircraft operators for the provision of opportunity SAR services. These include the provision of rescue capable helicopters with the capability to deploy life rafts and fixed wing aircraft to undertake visual search and homing to distress beacons.




Figure 3. AMSA Dornier Callouts 2011-12

18. AMSA position their aircraft in accordance with their contracts and Joint Standard Operating Procedures (JSOPs). The basing of aircraft is determined by the frequency, duration and location of incidents, the presence of opportunity SAR assets and the ability of the aircraft operator to adequately support the aircraft. Figure 3 shows that during 2011/12, Dornier callouts tended to be along the eastern coast of Australia, from Cape York to Tasmania; clustered around Darwin and Perth; the remainder was spread across the search and rescue region. This is consistent with the distribution of the population and maritime and air traffic, although recent mass SAR incidents (including 4106 and 4259) may suggest that there would be a greater focus to the north-west of Australia if the number of lives in distress was indicated rather than individual callouts.
19. In relation to search and rescue incidents north of Christmas Island AMSA normally calls on either the Perth or Darwin based Dornier. Flying times from these locations to Christmas Island are typically five and five and a half hours from Perth and Darwin respectively, although aircraft will usually refuel at Learmonth or Port Hedland, adding approximately 30 minutes flying time, but reducing the requirement to use Christmas Island's limited aviation fuel.
20. The Review was advised that there has not been a formal assessment of the positioning of Dorniers within the last few years.

Recommendation 6.1

AMSA should reassess whether its aviation search and rescue capabilities are appropriately located having regard to the workloads, the risks associated with SIEVs and the potential impact on other SAR operations within Australia.

PART TWO – Positioning and use of the assets for SARs 4106 and 4259

BPC assets on 21 June 2012 with reference to SAR 4106

21. The assets that were released to AMSA for the purposes of supporting SAR 4106 included ADF assets: HMAS *Wollongong*, HMAS *Larrakia* and an AP-3C Orion which had been assigned to BPC for civil maritime operations immediately prior to release. A Customs and Border Protection Dash-8 was also released from BPC for the purposes of the SAR response. The disposition of available BPC surface vessels and planned maritime surveillance sorties on 21 June 2012 is shown in figures 4 and 5 below. HMAS *Wollongong* was restricted by the unserviceability of one of its two Rigid Hull Inflatable Boats (RHIBs), which reduced its ability to board vessels or retrieve survivors.

The period leading up to SAR 4106

In the period leading up to SAR 4106, HMAS *Wollongong* and HMAS *Larrakia* were tasked by BPC as the Christmas Island response vessels. The vessels maintained primary responsibility for interception of SIEVs in vicinity of Christmas Island. [REDACTED] anticipated arrivals from 19 June 2012 combined with a significant number of un-alerted (i.e. unforecast) arrivals required response assets to be available within the 24 nm Contiguous Zone at Christmas Island. On 20 June 2012 BPC Intelligence Centre (BPCIC) assessed that four SIEVs were likely to arrive at Christmas Island between 20 - 25 June 2012 carrying approximately 500 people. A further two ventures were being monitored for expected arrival immediately after this period. By 21 June 2012 BPCIC assessed three imminent arrivals were likely at Christmas Island, with a further three ventures being monitored for subsequent arrival. This assessment did not include any additional allowance for potential un-alerted SIEV arrivals.¹

On the evening of Tuesday 19 June 2012, HMAS *Wollongong* was directed to maintain radar and visual watch over the western approaches to Christmas Island with the support of HMAS *Larrakia*. The vessels were directed to intercept two Contacts of Interest (COIs) detected earlier by BPC surveillance aircraft, once they entered the Australian Contiguous Zone. By midnight on 19 June 2012, the two earlier identified COIs were still to the west of Christmas Island and yet to reach the Australian Contiguous Zone.

At approximately 0605 AEST on 20 June 2012, HMAS *Wollongong* boarded the previously sighted COI, now known as SIEV 354. At 0750 AEST HMAS *Larrakia* boarded the second COI, now known as SIEV 355. At 0947 and 1100 AEST HMA ships *Wollongong* and *Larrakia* transferred the people from SIEVs 354 and 355 respectively to Flying Fish Cove. By 1133, HMAS *Larrakia* had completed the transfer of the people from SIEV 354 and commenced preparation of a condition report for SIEV 355. HMAS *Wollongong* reconstituted in preparation to head west and intercept a further COI identified as approaching the Australian Contiguous Zone west of Christmas Island.

At 1400 on 20 June 2012, BPC directed the scheduled Dash-8 surveillance flight depart to relocate a COI in order to expedite HMAS *Wollongong* interception. During this sortie, the Dash-8 also sighted a further COI (now known as SAR 2012/4106) located approximately 165 nautical miles north of Christmas Island, and heading in a southerly direction at approximately 4 knots.

At approximately 2007 AEST on 20 June 2012, HMAS *Wollongong* intercepted and boarded a COI, now known as SIEV 356.

[REDACTED] On arrival SIEV 356 was found to have 117 people onboard. On the basis of the large number of people expected, it was necessary to deploy both ACPBs to conduct the interception and boarding to address the risks posed by the relatively large sized venture. Post the intercept of SIEV 356, precautionary measures were initiated to ensure that both response vessels would be available overnight if circumstances changed and a response vessel was required. This was also regarded as necessary given the large number of ventures, and people, assessed as likely to arrive at the island. Options were put to Christmas Island authorities to either achieve a night-time transfer of people from SIEV 356 or, in the event that the ACPBs were required to deploy from the island, be prepared to take custody of SIEV 356 and its passengers until a transfer of the people ashore could be achieved. Ultimately, a night-time transfer was conducted, and HMAS *Wollongong* maintained custody of the hulk of SIEV 356 over night.

HMAS *Wollongong* planned to destroy the hulk of SIEV 356 on the morning of 21 June 2012. It was also planned that HMAS *Larrakia* would transit back to Darwin for other tasking.

1. The un-alerted arrival rate for June 2012 was 33% of total arrivals. In practice, this means asset disposition for law enforcement purposes must provide residual capacity to respond to the real possibility of un-alerted arrivals.

22. Given concerns in relation to the vessel approaching Christmas Island, HMAS *Larrakia* was retained at Christmas Island and both vessels were ordered to be prepared to respond. [REDACTED] HMAS *Wollongong* secured SIEV 356 so it could be left and would not be a danger to navigation whilst HMAS *Larrakia* curtailed stand down for fatigue management. This decision showed good judgement given the events that were about to unfold.




Figure 4 – Positioning of BPC Maritime Response Assets 21 June 2012



Figure 5 – Planned Maritime Surveillance Sorties 21 Jun 12

- [REDACTED]
23. At 1300 AEST (1000 Christmas Island local time), Commander BPC directed HMAS *Larrakia* and HMAS *Wollongong* proceed to the north of Christmas Island to the boundary of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) towards the expected arrival path of the approaching vessel. Both HMA Ships *Larrakia* and *Wollongong* were reconstituting after a 36 hour period of continuous operations/boardings, and a late night transfer of the people from SIEV 356 at Christmas Island (See text box). HMAS *Larrakia* was at Flying Fish Cove buoys refuelling. HMAS *Wollongong* was patrolling in vicinity of Flying Fish Cove but had a boarding party on the hulk of SIEV 356 to assess if the vessel was at risk of sinking at the buoys. HMAS *Larrakia* was required to slip from moorings, and HMAS *Wollongong* needed to recover her boarding party from the hulk of SIEV 356. Despite tasking associated with the earlier arrivals, the two ACPBs were near the northern edge of the Contiguous Zone as ordered at the time when the vessel (now known as SAR 4106) was observed as capsized by the Dash-8.
 24. At 1505 AEST, the Dash-8 reported sighting of the capsized vessel, and both patrol boats were ordered to proceed at best speed.
 25. In the lead up to SAR 4106 BPC had seen an increasing need to deploy an AP-3C Orion for surveillance of the broadening of the approach corridors to include the Cocos Keeling Islands. An Orion aircraft was therefore regularly flying from Learmonth to the Cocos Keeling Islands conducting routine aerial surveillance.
 26. Consistent with the Commander BPC's assessment as to the risk associated with Christmas Island, a Customs and Border Protection Dash-8 had been based at Christmas Island since 18 June 2012 to maintain capability to provide surveillance over Christmas Island approaches while the Orion was covering Cocos Keeling Islands. The Dash-8 was undertaking daily surveillance flights of the Christmas Island approaches informed by the status of threat on each day.
 27. On 20 June 2012 the Dash-8 surveillance flight for the Christmas Island approaches was scheduled to depart Christmas Island at 1600 AEST. However, at 1348 AEST BPC requested an early departure [REDACTED]. This flight departed at approximately 1500 AEST to investigate another vessel and then transit to the latest location of the vessel associated with SAR 4106. It sighted the SAR 4106 vessel from a distance of about 3 nm at 1715 AEST, noting that it was underway.
 28. On 21 June 2012 the Dash-8 surveillance flight was scheduled to depart from Christmas Island at 1300 AEST. The aircraft departed at 1321 AEST and detected the now capsized SAR 4106 vessel at 1458 AEST. It maintained station on the vessel until it refuelled at Christmas Island at 1810 AEST and returned to the incident site at 1914 AEST.
 29. BPC diverted the AP-3C Orion from its planned surveillance of the Cocos Keeling Islands approaches to the SAR 4106 area. The Orion dropped two Air and Sea Rescue Kits (each containing 2 life rafts and other supplies) and maintained station over the capsized vessel until 2107 AEST.

AMSA Dorniers on 21 June 2012

30. The Dorniers based at Perth and Darwin were both available on the ground at their respective bases when AMSA requested assistance at 1510 AEST 21 June 2012. They had to transit via Learmonth to refuel and collect additional crew and an engineer in order to be effective at Christmas Island, requiring a total response time from tasking to on-station of nine hours for the Perth aircraft. The aircraft responding to SAR 4106 also collected a life raft from Learmonth.

Life rafts on 21 June 2012

31. Five life rafts capable of carrying a total of approximately 40 people were deployed by aircraft for SAR 4106. The first four life rafts from aircraft were deployed approximately 10 hours after the assessed time of capsizing – by which time it is assessed that most people would have been too exhausted to get themselves into the life rafts. However, dropping a life raft, regardless of time in the water, is a morale booster for survivors. Life rafts are configured so that those who don't have the energy to board them can hold onto the outside webbing.

Commercial vessels on 21 June 2012

32. Five commercial vessels offered assistance to SAR 4106 in response to the Dash-8 relaying the Mayday at 1500 AEST 21 June 2012. MVs *MV Cape Oceania*, *WSA Dragon* and *JPO Vulpecula* assisted while *MV Lampang* and *MV Marta* offered assistance but were informed they were not required by AMSA. [REDACTED]



33. [REDACTED]

34. BPC aircraft surveillance records also indicate that there were numerous fishing vessels that were very close to the SAR location. These include five Type 4 vessels (motorised fishing vessels greater than 20m length) and two Type 3 vessels (up to 15m motorised vessels) that were located between where the SAR 4106 vessel capsized and where it had drifted by 22 June 2012. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] None of these vessels responded to the Mayday relay. Most would not have carried any sophisticated radio equipment and hence were unlikely to have received a Mayday relay or been aware that the SAR was occurring. It is assessed that this equipment is becoming more common due to decreasing costs.



[REDACTED]

BPC assets on 27 June 2012 with reference to SAR 4259

- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

Pages 59-60 are in relation to SAR 2012/4259.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Findings regarding the positioning of assets

BPC assets

43. The Review has found that the BPC assets were positioned in accordance with the Commander's Scheme of Manoeuvre prior to the two incidents. To the extent that there were variations, these [REDACTED] [REDACTED] were in favour of the response capability at Christmas Island. Specifically there were two response vessels located at Christmas Island in lieu of the single vessel anticipated, and the short term deployment of a Dash-8 at Christmas Island rather than Broome. Both of these changes increased the responsiveness from Christmas Island. Positioning two response vessels also increased the capacity to manage the larger numbers of PII on individual SIEVs that are currently being experienced compared to historical figures.

44. The Review therefore finds that the BPC assets were appropriately located and the short term variations against the Quarterly Plan reflected both good intelligence and sound judgement on the part of BPC.
45. In view of these findings the Review makes no recommendations concerning the positioning of BPC assets.

Dornier assets

46. The positioning of the AMSA aviation search and rescue capabilities has not been formally reassessed during the period in relation to the workload and risk associated with SIEVs. The review makes a recommendation concerning an assessment as to their current placement.

PART THREE – Issues requiring comment

47. In considering the search and rescue capability north of Christmas Island, three issues were identified that require comment by the Review. These issues are:
- Special considerations arising from multiple SOLAS situations occurring within a short period of time;
 - Life rafts and their deployment; and
 - Limitations of the Christmas Island airport.

Issue 1 - Special considerations arising from multiple SOLAS situations

48. Mass SOLAS situations involve large numbers of people whose lives are at risk. Multiple SOLAS situations on the other hand refer to occasions when two or more SOLAS situations arise either at the same time or in close succession. Given the large number of lives involved and the short space of intervening time (i.e. 4 days), SARs 4106 and 4259 can be seen as both mass and multiple SOLAS situations.
49. Multiple SOLAS situations give rise to special considerations – particularly for remote locations such as Christmas Island. Some of these special considerations include the depletion of life saving equipment such as life rafts, depletion of critical resources such as aviation fuel and the exhaustion and emotional fatigue on crews (particularly those dealing with casualties). In the worst case scenario of two or more incidents occurring at the same time, multiple SOLAS situations demand high risk judgements about which situation should receive the attention of the finite resources.
50. Between January and July 2012, the number of SIEV (102) was nearly equal to the whole of 2011 (134). In the same period the number of vessels that were the subject of maritime SAR incidents increased proportionally. These increases mean that the likelihood of multiple SOLAS situations has gone from being remote to a real possibility – as evidenced by SARs 4106 and 4259.
51. It is with this increased risk in mind that the second and third issues are raised.

Issue 2 - Life rafts and their deployment

52. The Review has identified two concerns in relation to the use of life rafts at Christmas Island, namely:
- the limited numbers of aircraft that are capable of deploying them; and
 - the limited numbers of available life rafts.

Aircraft capable of deploying life rafts

53. At present the only aircraft used by BPC for maritime aerial surveillance that have the ability to deploy life rafts are the ADF AP-3C Orions. Three of these are assigned to BPC each of which normally carries two Air Sea Rescue Kits (ASRKs). An ASRK contains two eight man life rafts that can be

deployed in response to a SAR incident. There is a standing requirement by JTF639 for AP-3C Orions to carry ASRKs for Op RESOLUTE missions regardless of the National SAR standby roster.

54. The other aircraft currently capable of deploying life rafts are the AeroRescue Dorniers leased by AMSA. The Dornier 328 turbo-prop aircraft has a standard load of two droppable life rafts but can carry up to seven if non-critical equipment is removed. However, AeroRescue's aircraft are normally located a minimum of four hours away from Christmas Island in Perth and Darwin.
55. Customs and Border Protection Dash-8s are also likely to be involved in a search and rescue off Christmas Island. These aircraft are primarily to provide aerial surveillance, especially to the threat of people smuggling to north west approaches to Australia, and do not currently have the ability to carry life rafts. Recognising this limitation, Customs and Border Protection has over the last year fitted one aircraft with an air operable door and trialed the feasibility of providing a life raft deployment capability. These trials were found to be successful. The cost of modifying further nine aircraft is estimated to be [REDACTED] with an additional operating cost of [REDACTED] per annum each year thereafter. (The additional operating cost results from the increased fuel consumption and additional aircraft staffing requirements.) To-date Customs and Border Protection has not received funding to proceed with modification of the aircraft.

Recommendation 6.2

It is recommended that subject to funding being provided, Customs and Border Protection proceed with the installation of In-flight Operable Doors into its Dash-8s in support of search and rescue activity.

Numbers of life rafts

56. AMSA currently has just over 80 droppable seven man life rafts located across Australia. At the time of SARs 4106 and 4259 eight of the life rafts were located in Perth and Darwin (four in each location) – the cities in which the closest Dorniers were based. During SAR 4106, the local supply of life rafts was depleted so the responding Dornier collected a life raft from Learmonth en route to the SAR incident. (It should be noted that once a life raft has been deployed, it cannot be reused other than for training purposes.)
57. The numbers of life rafts held by the ADF in this part of the country are also relatively modest. ASRK kits have a finite shelf life and can not be installed in the AP-3C Orion bomb-bay indefinitely (14 day download time). They also require specialist maintenance personnel to fit them. In the early stages of SAR 4106, immediately following the deployment of two ASRKs by an AP-3C Orion, there were only four ASRKs available on aircraft operating on the north western side of the mainland. Three were fitted onto aircraft assigned to BPC and one was fitted to a 92WG RAAF Solania aircraft.
58. During the course of the Review AMSA advised that following the two SARs, twelve life rafts have since been prepositioned to Christmas Island. The Review supports this initiative given the heightened risk of mass SOLAS situations in this region.

Limitations of SAR support at Christmas Island airport

59. The remote location and the small size of the Christmas Island airport introduces a number of limitations that need to be considered in the context of search and rescue operations. The main limitations are shortages of aviation fuel and space limitations for multiple aircraft needing to operate out of Christmas Island at the same time.

Fuel shortages

60. At present Christmas Island has only two fixed tanks for aviation fuel with a capacity of 85kl each. Fuel can also be held in isostainers - contributing a further 12 x 23kl. These stocks of fuel are typically replenished every six to eight weeks. At times when the sea state is poor, fuel reserves may not be replenished at all and reserves then need to be extended to the next refuel, some six to eight weeks later.

61. The limitations of the fuel storage and supply at Christmas Island have been well known for some time and were the subject of a Commonwealth Government funding announcement as part of the 2011/12 Budget. Part of the proposal involves the construction of fixed storage for aviation fuel adjacent to the current depot. Completion of this work is scheduled for February 2014.
62. In the meantime, coping with the additional requirements of search and rescue activity is likely to be a problem, particularly during the swell season when deliveries can be missed due to the adverse sea state. In the case of SARs 4106 and 4259 it is estimated that 4923 litres of fuel from local stocks were consumed (2589 litres for SAR 4106 and 2334 litres for SAR 4259)². Efforts were made to reduce this impact, by requiring some of the aircraft responding to SAR 4106 to fly three to four hours back to the mainland for re-supply, reducing the overall search/surveillance time of all aircraft. Although it was effectively managed on this occasion, it required careful coordination of a larger number of aircraft in order to prevent gaps in search operations.
63. The high demand for fuel for SAR incident response operations and maritime aerial surveillance will continue to place significant demand on reserves at Christmas Island. Until such time as the additional storage facilities become available, the fuel shortages on Christmas Island will pose a significant risk for the Island's capacity to support search and rescue activities.

Space limitations at Christmas Island airport

64. Christmas Island Airport is currently configured with one runway, one taxiway and two drive-through parking bays capable of holding up to two Boeing 737 aircraft. As refuelling points are located under the two parking bays, parked aircraft need to be repositioned to provide other aircraft access to the stations. In periods of high traffic such as for SAR incidents, the configuration can create delays and may potentially lead to runway closure. At one stage during SAR 4106, five aircraft had to be manoeuvred to enable refuelling, creating a delay of 90 minutes for some aircraft. If additional aircraft had arrived at the time, the airport may have been forced to close due to obstructions on the taxiway and runway.
65. The seriousness of the risk associated with this level of congestion should not be down-played. A recent report by the acting IOT Airport Program Manager at Christmas Island explained this risk in the context of SAR 4106. On 25 June 2012, he wrote:
- "The most critical and potentially disastrous situation occurred during the period when the AMSA Dornier 338 would not start. VH-VRE, a CL600 Challenger was holding on the taxiway as there was nowhere to go. This aircraft then became an obstruction as it penetrated the transitional surface of the Obstacle Limitation Surface (OLS). Had there been any additional arrivals we could have issued a NOTAM identifying the aircraft as an obstruction, the next arrival would have had to remain on the runway and the airport would be required by regulation to close. Any other inbounds would be unable to land due to an aircraft on the runway, and, most likely be fuel critical if returning from the search area. This would create a situation where a search aircraft with no chance of reaching an alternate, would only have the one option of ditching. We came close to this scenario."³
66. In his report, the IOT Airport Program Manager went on to identify some possible solutions relating to additional parking positions, use of a fuel truck and use of a tow motor. ADF advised they investigated 'loaning' two motors to Christmas Island, but found no spare tow motors were available.

Recommendation 6.3

Customs and Border Protection and AMSA should enter into discussions with Regional Australia in order to address the concerns identified by the acting IOT Program Manager regarding space limitations at Christmas Island airport.

2. An additional 3183 l was uplifted on 28 June 2012 for normal surveillance (no SAR)

3. Report on Search and Rescue Operation Reference Number 2012/4106, Acting IOT Airports Program Manager, 25 June 2012.

Chapter 7: The incidence of SIEVs making unnecessary calls for assistance

Review findings

The percentage of incidents where SIEVs have initiated communication with Australian authorities has steadily increased over the last three years. We are now to the point where the vast majority of all maritime SIEV SAR incidents are self reported.

The numbers of maritime SAR incidents has increased in line with the increased number of arrivals.

The number of unnecessary alerts has increased in 2012, but the proportion of unnecessary alerts has not.

Developing guidelines to help distinguish a genuine or false request for assistance would be extremely difficult and hazardous.

Unnecessary reporting has an operational impact on the Australian Government, particularly BPC.

The tasking of commercial assets to check on SIEVs requesting assistance is currently an option for AMSA. However, this option presents a number of practical difficulties that prevent it from being a common solution to the problem.

The Review makes no recommendations in relation to the issue of SIEVs making unnecessary calls for assistance.

Introduction

1. The incidence of SIEVs making unnecessary calls for assistance to Australian authorities is an important issue because it had a significant bearing on the judgements that were made in relation to the state of the vessels, particularly the 4106 vessel. The nature and content of the calls for assistance were germane to the judgements of RCC Australia and BPC (and quite possibly BASARNAS) during these incidents. Furthermore the incidence of unnecessary calls for assistance by earlier SIEVs provided the contextual background to these judgements.
2. This chapter defines and examines the incidence of unnecessary alerts to Australian authorities from SIEVs. The implications of this type of alerting in relation to the SARs 4106 and 4259 incidents are discussed. Current trends in calls for assistance and unnecessary alerting as well as the operational impacts and policy implications are examined.

Background

3. The practice of SIEV passengers, crews or third parties requesting assistance from Australian authorities is not new. This method has been observed over the last three years, however the number of calls for assistance from SIEVs over the past six to twelve months suggests an increase in this tactic, having direct implications for search and rescue and border protection agencies.
4. It is often difficult to determine the genuineness of a SIEV request for assistance because information about the location and condition of the vessel is often unreliable, ambiguous or insufficiently precise to support effective SAR operations. Furthermore, the motivation for some of these calls is assessed as being a desire to effect an early interception by Australian government authorities to facilitate escort to Christmas Island.
5. Unnecessary alerting has the potential to divert ADF and Customs and Border Protection's aerial and surface assets away from their primary maritime security mission and patrol areas, and potentially away from genuine SAR events

There is also a financial impact on commercial shipping in the area.

Definitions

6. For the purpose of this Review the term *unnecessary alerting* is used to describe instances where a SIEV communicates a request for assistance when no imminent danger exists and no other conditions for a maritime SAR incident are met, other than the alert itself.
7. The National Search and Rescue Manual (NATSARMAN) sets out the standard procedures for Australian Search and Rescue authorities and is consistent with relevant international conventions which Australia is party to. According to the NATSARMAN a maritime SAR incident is considered imminent or actual when any of the following conditions exist:
 - (a) a surface vessel or craft has requested assistance;
 - (b) a surface vessel or craft has transmitted a distress signal;
 - (c) it is apparent that a surface vessel or craft is in distress;
 - (d) a surface vessel or craft is reported to be sinking or to have sunk;
 - (e) the crew is reported to have abandoned ship or is about to do so;
 - (f) reports indicate that the operating efficiency of the craft is so impaired that the craft may sink or the crew may be forced to abandon;
 - (g) the surface vessel or craft is overdue or unreported;
 - (h) persons are in the water and require assistance;
 - (i) an EPIRB has been activated; or
 - (j) a MEDIVAC is required on medical advice.
8. As defined in the NATSARMAN, SIEVs which request assistance are considered to be in an imminent or actual SAR incident for which the AMSA has an obligation to respond.
9. *Unnecessary alerting* occurs when a SIEV or a third party has initiated communications with Australian authorities to request assistance (as per Condition a) of the NATSARMAN list above) but none of the other listed conditions are present. It should be noted that water entering a vessel, passenger stress, and lack of provisions do not normally warrant a maritime search and rescue response, however BPC assessments of the genuineness of alerts accounts for the cumulative risk of these factors. For the purposes of this chapter, *unnecessary alerting* is where a SIEV is not in immediate danger and capable of travelling under its own steam.

Unnecessary alerting and the 4106 incident


10. Recent experience with unnecessary alerting informed the judgements made in relation to the treatment of SAR 4106 incident for two reasons. First of all, knowledge of SIEVs involved in unnecessary alerting was part of the background informing any assessment on the vessel. [REDACTED]
11. On 19 and 20 June the collective view of Australian Government authorities with knowledge of the vessel was that it was not in distress. The assessments and evaluations that the vessel did not meet any conditions for being the subject of a maritime SAR incident, other than the call for assistance, shaped the Australian and probably the Indonesian response.

Indicators of unnecessary alerting

12. [REDACTED] RCC Australia received calls for assistance from the vessel late on 19 June. Details of the vessel's problems over the course of that night included bad conditions, no drinking water, no lifejackets, danger, and later the vessel being damaged and high water and wind. Given that the vessel was then only 36nm

south of the Sunda Strait, RCC Australia advised the vessel to turn back to Indonesia. BASARNAS referred to it as a 'possible distress' in correspondence to AMSA. Four and a half hours after being advised to turn back, calls from the vessel claimed it was sinking, and that the vessel was 'slow because of the water'.

13. At 1316 AEST 20 June a call from the vessel was reported by RCC Australia as having crying in the background. In this call the passengers claimed to be taking on water, but responded to questions from the RCC Australia operator indicating that the passengers had lifejackets. At 2033 and 2049 AEST engine sounds could be heard in the background of calls between RCC Australia and the vessel. During the calls the passenger claimed that the vessel was taking on water, that there was no drinking water and additionally he asked whether the vessel was in Australian waters.
14. During the course of the phone calls between the vessel and RCC Australia the vessel continued to sail south toward Christmas Island. Even after the initial distress calls where the vessel was close to Indonesia, and RCC Australia had warned them to sail back to Indonesia, the vessel continued its journey southward. There was nothing to indicate that the vessel had significantly slowed during those two days. Between the first position received by RCC Australia on 19 June and the calls made at approximately 2000 AEST 20 June the vessel travelled 43 nm south toward Christmas Island at an average speed of 2.26 knots. Legs of this journey were observed where the calculated speed was less than 2 knots, however these were short legs and are probably attributed to GPS latency.



15.

16. Secondly, a Dash-8 surveillance flight observed the vessel from a stand-off position of greater than 3nm at 1715 AEST. BPC AMSOC received information that vessel was underway at a speed of four knots and that people were sighted on deck. The following imagery was forwarded to AMSOC.



The extent to which the alerting was unnecessary

17. The Review considers that on the basis of what is now known about the venture, most if not all of the calls to RCC Australia were unnecessary alerting. The vessel travelled 72nm from the first alerting to where it was found capsized and held an average speed of 2 knots in that period. The vessel had been at sea for a number of days before this time. Until around 0800 AEST on 21 June, the vessel was not in imminent danger, its operating efficiency was not so impaired that it may sink, it did not have any medical emergency and there were no persons in the water. Some of the assertions made by the passengers on the phone were found to be inaccurate including that 'the vessel was sinking'. It is not clear whether there was any significant damage to the hull of the vessel prior to the final few minutes leading up to the capsizing.
18. Accounts of survivors indicate that it is possible that at two discrete points in time during its journey the vessel may have met the criteria set out in condition f) of the NATSARMAN indicating a maritime SAR incident. According to interviews conducted with passengers by AFP officers on 23 June, the first of these incidents probably occurred on or around 18 June when the bilge pump stopped working for a period of time. Given that the vessel was taking water and the means to pump that water out was not working, the vessel for that time would have been sufficiently impaired that it may sink. However this was approximately a day before contacting RCC Australia.
19. Secondly, the actual events leading to the overturning of the vessel involved a very brief period of escalating danger. According to passenger interviews, these events included water rushing into the vessel, attempts to manoeuvre the vessel, and panic by the passengers that caused them to move to one side of the vessel. These events took only a few minutes.
20. The vessel had characteristics that further complicate this issue. The vessel, while not in imminent danger or meeting other conditions for SAR, sailed to Christmas Island in a condition that made its journey extremely hazardous. The vessel had limited water, was overcrowded and was taking on water. Another characteristic that existed with the vessel was the expectation that calling Australian authorities when sufficient distance had been made from Java would result in Australian authorities bringing the passengers to Christmas Island.

Effects on the response


21. Based on the information available to BPC and RCC Australia on the afternoon 20 June, both agencies assessed that the vessel was not in distress and was behaving like similar previous SIEVs in seeking to misuse the SAR system. This assessment was a reasonable judgement. It was based on the balance of information available at the time as interpreted by operational decision makers and intelligence professionals with regard to the context of similar circumstances where SIEVs have requested assistance unnecessarily. Given trends in unnecessary alerting that are detailed later in this chapter it is reasonable to infer that this context played a real and significant role in judgements made prior to the vessel being discovered capsized. The reasonableness of the key judgement, namely the assessment on the level of distress of the vessel is examined in Chapter 10.

Unnecessary alerting and the 4259 incident


[REDACTED]

Current trends

23. There is growing reporting from agencies of an increase in unnecessary alerting over the last six to 12 months. It is difficult to determine the extent of such an increase because it is hard to be precise about what does or doesn't constitute unnecessary alerting. This is so, for a number of reasons including:
- The subjective nature of the evaluation of each case;
 - The general poor state of SIEVs; and
 - The incidence of vessels involved in unnecessary alerting that subsequently do satisfy the conditions for a maritime SAR incident.
24. The Review examined statistics provided by BPC on potential SOLAS incidents. These statistics assess the numbers of valid distress calls and incidents with calls being assessed as genuine based on signs of danger to the vessel or persons on board being evident to the responders. While this methodology does not entirely align with unnecessary alerts and only indicates the state of the vessel and crew after the response and not at the time of the alert, they serve as a good indication of numbers of unnecessary alerts. It is possible that unnecessary alerts may be more than these figures suggest because of the assessment methodology.
25. In 2012 the average number of PII's per vessel and the number of arrivals per month has increased significantly. (Arrivals for 2012 have included 102 SIEVs, 6946 PII's and 175 crew members as of early August 2012. The average number of PII's per vessel has also increased in 2012, with a quarter of all ventures now carrying more than 100 persons.) The number of SIEV maritime SAR incidents has increased with this trend. The number of incidents where calls for assistance were not assessed by BPC as 'genuine vessels in distress or SOLAS incident' in these statistics has also increased.



26. It should be noted in terms of total arrivals, the proportion of likely unnecessary alerts appears to have been relatively steady – or even decreased a little. These statistics suggest that the number of unnecessary alerts has increased in 2012, but the proportion of unnecessary alerts has not.
27. What may be more telling is that the percentage of incidents where SIEVs have initiated communication with Australian authorities has steadily increased over the last three years. In 2010, 36% of SIEV arrivals in a potential SAR incident, initiated communications with Australian authorities. This figure has grown in 2012 to 93% of SIEVs arrival in a potential SAR situation initiating communications with Australian authorities requesting assistance. This is demonstrated in the following graph. The source statistics are included at Attachment E.



- [REDACTED]
28. In summary the statistics suggest that:
- (i) the vast majority of all maritime SIEV SAR incidents are now self reported;
 - (ii) the numbers of maritime SAR incidents has increased in line with the increased number of arrivals; and
 - (iii) the numbers likely to be involved in *unnecessary alerting* have increased but not proportionately.
29. [REDACTED] in some instances people smugglers are instructing PIIs to call Australian authorities after a certain passage of time has passed when the SIEV is believed to be in a location that Australian authorities will respond. Recent experience demonstrates that those on vessels are becoming increasingly confident to call for assistance from Australian authorities in positions very close to Indonesia, and further away from Australian waters and BPC patrol areas.
30. It is reasonable to conclude, based on the statistics, reporting and 4106 as a case study, that ventures have become more deliberate about using the SAR system and calls for assistance to aid their journey to Christmas Island. It is likely, in some cases such as 4106, that ventures are conducting passage with an expectation of rescue and are embarking on the passage with greater risks because of that expectation. These risks include overloading, lack of provisions, or even seaworthiness of vessels.

Operational impact of these trends beyond the 4106 incident

31. The trend in unnecessary alerting is likely to have an operational impact on BPC's limited aerial and surface surveillance assets. BPC assets are not deployed on the basis of a search and rescue but rather to meet the requirements of a civil maritime security law enforcement mandate. A continued increase in requests for assistance from SIEVs, with a requirement to divert BPC assigned assets from their primary surveillance patrol areas will detrimentally impact response activity to intercept irregular maritime arrivals and address BPC's primary civil maritime security mandate and objectives. Not all BPC assigned assets are capable of being deployed to the outer limits of Australia's SAR region, or beyond.
32. As well as operational coverage, there are a number of broader operational consequences identified by BPC. This includes the fatigue of crews who remain for long periods of time on a high level of readiness to respond to SAR incidents. The exhaustion of fuel and other resources depletes the availability for use in non-SAR activities, particularly at Christmas Island.
33. AMSA has similar resource considerations when tasking rescue aircraft, particularly where they are required to deploy from Perth and Darwin to conduct a search and rescue. This has an impact on AMSA's capability to respond to other maritime and aviation SAR events. Furthermore the search and rescue response by civil merchant shipping to unnecessary alerting may reduce over time given the economic implications. Diverting of merchant shipping adds significantly to fuel and operating costs.
34. [REDACTED]
35. It is likely that potential and actual SIEV maritime SAR incidents will occur in rapid succession or at simultaneous times in the future. In these cases, the instances of unnecessary reporting will necessitate an assessment of the state of each vessel and a judgement on the allocation of response to each incident.

Policy implications

36. The SAR and SOLAS Conventions specify Australia's obligations to provide a search and rescue service and the obligations of ships' masters to render assistance to vessels requiring assistance. Under SOLAS, the master of a vessel at sea (including BPC assigned assets) which is in a position to provide assistance, on receiving a signal from any source that persons are in distress at sea, is bound to proceed with all speed to their assistance. As the SOLAS Convention does not differentiate between types of vessel and applies to all in the same manner, including SIEVs, attempts to draw distinctions between SIEVs requiring assistance and other vessel types may be in contravention of Australia's obligations under the international SOLAS convention.
37. While an assessment of the material state of the vessels is needed to mitigate against unnecessary alerting, the Australian government still has obligations in relation to responding to requests for assistance, whether they are regarded as genuine or not.

Possible response options

38. Following SARs 4106 and 4259 some commentators have suggested that there are possible response options that could be adopted by Australian government agencies in order to make a determination on the nature of SIEV requests for assistance. These suggestions have included writing guidelines to distinguish between genuine or false requests for assistance, and AMSA utilising commercial air and sea assets to assess the status of a SIEV claiming to be in distress.
39. The development of guidelines to help distinguish a genuine or false request for assistance would be extremely difficult and hazardous. The first problem derives from the SAR Conventions which indicate that a vessel requesting assistance, by definition, is already considered to be in an imminent or actual SAR incident.
40. Second any guidance would need to be carefully weighed against all of the known factors including the available intelligence. This will always be a complex and high risk judgement.
41. Third any guidance written to form a decision on the genuine or non-genuine nature of a request for assistance would only be able to provide guidance that is valid for a limited period of time. As seen with the SAR 4106 (and to a lesser extent 4259), a situation that is considered to be under control at one point can quickly turn into a major SAR incident.
42. The tasking of commercial assets to check on SIEVs requesting assistance is currently an option for AMSA. The obligation on masters of vessels to provide assistance to persons in distress at sea is set out in SOLAS Regulation 33.1. However, this option presents a number of practical difficulties that need to be carefully considered. Some of these include:
 - the difficulty of communicating with SIEV passengers and crew given language barriers and the absence of radio communications equipment;
 - the motivations of SIEV passengers and crew to falsely report depending on which direction the vessel is heading;
 - the capability of a commercial vessel to render assistance in any given situation;
 - the risks that can ensue for a SIEV when approached by a large commercial vessel; and
 - the risk of merchant vessels failing to respond to this request over time.
43. Most of these difficulties were seen at play when the *MV Bison Express* responded to SAR 4259.

Findings

- The information known on the material state of the 4106 vessel prior to being found capsized was almost the same at RCC Australia, BPC [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED] information on the material state of 4106 were [REDACTED] not immediately known by RCC Australia, however COMBPC acted on this information.
- [REDACTED]
- The situational awareness pictures on both incidents varied between BPC operations centres, RCC Australia and BASARNAS because of their functions and access to classified systems.
- The differences in situational awareness between agencies did not have a material effect on the outcome of the SAR.

Introduction

1. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
2. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
3. The review also examined three additional components and considered the extent of their effect on the search and rescue efforts:
 - the impediments to communicating and fusing the available information;
 - the assessment capability of BPC and AMSA; and
 - the accuracy of critical information

[REDACTED]

SAR 4106

4. [REDACTED]

5. [REDACTED]

6. Despite operating in different [REDACTED] environments, RCC Australia, BPC and [REDACTED] were all cognisant of the same body of [REDACTED] information on the state of the vessel prior to 1200 AEST. Principally, that the vessel had been taking on water; that the last successful call from RCC Australia to the vessel was at 2049 AEST 20 June; that passengers were fearful for their lives; and that the vessel had continued to sail south after the original distress calls. BASARNAS also received all of this [REDACTED] information from RCC Australia as it became available.

7. [REDACTED]

8. [REDACTED]

9. The critical point for this incident was the point at which an Australian government agency involved determined that there was concern for the safety of the vessel and either communicated that concern or acted on it. BPC was able to make that determination and act on it [REDACTED]

10. [REDACTED]

11. [REDACTED]

12. The Review notes that the use of an AMSA liaison officer and [REDACTED] reporting has generally been successful in ensuring that AMSA is passed as much relevant information as possible in SIEV search and rescue incidents. In some cases such as with 4106, additional sensitivities or unique circumstances warrant improvements to the standing arrangements.

13. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SAR 4259

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SAR 4106

Situational awareness picture

15. [REDACTED]

16. For RCC Australia, the limited view of ADF and Customs assets, and more limited view of Indonesian assets would not normally be a concern. In SAR activities within the Australian SRR, Australian government vessels and aircraft respond to RCC Australia requests for information and assistance and there is no requirement for knowledge of Indonesian activities. Where RCC Australia coordinates or assists in a SAR activity within the Indonesian SRR, the requirement for knowledge about the Indonesian response becomes much more important. During the 4106 incident BASARNAS advised that an Indonesian Navy vessel had departed and was proceeding to the search area [REDACTED]

17. For the incident of 21 June RCC Australia did not always have a complete picture of the actions of BPC. RCC Australia was not informed of the direction given by COMBPC regarding the Dash-8 surveillance route and the ACPB movement to the extent of the Contiguous Zone until the AMSA liaison officer was briefed at BPC. At that time, RCC Australia was assisting BASARNAS which had overall coordination, and BPC actions were unilateral. Nevertheless the object of these actions was at the time part of a maritime SAR incident. It is relevant to consider that those assets were not requested by RCC Australia and not being coordinated by that organisation. Given that the BPC aircraft was making its way toward a potential incident, and that RCC Australia was not at that time coordinating a response, this did not have material effect on the outcome of the SAR.

SAR 4259

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

22. In response to the Homeland and Border Security Review by Ric Smith in 2008, AMSA and Customs and Border Protection co-sponsored a paper examining *'The Feasibility of Options to Integrate the RCC Australia and AMSOC 2010.'* Several of the recommendations from that paper remain relevant to overcoming potential information sharing and classification issues. In particular one of the recommendations was to assign an AMSA liaison officer to AMSOC to facilitate coordination and planning. Other initiatives were recommended including shared situation awareness and an updated MOU between the two organisations.

23. [REDACTED]

24. [REDACTED]

25. [REDACTED]

Enhancing the use of liaison functions

26. The use of an AMSA liaison officer is a generally effective means of bridging the information gap between BPC [REDACTED] and RCC Australia. In some situations it may not be timely, or may not be able to successfully pass critical information to RCC Australia [REDACTED]. The liaison officer system could be further improved [REDACTED] if there was a greater presence by the liaison officers in BPC and if there was more involvement by the liaison officers in assessments of the material state of SIEVs.

27.

[REDACTED]

Recommendation 8.2

[REDACTED]

28. By itself this measure might make only a small difference to the interaction between relevant organisations. However, in conjunction with other recommendations it is more likely to have an impact on the critical sharing of information during a search and rescue incident. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

29. In the 4106 incident BPC developed an increasing concern for the safety of the vessel and this was communicated to RCC Australia through the AMSA liaison officer after he was briefed. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

30.

[REDACTED]

Recommendation 8.3

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

31.

[REDACTED]

32.

[REDACTED]

33.

[REDACTED] SIEV SAR incidents make up less than 1% of RCC Australia responses to distress, although recent incidents demonstrate they can account for a disproportionate number of fatalities. The Review concludes that this option would not be viable.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Assessment capability

36.

The narrative for SAR 4106 reveals that there were competing pieces of information [REDACTED] on the state of the vessel. To make a judgement on the competing pieces of information, analysis was required to balance the veracity and the latency of the information [REDACTED]

37.

[REDACTED]

38.

In contrast, the incident of 27 June did not have competing information on the state of the vessel, as there was no information to suggest a changed state prior to their call to the AFP. Nevertheless, SAR 4259 does illustrate another assessment challenge, and one that occurred to a lesser extent to SAR 4106. [REDACTED]

39.

[REDACTED]

40.

[REDACTED]

41.

[REDACTED]

Accuracy of information

Accuracy of the position of the 4106 vessel

42. The information indicating the last known position of the vessel was consistent between the responding agencies, specifically BPC, RCC Australia and BASARNAS prior to awareness by each organisation that the vessel was foundering.

[REDACTED]

43.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

44. AMSOC had advised the Dash-8 that they believed the vessel may be 20nm south of the last known location.

[REDACTED]

45. Based on the track of the Dash-8 on that flight, it is likely that the incorrect location did not substantially negatively impact the search time taken to locate the upturned vessel. The Dash-8 track went north from the planned route to the last known location of the vessel on 20 June and tracked south along the probable vessel route. If the correct last known location had been used as a starting point, then the search for the vessel may have been 10nm north and taken more time.

46. Despite the fact that in this circumstance where the position errors worked in favour of the search, it would be prudent in future to communicate the most accurate information available to the search assets. Subsequent recommendations in this paper are relevant to making this possible.

Accuracy of the position of the 4259 vessel

■ [REDACTED]

■ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Accuracy of the content of the 4106 calls for assistance

51. RCC Australia received sixteen calls from the 4106 vessel on 19 and 20 June. These calls presented significant challenges to RCC Australia in determining the phone number of the caller, the position of the vessel and details of the condition of the vessel and the passengers on board. The difficulty lay firstly with the quality of the sound coming through from the vessel due probably to wind and the quality of the satellite phone connections. Further difficulty lay in the language barrier as the passengers tried to communicate in broken English. As a result of these difficulties, there were two facts that were promulgated by RCC Australia that have subsequently been found to be inaccurate reflections of the phone calls.
52. At 0650 AEST on 20 June a call was taken by RCC Australia. In a retrospective transcript of this call the caller indicates that there are old men and boys on board the vessel and does not properly respond to a question about the numbers of wives on board. At the time of the incident this was reported as there were old men and wives on board the vessel, contradicting earlier reports. This inaccuracy may have had a minor effect on assessments of the accuracy of the alerting of this vessel, given that it reinforced any inconsistency in the passenger's message.
53. Given the difficulty gaining information from the sixteen phone calls from the vessel, it is reasonable to consider options to improve the quality of information. While the Review recognises that the transmission quality of the satellite phone cannot be improved, the ability to communicate with passengers speaking only rudimentary English can be addressed. RCC Australia currently uses a translation service where a caller does not speak sufficient English and on several of the 4106 calls this service was utilised. After listening to the voice recordings of the calls, the Review found that the telephone conferencing arrangements with the translation service used was not sufficiently effective in these circumstances. Specifically, the time taken to connect to a translator effectively prohibited a translator from communicating with the passenger making the calls. In one case this was more than three minutes. In light of the number of SIEV SAR incidents and that English is rarely spoken well by those calling for assistance from SIEVs, the Review makes the following recommendation:

Recommendation 8.5

It is recommended that AMSA investigate improved teleconferencing arrangements during calls for assistance.

Chapter 9:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Introduction

- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- 3. On the morning of 21 June, the 4106 vessel was already subject of a declared maritime search and rescue operation being coordinated by BASARNAS, having been handed over by RCC Australia on the morning of 20 June [REDACTED]

■ [REDACTED]

■ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

report contained the following information:

(U) At approximately 0730 AEST a maritime vessel in a position approximately 110nm NNW of Christmas Island may be taking on water with persons on board fearful for their safety.

10. BPC sent this report to AMSA at 1143 AEST. BPC then undertook its own analysis of these latest reports against other information including the content of calls to RCC Australia, and the fact that no further calls for assistance had been received for more than 12 hours. This information gradually accumulated over the course of the morning and required a fresh assessment to determine whether there was any basis to infer a changed state of the vessel.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Page 85 has been redacted in full.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

19. On this particular occasion, the time taken by BPC to transfer information to AMSA was not part of the critical path for the commencement of the search and rescue activity.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Chapter 10: Appropriateness and timeliness of the Australian response

Findings

- The Review considers that the timeliness of the response by BPC, RCC Australia [REDACTED] was reasonable. Although some actions could have taken place earlier, this would have been unlikely to have accelerated the critical path for the arrival of search and rescue assets. The one exception to this conclusion was the time taken to relocate the 4106 vessel after a heightened level of concern was established. The Review considers that the time taken could have been reduced by between 30 and 60 minutes had the Dash-8 been tasked to proceed immediately to relocating the vessel rather than being allowed to continue with its scheduled flight plan.
- The Review concluded that whilst the handover of SAR 4106 to BASARNAS was appropriate and in accordance with IAMSAR principles and the Australian Indonesian SAR Arrangement, it would also have been appropriate for RCC Australia to have adopted a more forward leaning posture in assisting BASARNAS in areas where they lacked capability.
- The Review considered that the covert surveillance undertaken by BPC on 20 June was a reasonable course of action.
- The Review concluded that the actions of BPC in not searching for the 4106 vessel any earlier on 21 June were reasonable.

Introduction

1. This chapter examines the appropriateness and timeliness of all other aspects of the Australian response to SAR 4106 and SAR 4259 – other than those already addressed in Chapter 9. The chapter is structured in two parts:
 - (i) The timeliness of the Australian response (including information flows) – [REDACTED]; and
 - (ii) The appropriateness of the actions in response to the information available at the time.

Part 1 – Timeliness of the Australian response

2. In examining the timeliness of the information sharing and response to the two incidents, the Review developed timelines to identify areas that require explanation. Chapters 2 and 3 contain detailed timelines for the 4106 and 4259 incidents respectively. [REDACTED]
3. A number of areas relating to timeliness were identified and are detailed in this chapter. The examination of these areas was based on actions taken according to logs and statements and, where appropriate, a comparison of those actions with typical times and relevant procedures.

[REDACTED]

4106 Incident

4. RCC Australia received the first series of calls from the 4106 vessel between 2152 and 2238 AEST on 19 June. During that time the vessel became the subject of a maritime SAR incident in

[REDACTED]

accordance with the National Search and Rescue Manual. RCC Australia advised AMSOC of the maritime incident and key details of the phone calls made from the vessel at 2221 AEST. Thirty minutes later AMSOC informed the BPC IC Duty Officer of the incident and this information was forwarded to BPC stakeholders, HQJTF639 and the AFP. Further calls were made during the course of the night and the BPC IC Duty Officer forwarded the updates to HQJTF639 and AFP.

5. [REDACTED]
6. [REDACTED]
7. [REDACTED]
8. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

12. RCC Australia received the following [REDACTED] from BPC at 1143 AEST on 21 June:
(U) At approximately 0730 AEST a maritime vessel in a position approximately 110nm NNW of Christmas Island may be taking on water with persons on board fearful for their safety.

[REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]
13. This report contained information relevant to assessing the material state of the vessel as well as the last known position of the vessel. This information was passed to BASARNAS, the lead in coordinating the SAR response at 1227 AEST. Principally two activities were undertaken at RCC Australia in the 38 minutes between receiving and forwarding the information to BASARNAS. RCC Australia undertook analysis to determine if the information matched that of the likely position of the 4106 vessel in order to determine whether this information could be attributed to 4106. RCC Australia also sent a message to BASARNAS with [REDACTED] their assessment that this was the 4106 vessel.
 14. It is not apparent that the forwarding of this information had any effect on the actions of BASARNAS which was then coordinating the response. The time taken to forward this information therefore did not have an effect on the outcome of the SAR operation.

The time for BPC and the AMSA liaison officer to pass information about their concerns and actions in relation to 4106 to RCC Australia

15. The narrative of the 4106 incident notes that [REDACTED] the Commander of BPC directed that a Dash-8 surveillance aircraft be tasked with locating the 4106 vessel. Shortly before that decision, the AMSA liaison officer was asked to attend BPC for a [REDACTED] briefing. The AMSA liaison officer attended the [REDACTED] briefing at 1330 AEST.
16. At 1300, BPC were aware of a number of facts relevant to the SAR operation and did not communicate them until 1330 AEST to RCC Australia. These facts included:
[REDACTED]
 - (ii) That BPC IC had assessed increased concern for the safety of the vessel
 - (iii) That the scheduled Dash-8 flight had been tasked to relocate the vessel
 - (iv) That HMA ships *Larrakia* and *Wollongong* had been tasked to commence passage north in anticipation of the SAR possibly becoming imminent.
17. [REDACTED] The SOLAS Protocol [REDACTED] indicate that AMSA is to be contacted directly and advised that a [REDACTED] briefing is required. BPC followed these instructions.
18. Nevertheless, the Review notes that the increased concern for the vessel and the actions arising from that concern could have been immediately communicated [REDACTED] to AMSA in these circumstances. [REDACTED]
19. The AMSA liaison officer emailed AMSA at 1420 AEST. The period between arriving for the brief and emailing AMSA was taken up by the briefing, which took 30 minutes, movement from the [REDACTED] area to AMSOC and a phone call. The Review considers that there was no unreasonable delay in this time.
20. This email advised there was markedly heightened level of concern for the vessel based on [REDACTED] the fact that RCC Australia had not been able to contact the vessel in more than six hours. He also requested that the phone associated with the vessel be called and that a position on the phone be obtained from the satellite telecommunications provider and that an update from BASARNAS be sourced. [REDACTED]
The development of procedures would enable the continuation of this practice and could enable this to be used as a method of dissemination employed by BPC directly to AMSA in appropriate circumstances.

[REDACTED]

Recommendation 10.2

[REDACTED]

The time for RCC Australia to issue Mayday broadcasts and relays for 4106 and 4259

21. During the 4106 incident there was 29 minutes between the time when RCC Australia received advice that the vessel had overturned and RCC Australia requesting a Mayday relay to BASARNAS and 29 minutes before a Mayday broadcast to shipping was made over the Inmarsat satellite telecommunications network. [REDACTED]
22. The timeliness of the 4106 Mayday response was consistent with RCC Australia mounting other rescue responses. The RCC Australia watch was required to draft the Mayday message, as well as a number of other concurrent activities. On 21 June these included tasking assets to respond to the rescue, noting information and briefing RCC Australia officers as well as requesting rescue resources from ADF. It is also important to note that prior to this time, VHF Maydays had been issued by the Customs Dash-8 on the scene, and by 1530 AEST WSA *Dragon* and *Cape Oceania* had replied to the Dash-8 over VHF communications.

23. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The rescue response times of Australian aircraft and vessels for 4106 and 4259

The time for the Dash-8 to locate the upturned 4106 vessel

24. The Dash-8 did not go directly to any assessed last known location of the vessel after the 1321 take off. The aircraft conducted the first component of the planned surveillance route before coming to the search area. This route took the aircraft more than 100nm to the west of Christmas Island and more than 60nm west of the search location. See page 90 Map SAR 4106 Dash-8 Response.
25. Prior to 1500 AEST and the discovery of the upturned vessel, the aircraft reported on five foreign fishing vessel contacts. The aircraft was in the search area for the 4106 vessel at 1439 AEST, approximately 78 minutes after takeoff. BPC have noted that the Dash-8 was expected in the area at approximately 1430. The search for the vessel was tasked in addition to the planned patrol route.
26. At this time BPC still had concerns for the arrival of up to four more SIEVs at Christmas Island between 20 and 25 June. BPC retained its responsibility to detect, identify and intercept these vessels along with any unforecast arrivals approaching the Christmas Island area. Details of the BPC decision making and tasking are included as Attachment E2.
27. The Review considers that the time to locate the upturned vessel could have been reduced by between 30 and 60 minutes had the Dash-8 been tasked to proceed immediately to relocating the vessel rather than being allowed to continue with its scheduled flight plan.

Response during the 4106 incident

28. After the discovery of the upturned vessel at 1458 AEST on 21 June, the Dash-8 issued a broadcast to shipping on VHF radio, and immediately communicated information on the vessel to RCC Australia, and HMA Ships *Larrakia* and *Wollongong*. This marked the commencement of a substantial response from the Australian government to support the search and rescue of persons in the water and with the hulk of the 4106 vessel.
29. RCC Australia began tasking response assets before the broadcast to shipping was relayed as noted in the previous section. By 1530 AEST the following assets had been tasked to respond:
 - (i) An AP3C Orion (Callsign SEALION 57) that was on surveillance flight to Cocos Island
 - (ii) Two AMSA contracted Dorniers (Callsigns Rescue 461 and Rescue 481) at Darwin and Perth respectively
 - (iii) IMA Ships *Larrakia* and *Wollongong* north of Christmas Island.
30. As noted in the narrative, it was clear by 1540 AEST that an enduring search and rescue effort would be required. RCC Australia as well as HQJOC continued to task and make arrangements for additional aircraft to participate in the search and rescue effort.
31. The Dash-8, which maintained surveillance of the hulk and area in vicinity of wreckage and survivors until 1730 AEST was the first responder. It was able to maintain station until after the arrival of SEALION 57 at 1630 AEST. These two aircraft were able to provide continuous air surveillance coverage of the area until the Dash-8 came off-station on its second flight at 2140 AEST.
32. *Larrakia* and *Wollongong* travelled at best speed, having been alerted at approximately 1500 AEST, verbally tasked at 1505 AEST and formally tasked at 1610 AEST. Both vessels travelled over 80nm and were in the vicinity of the incident by 1920 AEST having travelled at 18kts.
33. Along with the merchant ships *Cape Oceania*, *WSA Dragon* and *JPO Vulpecula*, this was effectively the immediate local response to the incident. All Australian aircraft or vessels in this group responded in a timely manner.

- [REDACTED]
34. In addition, there was an immediate response from the Australian mainland. This comprised of *Rescue 481*, an AMSA contracted Aerorescue Dornier and a second AP3C, call-sign *Rescue 251*. *Rescue 481* was tasked at 1520 AEST, and took off from Perth at 1610 well within its notice to move requirement of 30 minutes. It travelled via Learmonth and Christmas Island and was on station at the incident area by 0008 AEST 22 June. It provided search and a life-raft drop within nine hours of the vessel being discovered upturned. By approximately 1700 AEST, *Rescue 251* in Darwin had been tasked by JTF639 and was expected to be available within three hours. It took off from Darwin at 2041 AEST and was on station conducting search between 0050 AEST and 0400 AEST. Given that the aircraft was not on any notice to be ready, this would appear to a timely response.
35. Details of the immediate responses can be seen in the timeline in Chapter 2. Over the course of the operation three additional ADF AP3C Orion aircraft were tasked, as well as four additional civilian search aircraft from the Australian mainland. A number of these aircraft were on station the next day in what was a measured and planned search operation.

Response during the 4259 incident

- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

Part 2 - Appropriateness of the Australian response

39. The second part of this chapter considers key questions on the appropriateness of the Australian response, including areas where protocols, policies and procedures did not provide adequate guidance for critical decisions in relation to the incidents. Specifically, this part of the chapter examines:
- (a) the appropriateness of AMSA's transfer to BASARNAS;
 - (b) the appropriateness of AMSA not accepting coordination lead for 4106 until 2221 AEST on 1 June;
 - (c) the appropriateness of AMSA not calling the 4106 'phone earlier; and
 - (d) the type and timings of BPC surveillance.
40. While Chapter 8 identifies the key information related to this assessment, it is helpful to summarise what was known by Australian government agencies at critical times.
- (a) In the first half of 2012 there had been a trend toward a greater proportion of SIEVs initiating contact with Australian authorities to request assistance. More SIEVs, (although not a greater proportion) have been initiating *unnecessary alerting*. There was a perception, with a reasonable basis that ventures were more deliberate in using the SAR system and calls for assistance to aid their journey to Christmas Island. Chapter 7 examined this phenomenon in more detail.
 - (b) On the morning of 21 June prior to 1135 AEST for BPC, and 1144 AEST for RCC Australia, the following information was known:
 - (i) The vessel had called for assistance; however the passengers were not consistent about some assertions relating to the vessel and passengers.

- [REDACTED]
- (ii) The vessel had called for assistance close to Indonesia and had been requested to turn back but did not comply.
 - (iii) The vessel had steadily continued passage south despite calling for assistance and had made reasonably consistent progress.
 - (iv) The passengers' principal assertion was that the vessel was taking on water, however that in itself was common and not a sufficient indicator of distress.
 - (v) The passengers had been asking if they were in Australian waters.
 - (vi) That nothing had been heard from the vessel since 2049 AEST the evening before.
 - (vii) That there was crying in the background of a call the previous day.
- [REDACTED]

- (c) After 1135 AEST, both agencies had separate corroborating information that the vessel was taking on water. Additionally it was known that the passengers were fearful for their lives.

41. In light of the above information, the Review considers that the assessment that the vessel was probably neither in distress nor in immediate need of assistance was a reasonable judgement up until 1239 AEST on 21 June.

The appropriateness of AMSA's hand-off to BASARNAS on 20 June given what was known about their capability

42. At 0201 AEST on 20 June RCC -A requested BASARNAS take overall coordination of the incident. Later that day BASARNAS made telephone calls (0745 and 0831 AEST) and subsequently confirmed by facsimile message to RCC Australia (at 0900 AEST) that it had accepted coordination authority. AMSA's decision to transfer this responsibility was made in the context of three key considerations:
- (a) That the SAR Arrangement and other conventions place the responsibility with the competent SAR authority of the SRR (in this case BASARNAS), and in certain circumstances, by agreement with the SAR authority more favorably placed to coordinate the operation.
- [REDACTED]
- (c) That the 4106 vessel, at the time of the transfer, was less than 40nm from Indonesian land and more than 180nm from Christmas Island. However by the evening of 20 June, the vessel was more than 100nm from Indonesian territory and less than 140nm from Christmas Island.
43. The Review draws the following conclusions concerning this action:
- (a) RCC Australia was responding in accordance with the SAR Arrangement and guidelines contained in the IAMSAR manual at paragraph 5.2;
 - (b) At the time of the transfer, this was a reasonable action – particularly given the distance of the vessel from Java as noted above;
 - (c) The Review noted that the RCC Australia log records that 'SAR coordination changed from AMSA to Foreign RCC' at the same time that AMSA sent the request to BASARNAS seeking transfer of coordination i.e. 0201 AEST on 20 June. However, the earliest indication of acceptance by BASARNAS was a phone call at 0745 AEST. During this period of five hours and 44 minutes, the RCC Australia log indicates that its actions were confined to conveying further information to BASARNAS (concerning subsequent calls from the vessel) rather than response type activities such as broadcasts to shipping.
 - (d) AMSA subsequently acted in accordance with requests for information from BASARNAS, as the responsible SAR authority, throughout the incident. All relevant information was passed to BASARNAS;

- [REDACTED]
- (e) The advice from Indonesian authorities that BASARNAS was coordinating with Indonesian Navy, Marine Security Agency and Marine Police, had issued a broadcast to shipping and that naval vessel had been sent out on the afternoon of 20 June would have provided RCC Australia with some reassurance that a response was underway.
 - (f) The fact that the vessel continued to make its way southward towards Christmas Island should have raised the level of concern for RCC Australia given the possibility that the vessel was beyond the reach of any Indonesian assistance – assistance that BASARNAS was unable to detail.
 - (g) On the other hand the longer the vessel made steady progress towards Christmas Island the stronger the view would have been that it was not really a vessel in distress at all; and
 - (h) RCC Australia could have adopted a more forward leaning posture in assisting with this SAR. This view is based on the actions of RCC Australia on 20 June before the visual sighting by the Dash-8 that reported that the vessel was underway at 4 knots. RCC Australia did not issue broadcasts to shipping while it was the responsible SAR authority between receiving a position from the vessel at 0126 AEST 20 June and transferring authority at 0745 AEST 20 June. After transfer of authority, RCC Australia offered to assist BASARNAS with satellite broadcast to shipping but did not follow up this question when no response was received.

Recommendation 10.3

It is recommended that up until and following the transfer of SAR coordination to BASARNAS, RCC Australia should proactively provide support to BASARNAS in areas of capability not held by Indonesian authorities, such as broadcasts to shipping and contacting the telecommunications provider.

The AMSA decision-making process

44. The Review also considered the manner in which the decision was made to transfer responsibility for this incident to BASARNAS. AMSA advised that whilst a decision for a matter like this would normally be escalated, this did not happen on this occasion given that the transfer occurred outside of normal working hours. Specifically the decision was taken by a SAR Mission Coordinator (an EL1 on shift). In the cases of SIEVs requesting assistance from within the Indonesian SRR there are range of considerations for RCC Australia including the significant resource implications of sending air and sea assets from Australia, the relationship with Indonesia, and the inherently difficult nature of determining how genuine the distress is. Given these considerations and what is at stake, the Review considers that judgements involving the transfer of SARs involving SIEVs should be taken by more senior officers. [REDACTED]

Recommendation 10.4

It is recommended that AMSA should put in place arrangements for Senior Executives to approve the transfer or acceptance of SAR coordination between RCC Australia and BASARNAS for SIEVs requesting assistance in the Indonesian SRR – both during and after normal working hours. Part of these arrangements should include collaboration with BPC [REDACTED]

The appropriateness of AMSA not calling the 4106 vessel or the telecommunications provider after 2100 20 June

15. RCC Australia had received calls for assistance from the satellite telephone on vessel on 19 and 20 June. The last call received from the vessel was at 2049 AEST 20 June. RCC Australia called the number shortly after at 2058 AEST and, when the call ended abruptly, RCC Australia attempted to ring the caller – but without any answer. BASARNAS also advised RCC Australia that it had attempted to call on the same evening but the phone was not answered. No further attempt was made to call the vessel or to contact the telecommunications provider between that time and 1432 AEST 21 June when the AMSA liaison officer to BPC was briefed on increasing concerns for the safety of the vessel. RCC Australia has advised that experience to date with SIEVs is that calls from Australian agencies to vessels requesting assistance are not answered.

46. The information supplied at the last call from the vessel was relevant to RCC Australia's assessment at that time that the vessel was not in danger of sinking and proceeding south to enter Australian waters. At that time, RCC Australia did not consider the break in the communications to be an indicator of distress. RCC Australia received a total of 16 calls from the vessel throughout the incident. There was no regular call pattern with the shortest interval between calls being 8 minutes and the longest being 13 hours and 6 minutes.
47. The Review notes that during the 4259 incident RCC Australia attempted to call the 4259 vessel phone several times and attempted to have the satellite telecommunications provider assist in contacting the phone twice during the first hour of the incident being known to them; all proved unsuccessful. Additionally, RCC Australia requested that AFP set up an *hourly schedule of calls* to the vessel within that first hour. A *schedule of calls* allows RCC Australia to monitor the progress of a vessel and monitor its safety. Unlike the circumstances of 4106, RCC Australia was, during the 4259 incident, the responsible SAR authority and had not handed over the lead to BASARNAS.
48. AMSA and Thuraya, the satellite telecommunications provider for the phone associated with the 4106 vessel, signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) for distress alerting in 2010. Through this MOU, AMSA can request trace records related to a Thuraya phone for a potential life threatening situation. Such a trace request where possible will provide AMSA with positional data on the phone as well as times of calls. AMSA did not levy a request to Thuraya during the 4106 incident.

Recommendation 10.5


It is recommended that AMSA, proactively attempt to communicate with SIEVs requesting assistance or where this is not possible, to locate the SIEVs using arrangements with telecommunications providers.

The appropriateness of AMSA not accepting coordination lead for 4106 until 2221 AEST on 21 June


49. BASARNAS accepted coordination authority for this incident by 0900 AEST on 20 June. During the time that BASARNAS was the coordinating lead, RCC Australia continued to offer assistance. At 1500 AEST 21 June, when RCC Australia had established that the vessel had overturned, it informed BASARNAS. BASARNAS was still the coordination authority at that time and formally retained that role until 2221 AEST on 21 June.
50. After the discovery of the vessel overturned and prior to BASARNAS formally offering the coordination lead for the incident, RCC Australia undertook all of the measures that would be undertaken if it were technically the coordination authority on the incident. This included Mayday relays and broadcasts to shipping, the tasking provision and coordination of search aircraft, communication of information to BASARNAS and communications with and coordination of merchant shipping responding to the incident. The fact that RCC Australia did not formally accept the role of coordination authority until late on 21 June did not make any difference to the outcome of the SAR operation conducted after 1500 AEST.

The appropriateness of the type of surveillance of the 4106 vessel on 20 June

51. On 20 June the Dash-8 based at Christmas Island was scheduled to conduct routine surveillance of the approaches to Christmas Island. The aircraft was tasked to relocate the vessel that, at that time, was the subject of a maritime SAR incident being coordinated by BASARNAS. The aircraft was tasked by BPC to conduct a *covert relocate*, or in other words the aircraft was to observe the vessel in a profile with a reduced risk that the vessel could detect the aircraft.
52. The aircraft conducted two separate surveillance patterns 5nm from the vessel and recorded full motion video using the aircraft electro-optic systems as well as acquiring handheld imagery. From this profile the state of the vessel could not be accurately evaluated, due in part to it being a hazy and cloudy day, and the sea state. At 1731 AEST the aircraft communicated that the vessel was 'difficult to classify' at that range. The aircraft was given permission from BPC AMSOC to fly a track closer to the vessel. During that communication, the Dash-8 requested permission for a photo pass, which would have put them in an overt rather than covert profile. BPC AMSOC did not give permission for the aircraft to conduct the photo pass.



53. A single 3nm covert pattern was then flown and additional imagery acquired. The Dash-8 crew was able to observe key facts about the vessel including course and speed, the fact that it was low in the water and that a person was observed climbing on the roof of the vessel. The aircraft also collected imagery and full motion video of the vessel. The aircraft advised AMSOC that this was the extent of their observations at the 3nm. From the imagery and observations AMSOC made an assessment on the state of the vessel.



54. [REDACTED]

55. The Review considered that the covert surveillance undertaken on 20 June was a reasonable course of action on the part of BPC.

The appropriateness of BPC not searching for the vessel earlier on 21 June

56. Prior to 1107 AEST on 21 June, there had not been any new information on the location of the 4106 venture or any new information relating to the material state of the vessel received by BPC. At that time there had been no communication with the vessel since the evening of 20 June and the maritime SAR incident attributed to the vessel remained under BASARNAS coordination authority. [REDACTED]
57. At 1138 AEST, BPC tasked the Dash-8 located at Christmas Island to relocate the 4106 vessel during its surveillance mission. At 1300 AEST this aircraft was preparing for a scheduled patrol of approaches to Christmas Island. At 1305 AEST HMA Ships *Wollongong* and *Larrakia* had been tasked to proceed to the edge of the Contiguous Zone (24nm boundary, and limit of law enforcement jurisdiction). These were the first direct actions leading to the rescue operation later in the day.
58. The Review considered whether it was reasonable for earlier action to not have been undertaken by BPC on 21 June to locate the vessel and ascertain its material state. In doing so the Review considered whether the information known to BPC at the time warranted earlier action, and whether BPC had sufficient capability to undertake earlier action.

Assessment of the maritime SAR incident and security threats on 21 June

59. [REDACTED] at approximately 1239 AEST 21 June, the collective view of relevant Australian agencies was that the 4106 vessel was not in distress. While the vessel had asked for assistance on 19 and 20 June, and by that action became subject of a maritime SAR incident, the assessment was that the vessel was not in imminent danger.
60. BPC did not receive any earlier request for assistance from either BASARNAS, as the responsible SAR authority for the maritime incident, or from RCC Australia as a supporting authority. BPC conducts operations in accordance with its maritime security mission and in order to diverge from that mission to relocate a vessel as part of a search operation would require tasking by the coordinating SAR authority or knowledge of distress.
61. [REDACTED] BPC assets at Christmas Island were therefore required to attend to their primary irregular maritime arrivals law enforcement interception responsibilities within the Australian Contiguous Zone. The disposition of assets was informed by the recent trend towards significantly higher number of ventures, higher numbers of passengers, the propensity for concurrent or simultaneous arrivals, and unforeseen arrivals. It was appropriate for BPC to take this information into account in relation to any surveillance or search activities. Attachment E5 provides part of the BPC submission on this issue and details the reasoning which informed the deployment of assets on that day.

Capacity of BPC to search earlier on 21 June

62. It would have been possible to task the Dash-8 to conduct a search for the vessel earlier. BPC notes, that with crew rest and [REDACTED] flight planning it would have been possible for the aircraft to commence at 1200 AEST or an hour earlier if it were deemed an emergency. The Review notes that this would have required a request or knowledge of distress some hours prior in order to undertake a search operation at that time. Given that the heightened concern for the vessel was realized at approximately 1250 AEST, it would not have been possible to launch the aircraft any earlier.
63. The surface response assets at Christmas Island had been actively attending to the arrival, boarding, processing, and transfer of arrivals from SIEVs 354 through 356. Both HMA Ships *Larrakia* and *Wollongong* were engaged in activities relating to those arrivals prior to 1300. At 1300 *Larrakia* was refuelling and *Wollongong* had a boarding party on the hulk of another SIEV. Measures were enacted that morning to ensure that if requested, BPC assets would be available to respond if tasked by AMSA or an emergency situation became evident. Excerpts from BPC's submission on this issue detailing the availability of the Christmas Island assets to conduct earlier search operation can be found in Attachment E5.

The Review concluded that the actions of BPC in not searching for the 4106 vessel any earlier on 21 June were reasonable.

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Attachment A: Terms of reference



Australian Government
Australian Customs and
Border Protection Service

TERMS OF REFERENCE

INTERNAL REVIEW INTO THE CAPSIZED VESSEL NORTH OF CHRISTMAS ISLAND OF 21 JUNE 2012 (SAR 2012 - 4106)

Introduction

1. On 21 June 2012 a vessel carrying a number of potential illegal immigrants went into distress north of Christmas Island. Whilst a number of people on the vessel were rescued, there was significant loss of life.
2. CEO Customs and Border Protection has directed that an Internal Review ('the review') of the incident be undertaken. The review is supported and endorsed by the Secretary Department of Defence, Chief of the Defence Force and CEO AMSA.

Review Task

3. You are to investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding the response to the incident from the time that the first information of the venture was received to the point when search and recovery operations ceased ('the period').
4. You are to:
 - a. produce a narrative of events drawn from all available sources for the period, appropriately verified by relevant senior officials;
 - b. identify the relevant policies, processes and procedures applicable to the response to the incident
 - c. ascertain whether the relevant policies, processes and procedures were applied during the incident and whether they were effective;
 - d. identify whether any changes to policies, processes and procedures should be considered to improve the response to any possible similar occurrences; and
 - e. identify issues that require further investigation or analysis.
5. In conducting the review and preparing the report it is necessary to be cognizant of the potential for parallel investigations (including Coroner or Parliamentary inquiries) to be conducted. All reasonable measures are to be taken to ensure that there is no conflict between the conduct of the Internal Review, and those potential inquiries.

Documentation

6. The following are to accompany the report:
 - a. the Internal Review direction;
 - b. all source documents used to compile both the narrative and detailed chronology of events; and
 - c. copies of relevant policies, processes and procedures applicable to the response to the incident.
7. Appropriate measures are to be taken to ensure that any privileged or confidential material (including national security or intelligence material) is appropriately handled, including in the preparation of classified annexures to the final report.

Michael Carnody
CEO
Customs and Border Protection
25 June 2012

Endorsed

Duncan Lewis
Secretary
Department of Defence
25 June 2012

David Hurley
CDF
25 June 2012

Mick Kinley
Acting CEO
AMSA
25 June 2012

Attachment A: Terms of reference



Australian Government
Australian Customs and
Border Protection Service

TERMS OF REFERENCE
INTERNAL REVIEW INTO THE CAPSIZED VESSEL NORTH OF
CHRISTMAS ISLAND OF 21 JUNE 2012 (SAR 2012 - 4106)

AND

INTO THE SINKING OF A VESSEL NORTH OF CHRISTMAS ISLAND OF 27 JUNE 2012 (SAR 2012 - 4259)

Introduction

- 1 On 25 June 2012 CEO Customs and Border Protection directed that an Internal Review into the capsized vessel north of Christmas Island of 21 June 2012 (SAR 2012 - 4106) be undertaken
- 2 On 27 June 2012, another vessel went into distress and sank north of Christmas Island. While there were a number of people from this vessel that were rescued, there was nonetheless, loss of life ("the additional incident")
- 3 Acting CEO Customs and Border Protection has directed that the terms of reference for the Internal Review into the capsized vessel north of Christmas Island of 21 June 2012 be expanded to include the additional incident. These terms of reference are in addition to those issued by the CEO Customs and Border Protection of 25 June 2012
- 4 The terms of reference for the expanded internal review are supported and endorsed by the Secretary Department of Defence, Chief of the Defence Force and CEO AMSA

Review Task

- 5 You are to investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding the response to the additional incident from the time that the first information of the venture was received to the point when search and recovery operations ceased ("the period")
- 6 You are to:
 - a produce a narrative of events drawn from all available sources for the period, appropriately verified by relevant senior officials;
 - b identify the relevant policies, processes and procedures applicable to the response to the incident
 - c ascertain whether the relevant policies, processes and procedures were applied during the incident and whether they were effective;
 - d identify whether any changes to policies, processes and procedures should be considered to improve the response to any possible similar occurrences; and
 - e identify issues that require further investigation or analysis
- 7 In conducting the review and preparing the report it is necessary to be cognizant of the potential for parallel investigations (including Coroner or Parliamentary inquiries) to be conducted. All reasonable measures are to be taken to ensure that there is no conflict between the conduct of the Internal Review, and those potential inquiries

Documentation

- 8 The following are to accompany the report:
 - a the Internal Review direction;
 - b all source documents used to compile both the narrative and detailed chronology of events; and
 - c copies of relevant policies, processes and procedures applicable to the response to the incident
- 9 Appropriate measures are to be taken to ensure that any privileged or confidential material (including national security or intelligence material) is appropriately handled, including in the preparation of classified annexures to the final report

Michael Pezzullo
Acting CEO
Customs and Border Protection

29 June 2012

Endorsed

Duncan Lewis
Secretary
Department of Defence
June 2012

David Hurley
CDF
June 2012

Mick Kintley
Acting CEO
AMSA
June 2012

Attachment A: Terms of reference



Australian Government
Australian Customs and
Border Protection Service

FURTHER TERMS OF REFERENCE

**INTERNAL REVIEW INTO THE CAPSIZED VESSEL NORTH
OF CHRISTMAS ISLAND OF 21 JUNE 2012 (SAR 2012 - 4106)
AND
INTO THE SINKING OF A VESSEL NORTH
OF CHRISTMAS ISLAND OF 27 JUNE 2012 (SAR 2012 - 4259)**

Introduction

1. On 25 June 2012 CEO Customs and Border Protection directed that an Internal Review into the capsized vessel north of Christmas Island of 21 June 2012 (SAR 2012 - 4106) be undertaken.
2. On 29 June 2012 Acting CEO Customs and Border Protection directed that the terms of reference for the Internal Review be expanded to include the vessel that went into distress and sank on 27 June 2012 (SAR 2012- 4259).

Additional Review Task

3. Further to the terms of reference of 25 and 29 June 2012, as part of your report you are to include a definitive judgment on the issue of timeliness of the reporting of information from Defence and Border Protection Command (BPC) in connection with SAR 2012-4106. Should it become necessary for you to interview staff from Defence or BPC you are authorised to do so. If you take this step you should seek legal assistance so as to ensure that the approach is not prejudicial to any subsequent enquiry.

Michael Cammody
CEO
Customs and Border Protection
13 August 2012

Endorsed

Duncan Lewis
Secretary
Department of Defence
August 2012

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August 2012

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Key Events Chronology - SAR 2012/4106

Time	Source	To	Type	Summary of Activity	Original Information	Reference
19 JUNE 2012						
BPC SIEV Arrival Matrix (1732 AEST 18 JUN): Christmas Island / Cocos Keeling Islands - 2 MEDIUM threat ventures						
BPC Assigned Surface Vessels to Christmas Island: HMAS WOLLONGONG and HMAS LARRAKIA						
BPC Assigned Aircraft Surveillance: RAAF AP-3C Orion: Area [REDACTED] CBP: BPC Dash 8: Area [REDACTED] (north and north western bias)						
[REDACTED]						
2152AEST (1152Z)	Vessel in Distress	AMSA RCC-A	Phone Call	First call from vessel received. RCC-A is unable to understand the caller. Caller disconnects.	AMSA Log Entry: "Call received. Not able to understand caller hung up." Telephone Call Summary - Part I: "I cannot hear you, you need to get out of the wind." Telephone Call Summary - Part II: "RCC: You're on a boat. Can you tell me where you are? No good conditions do you have a GPS position? Caller can't be understood. "No life jackets, we are from Indonesia." Telephone Call Summary - Part III: RCC: "I cannot hear what you are saying, you need to get out of the wind."	AMSA Log
2159 AEST (1159Z)	Vessel in Distress	AMSA RCC-A	Phone Call	Second call from vessel is received. Caller advises: - No lifejackets - "Please help me", "Help me help me" - 250 people in small boat - From Indonesia	Telephone Call Summary: "Caller: We have no life jackets, RCC: For me to help you, you need to tell me where you are. I don't know where you are. Do you have GPS? Caller repeats 'no life jackets' but does not provide GPS coordinates." AMSA Log Entry: "SIEV: No lifejackets "Please help me" "250 people in small boat" "come from Indonesia" "Help me help me"	Telephone Call / AMSA Log Entry
2203 AEST (1203Z)	AMSA RCC-A	N/A	Log Note	SAR coordination set to AMSA RCC-A.	AMSA Log Entry: "SAR coordination set to AMSA"	AMSA Log
2207 AEST (1207Z)	Vessel in Distress	AMSA RCC-A	Phone Call	Third call from vessel is received. No information obtained - call lost.	Telephone Call Summary: "RCC: Do you have your position? Call ends." AMSA Log Entry: "SIEV: Call lost"	Telephone Call / AMSA Log Entry
2211 AEST (1211Z)	Vessel in Distress	AMSA RCC-A	Phone Call	Fourth call from vessel is received. Vessel advises: - No water - Don't know where they are - No life jackets - No EPIRB	Telephone Call Summary: "RCC: "You need to tell me your GPS position" Caller hard to understand repeating 'no water, no life jackets'. Caller advises he doesn't know where they are. RCC: "How long have you been at sea? What language do you speak?" AMSA Log Entry: "GPS? No water, don't know where we are. No EPIRB, Danger South?"	Telephone Call / AMSA Log Entry
2217 AEST (1217Z)	Vessel in Distress	AMSA RCC-A	Phone Call	Fifth call from vessel is received. No further information received.	Telephone Call Summary: "Cannot hear caller due to wind. RCC: "What is your position?". Caller gives position but hard to understand." "Caller saying same position. RCC try to explain they do not know their position." AMSA Log Entry: "SIEV: - No life jackets - Don't know - No EPIRB - Could not get position or phone number"	Telephone Call / AMSA Log Entry

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2221 AEST (1221Z)	AMSA RCC-A	BPC (AMSOC)	Unknown	RCC-A advises BPC (AMSOC) of the phone calls made from the vessel. (Initial notification)	AMSA Log Entry: "RCC - AMSOC: RCC received several phone calls reporting from an unknown caller stated (word to the effect of): - vessel in distress - don't have a position - don't have water - there are no lifejackets - they are in danger - they don't have an EPIRB The caller asked for help stating there were 250 people on a small boat and the word 'asylum' was referenced. The vessel departed from Indonesia - No phone number has been obtained.	BPC (AMSOC) Operations Incident Log / Phone Message
2228/9 AEST (1228/9Z)	BPC (AMSOC)	Duty Director / BPC (-IC)	Verbal Briefing	BPC (AMSOC) advises BPC (-IC) of possible SAR incident.	BPC (AMSOC) Log Entry: "AMSOC - BPC IC - Information provided to AMSOC at 2221 AEST provided to BPC IC (G HUTTON also as Duty Director) - No action provided from BPC IC"	BPC (AMSOC) Operations Incident Log
2229 AEST (1229Z)	Vessel in Distress	AMSA RCC-A	Phone Call	Sixth call from vessel is received. AMSA RCC-A tries to ascertain position but caller doesn't understand.	Telephone Call Summary: "RCC-A tries to ascertain GPS numbers but caller doesn't understand RCC instruction" AMSA Log Entry: "SIEV: Could not understand anything from the vessel."	Telephone Call / AMSA Log Entry
2238 AEST (1238Z)	Vessel in Distress	AMSA RCC-A	Phone Call	Seventh call from vessel is received. Vessel advises they are in international waters and there is water on the boat.	Telephone Call Summary "Caller advises there is a lot of water in the boat and need help. Call put through to translator but lost connection with vessel" AMSA Log Entry: "SIEV: International waters water on the boat."	Telephone Call / AMSA Log Entry
2242 AEST (1242Z)	BPC (AMSOC)	BPC (COMBPC)	Email	BPC (AMSOC) advises BPC (COMBPC) of information from AMSA RCC-A	AMSA Log Entry: "AMSOC - COMBPC: Email advising COMBPC of information from RCC" Document Overview: "At 2221 AEST, RCC provided info re: 4 x calls from a vessel that departed Indonesia. 1st call at 2153 AEST and the last call at 2211 AEST. No sat phone number was ascertained."	BPC (AMSOC) Operations Incident Log / Document
2245 AEST (1245Z)	BPC (AMSOC)	BPC (-IC)	Phone Call	BPC (AMSOC) advises BPC (-IC) of a possible SAR with 250 persons on board, north of Christmas Island	BPC Log Entry: "Adam Caray (in AMSOC) called and gave heads up on possible SAR wrt boat to north of CI with poss 250 POB."	BPC (-IC) Log
29 JUNE 2012						
BPC SIEV Arrival Matrix (1840 AEST 19 JUN): Christmas Island / Cocos / Keeling Islands - 5 MEDIUM threat ventures						
BPC Assigned Surface Vessels to Christmas Island: HMAS WOLLONGONG and HMAS LARRAKIA						
BPC Assigned Aircraft Surveillance: RAAF AP-3C ORION; Area [REDACTED] CBP: BPC Dash 8: Area [REDACTED] (north and north western bias)						
0004 AEST (1404Z 19 JUN)	AMSA RCC-A	BASARNAS BPC (AMSOC) JAKARTA JOC	Email	AMSA RCC-A advises BASARNAS of the distress calls from a vessel which departed Indonesia. AMSA RCC-A request BASARNAS to provide available information regarding any vessel departure that matched the description.	AMSA Log Entry: "191404Z JUN 2012 FM RCC AUSTRALIA TO INDONESIA BASARNAS BT UNCLAS SUBJ: VESSEL IN DISTRESS 250 POB AUSSAR: 2012/4106 1. RCC AUSTRALIA RECEIVED SEVERAL DISTRESS CALLS FROM A VESSEL WHICH HAD DEPARTED INDONESIA. THE FIRST CALL WAS RECEIVED VIA SATELLITE PHONE AT 191152Z. SPECIFIC DETAILS FOR THE VESSEL WERE VERY DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN DUE TO THE POOR PHONE CONNECTION AND LANGUAGE BARRIER. 2. RCC AUSTRALIA WERE ABLE TO DISCERN THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: A) A VESSEL HAD DEPARTED INDONESIA WITH POSSIBLY 215 OR 250 PEOPLE ONBOARD AND WAS CURRENTLY IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS B) POB HAD NO DRINKING WATER, LIFE JACKETS OR EPIRB C) CONTACT REPORTED WATER COMING INTO THE BOAT AND REQUESTED ASSISTANCE D) CONTACT SAID HE SPOKE ARABIC 3. NO POSITION INFORMATION OR CONTACT NUMBER WERE PASSED DURING THE CALL. RCC AUSTRALIA ATTEMPTED TO HAVE AN ARABIC INTERPRETER SPEAK TO THE CONTACT ONBOARD BUT THE CONNECTION WAS LOST PRIOR TO THE CONVERSATION COMMENCING. LAST CONTACT WITH THE VESSEL WAS 191244Z. THERE HAVE BEEN NO FURTHER CALLS. 4. RCC AUSTRALIA REQUEST THAT BASARNAS PROVIDE AVAILABLE INFORMATION REGARDING ANY VESSEL DEPARTURES WHICH MAY MATCH THIS DESCRIPTION. 5. REQUEST BASARNAS ACKNOWLEDGE THIS MESSAGE. 6. YOUR ASSISTANCE IS APPRECIATED. REGARDS, RCC AUSTRALIA BT"	AMSA Log / Email / First Secretary, Jakarta, ACBPS Log

Key Events Chronology - SAR 2012/4106

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0104 AEST (1504Z 19 JUN)	AMSA RCC-A	First Secretary, Jakarta, ACBPS	Email	AMSA RCC-A provides First Secretary, Jakarta, ACBPS with further information on the vessel possibly in distress.	First Secretary, Jakarta, ACBPS Log Entry: "Received email advice from AMSA RCC advising of possible distress situation (email title: "VESSEL IN DISTRESS 204 POB)"	First Secretary, Jakarta, ACBPS Log
0106 AEST (1506Z 19 JUN)	Vessel in Distress	AMSA RCC-A	Phone Call	<p>Eightth call from vessel is received. Caller advises:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ship is broken on one side - 204 people on board - Three days from Jakarta - No women or children - all men - Don't know number of phone - A lot of wind - Situation bad 	<p>AMSA Log Entry: "SIEV: Ship is broken on one side 204 POB three days from Jakarta. No women, no children, all men. Don't know number of phone. A lot of wind. Situation bad water high water coming into..."</p> <p>Telephone Call Summary "Caller: My ship is broken, 204 people on board". RCC asking for boat description. Caller: "No children on board, no women, just men." Transferred to Persian Interpreter. Lost caller."</p>	Telephone Call / AMSA Log Entry
0126-0128 AEST (1526-1528Z 19 JUN)	Vessel in Distress	AMSA RCC-A	Phone Call	<p>Ninth call from vessel is received. Caller advises:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Position: 07 27.873 South 105 07.481 East - 204 males onboard - Located 76' south of Indonesian mainland - Hull damage <p>AMSA RCC-A advises the caller that the vessel was still in Indonesian waters and needs to turn back.</p>	<p>AMSA Log Entry: "SIEV: 07 27.873 South 105 07.481 East." "SIEV with 204 males onboard reports hull damage and in position 07 27.8 South 105 07.48 East." "Vessel is located 76' south of Indonesian mainland. Told vessel they are still in Indonesian waters and need to turn back. They responded "OK OK OK" and hung up. Position given as 07 27.873 South 105 07.481 East."</p> <p>Telephone Call Overview: "GPS coordinates were provided. "Turn back to Indonesia, you are in Indonesian SRR"</p>	AMSA Log / Telephone Call
0131 AEST (201531Z 19 JUN)	AMSA RCC-A	BPC (AMSOC)	Log Note	AMSA RCC-A advise BPC (AMSOC) that it had received further calls from the vessel claiming to be distress.	<p>BPC (AMSOC) Log Entry: "RCC-AMSOC:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Position received for the vessel in distress 0727.80S 10507.48E, approx 36nm south of the Sunda Strait - Vessel advised of a problem with the side of the vessel - RCC advised them to 'turn back to Indonesia' - There are reportedly 104 people on board (all adult males)" 	BPC (AMSOC) Log
0201 AEST (1801Z 19 JUN)	AMSA RCC-A	BASARNAS / JOC / AMSOC / First Secretary Jakarta, ACBPS	Log Note	AMSA RCC-A advises BASARNAS of further contact with the vessel. RCC-A requests that BASARNAS take coordination of the incident.	AMSA Email - Subject VESSEL IN DISTRESS 204 POB. R 10101Z JUN 2012 FM RCC AUSTRALIA TO INDONESIAN BASARNAS BT	AMSA Log
0204 AEST (1804Z 19 JUN)	AMSA RCC-A	BASARNAS / JOC / AMSOC / JAKARTA	Email	<p>AMSA RCC-A advises BASARNAS of the subsequent calls made by vessel.</p> <p>AMSA RCC-A request that BASARNAS take co-ordination of the incident.</p>	AMSA Log Entry: "R 191601Z JUN 2012 FM RCC AUSTRALIA TO INDONESIAN BASARNAS BT UNCLAS SUBJ: VESSEL IN DISTRESS 204 POB AUSSAR: 2012/4106 1. RCC AUSTRALIA HAS HAD FURTHER CONTACT WITH THE VESSEL PREVIOUSLY REPORTED AT 191400UTC. 2. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM A CALL MADE AT 191528Z. DETAILS AS FOLLOWS: A) VESSEL IN POSITION: 07 27.80S 105 07.48E AT 191525UTC (36NM SOUTH OF INDONESIAN MAINLAND). B) CONTACT REQUESTED ASSISTANCE AS THE VESSEL HAD SUFFERED HULL DAMAGE ON ONE SIDE AND WAS TAKING ON WATER. C) 204 POB. ALL MALE, NO WOMEN OR CHILDREN. D) VESSEL DEPARTED JAKARTA ON THE 16-17 JUN. 3. RCC AUSTRALIA WERE UNABLE TO ACQUIRE A CONTACT NUMBER OR DESCRIPTION FOR THE VESSEL. 4. RCC AUSTRALIA ADVISED THE CONTACT ONBOARD THAT IF THE VESSEL HAS SUFFERED SIGNIFICANT HULL DAMAGE AND WAS TAKING ON WATER THE SAFEST COURSE OF ACTION WOULD BE TO RETURN TO INDONESIA. THE CONTACT ACKNOWLEDGED THIS INFORMATION AND ENDED THE CALL. RCC AUSTRALIA HAS HAD NO FURTHER CONTACT WITH THE VESSEL. 5. RCC AUSTRALIA REQUEST THAT BASARNAS TAKE COORDINATION OF THE INCIDENT."	AMSA Log / Email
0206 AEST (1806Z 19 JUN)	AMSA RCC-A	BASARNAS	Phone Call	AMSA RCC-A asks BASARNAS if they are happy to take coordination of the incident while in the Indonesian SRR. BASARNAS advise they will coordinate with their assets.	<p>AMSA Log Entry: "Received information. BASARNAS Iman is confirming coordination with his boss. Wki advise by fax/email."</p> <p>Telephone Call Overview: "RCC ask BASARNAS if they are happy to take coordination of the incident while in Indonesian SRR. BASARNAS advise they will coordinate with their assets."</p>	AMSA Log / Telephone Call

Time	Source	To	Type	Summary of Activity	Original Information	Reference
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0501 AEST (1901Z 10 JUN)	AMSA RCC-A	BASARNAS	Phone Call	AMSA RCC-A make a follow up call to BASARNAS regarding the acceptance of coordination.	Follow up call with BASARNAS regarding acceptance of coordination, vessel position points, hull damage. All persons on board are male - no female or children.	AMSA Log

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0508 AEST (1900Z 19 JUN)	AMSA RCC-A	BASARNAS	Email	AMSA RCC-A send a second written request to BASARNAS requesting they take on SAR coordination	AMSA Log Entry: "Second request sent to BASARNAS for incident coordination. 101001Z JUN 2012 FM RCC AUSTRALIA TO INDONESIAN BASARNAS BT UNCLAS SUBJ: VESSEL IN DISTRESS 204 POB AUSSAR: 2012/4106 1. REQUEST BASARNAS ADVISE ACCEPTANCE OF COORDINATION OF THIS INCIDENT AS REQUESTED AT 191601UTC AND FOLLOW UP TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN RCC AUSTRALIA AND BASARNAS AT 191606UTC JUNE 2012. REGARDS RCC AUSTRALIA R 191601Z JUN 2012 FM RCC AUSTRALIA TO INDONESIAN BASARNAS BT UNCLAS SUBJ: VESSEL IN DISTRESS 204 POB AUSSAR: 2012/4106 1. RCC AUSTRALIA HAS HAD FURTHER CONTACT WITH THE VESSEL PREVIOUSLY REPORTED AT 191400UTC. 2. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM A CALL MADE AT 191528Z. DETAILS AS FOLLOWS: A) VESSEL IN POSITION: 07 27.80S 105 07.48E AT 191525UTC (38NM SOUTH OF INDDONESIAN MAINLAND). B) CONTACT REQUESTED ASSISTANCE AS THE VESSEL HAD SUFFERED HULL DAMAGE ON ONE SIDE AND WAS TAKING ON WATER. C) 204 POB: ALL MALE, NO WOMEN OR CHILDREN. D) VESSEL DEPARTED JAKARTA ON THE 16-17 JUN. 3. RCC AUSTRALIA WERE UNABLE TO ACQUIRE A CONTACT NUMBER OR DESCRIPTION FOR THE VESSEL. 4. RCC AUSTRALIA ADVISED THE CONTACT ONBOARD THAT IF THE VESSEL HAS SUFFERED SIGNIFICANT HULL DAMAGE AND WAS TAKING ON WATER THE SAFEST COURSE OF ACTION WOULD BE TO RETURN TO INDONESIA. THE CONTACT ACKNOWLEDGED THIS INFORMATION AND ENDED THE CALL. RCC AUSTRALIA HAS HAD NO FURTHER CONTACT WITH THE VESSEL. 5. RCC AUSTRALIA REQUEST THAT BASARNAS TAKE CO-ORDINATION OF THE INCIDENT."	AMSA Log / Email
0521 AEST (1912Z 19 JUN)	Vessel in Distress	AMSA RCC-A	Phone Call	Tenth call from the vessel is received. Caller advises it is taking on water and its location (007 31 52.15 South 105 10 39.08 East).	AMSA Chronology entry: "Taking water 007 31 52.15 South 105 10 39.08 East. Very bad line. File note 42 nautical miles south of Sunda Strait"	AMSA Log (Not found on Call Parrot recorder)
0605 AEST (2005Z 19 JUN)	HMAS WOLLONGONG	N/A	Event	HMAS WOLLONGONG boards SIEV 354.	BPC (AMSOC) Chronology: "At approximately 0605, WOLLONGONG boarded the first CO12, now known as SIEV 354. 61 adult male PILs, believed to be from Sri Lanka, were onboard."	BPC (AMSOC) Chronology
0615 AEST (2015Z 19 JUN)	AMSA RCC-A	BASARNAS / BPC (AMSOC) / First Secretary, Jakarta, ACBPS	Email	RCC-A provide BASARNAS, BPC (AMSOC) and First Secretary, Jakarta, ACBPS with an updated position of the SAR incident.	AMSA Log Entry: "192015Z JUN 2012 FM RCC AUSTRALIA TO INDONESIAN BASARNAS INFO BPC AMSOC ROBERT BYRNE BT UNCLAS SUBJ: VESSEL IN DISTRESS 204 POB 42NM SOUTH OF SUNDA STRAIT AUSSAR: 2012/4106 1. RCC AUSTRALIA HAS RECEIVED ANOTHER PHONE CALL FROM VESSEL IN DISTRESS WITH 204 PERSONS ONBOARD IN POSITION 07 31.52S 105 10.39E ADVISING THEY ARE TAKING WATER AND REQUIRE ASSISTANCE. THE POSITION IS APPROXIMATELY 42NM SOUTH OF SUNDA STRAIT. 2. REQUEST BASARNAS ADVISE ACCEPTANCE OF COORDINATION OF THIS INCIDENT AS REQUESTED AT 191601UTC AND FOLLOW UP TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN RCC AUSTRALIA AND BASARNAS AT 191606UTC JUNE 2012. REGARDS RCC AUSTRALIA R 191601Z JUN 2012 FM RCC AUSTRALIA TO INDONESIAN BASARNAS BT UNCLAS SUBJ: VESSEL IN DISTRESS 204 POB AUSSAR: 2012/4106 1. RCC AUSTRALIA HAS HAD FURTHER CONTACT WITH THE VESSEL PREVIOUSLY REPORTED AT 191400UTC. 2. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM A CALL MADE AT 191528Z. DETAILS AS FOLLOWS: A) VESSEL IN POSITION: 07 27.80S 105 07.48E AT 191525UTC (38NM SOUTH OF INDDONESIAN MAINLAND). B) CONTACT REQUESTED ASSISTANCE AS THE VESSEL HAD SUFFERED HULL DAMAGE ON ONE SIDE AND WAS TAKING ON WATER. C) 204 POB: ALL MALE, NO WOMEN OR CHILDREN. D) VESSEL DEPARTED JAKARTA ON THE 16-17 JUN. 3. RCC AUSTRALIA WERE UNABLE TO ACQUIRE A CONTACT NUMBER OR DESCRIPTION FOR THE VESSEL. 4. RCC AUSTRALIA ADVISED THE CONTACT ONBOARD THAT IF THE VESSEL HAS SUFFERED SIGNIFICANT HULL DAMAGE AND WAS TAKING ON WATER THE SAFEST COURSE OF ACTION WOULD BE TO RETURN TO INDONESIA. THE CONTACT ACKNOWLEDGED THIS INFORMATION AND ENDED THE CALL. RCC AUSTRALIA HAS HAD NO FURTHER CONTACT WITH THE VESSEL. 5. RCC AUSTRALIA REQUEST THAT BASARNAS TAKE CO-ORDINATION OF THE INCIDENT. REGARDS, RCC AUSTRALIA BT"	AMSA Log / Email
0650 AEST (2050Z 19 JUN)	Vessel in Distress	AMSA RCC-A	Phone Call	Eleventh call from the vessel is received. Caller provides position update (~7.52.51S South 105 10 39.08 East). Advises that boat is "going down in the water".	AMSA Log Entry: "007 52.51S [South] 105 10 39.08 [East] very windy, 204 people just old men + boys. Doesn't know phone number. Boat has problem "going down in the water". Slow because of water." Telephone Call Overview: Caller states position and mentions there are old men and boys onboard.	AMSA Log / Telephone Call
0745 AEST (2145Z 19 JUN)	AMSA RCC-A	BASARNAS	Phone Call	BASARNAS confirms by telephone that they are coordinating the incident with local RCC and Navy.	AMSA Log Entry: "BASARNAS (iman) confirmed by telephone they are coordinating this incident with local RCC and Navy. RCC Australia requested hardcopy of confirmation." Telephone Call Overview: "RCC call to BASARNAS to confirm receipt of fax email advising of vessel in distress with 204 POB and providing position. BASARNAS confirmed they are coordinating SAR and RCC advised they will lead coordination"	AMSA Log / Telephone Call
0750 AEST (2150Z 19 JUN)	HMAS LARRAKIA	N/A	Event	HMAS LARRAKIA boards SIEV 355 approximately 8nm north-west of Christmas Island.	BPC (AMSOC) Chronology: "At approximately 0750, LARRAKIA boarded the CO13, now known as SIEV 355, approximately 8nm north-west of CI. 70 adult male PILs were onboard, believed to be from Sri Lanka."	BPC (AMSOC) Chronology

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Time	Source	To	Type	Summary of Activity	Original Information	Reference
[REDACTED]						
0831 AEST (2231Z 19 JUN)	BASARNAS	AMSA RCC-A	Phone Call	Second verbal confirmation that BASARNAS were coordinating the SAR incident with Navy, Police and RCC's.	AMSA Log Entry: "From Iman BASARNAS: BASARNAS is coordinating - confirmed. Will send fax Liaising with navy, police, RCC's no phone number of vessel available RCC Aus calculations vessel drifting to S/E @ 1kt RCC Aus will pass any new info to BASARNAS." AMSA Telephone Call Overview: "BASARNAS call to RCC confirming they are still coordinating with Navy in West Java, Police and Radio Station. RCC requested a fax from BASARNAS confirming they are coordinating. No phone number at this stage. Drift position provided."	AMSA Log AMSA / Telephone Call
0900 AEST (2300Z 19 JUN)	BASARNAS	AMSA RCC-A	Log Note	BASARNAS confirms it is taking coordination and advises that they will issue a broadcast to all vessels.	AMSA Log Entry: "From BASARNAS - Ref all your information Ausar [sic] 2012/4106 about the distress vessel, was following BASARNAS action: - give urgency broadcast to all vessel closed [sic] the distress position by Indonesia coast Radio Station, Navy and Marine Police. BASARNAS still investigate this position and take coordination for this vessel and request your assistance if the distress vessel is going to Christmas [sic] Island closely."	AMSA Log
0923 AEST (2323 19 JUN)	BASARNAS	AMSA RCC-A	Fax	BASARNAS confirms by fax that they will be coordinating the incident	AMSA Log Entry: "[Outside AMSA] Message from "CER-ERC01". [refers to fax from BASARNAS accepting coordination - referred to in later messages as 192323 UTC from BASARNAS- NOT ON FILE]" Document Overview: "Copy of fax from BASARNAS which states emergency broadcast to all vessels in the area, and that BASARNAS will continue to investigate and take coordination for distressed vessel."	AMSA Log / Document
0932 AEST (2332Z 19 JUN)	AMSA RCC-A	First Secretary, Jakarta, ACBPS	Email	AMSA RCC-A advises First Secretary, Jakarta, ACBPS of confirmation from BASARNAS that they will coordinate the incident.	First Secretary, Jakarta, ACBPS Log Entry: "Received email from AMSA RCC: RCC Australia has received a fax in the last 10 minutes confirming their coordination of this incident. Thankyou R&DS RCC AUSTRALIA"	First Secretary, Jakarta, ACBPS Log / Email
[REDACTED]						
0947 AEST (2347Z 19 JUN)	HMAS WOLLONGONG	N/A	Event	HMAS WOLLONGONG arrives at Christmas Island with SIEV 354.	BPC (AMSOC) Chronology: "HMAS WOLLONGONG arrives at Flying Fish Cove with SIEV 354"	BPC (AMSOC) Chronology
[REDACTED]						

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1052 AEST (0052Z)	BASARNAS	AMSA RCC-A	Log Note	AMSA RCC-A receives further confirmation that BASARNAS is coordinating the SAR	AMSA Log Entry: "RCC Australia has received confirmation by telephone at 192145 UTC and then by fax at 192323 UTC that they [BASARNAS] is coordinating this incident. BASARNAS only request is for updates from RCC Australia from any received telephone calls from the vessel."	AMSA Log
1054 AEST (0054Z)	AMSA RCC-A	BPC (AMSOC)	Email	AMSA RCC-A advises BPC (AMSOC) that BASARNAS is coordinating the SAR incident.	BPC (AMSOC) Log Entry: " - RCC advises AMSOC that BASARNAS is coordinating the incident"	BPC (AMSOC) Log / Email
1100 AEST (0100Z)	HMAS LARRAKIA	N/A	Event	HMAS LARRAKIA arrives at Christmas Island with SIEV 355	BPC (AMSOC) Chronology: "HMAS LARRAKIA arrives at Flying Fish Cove with SIEV 355"	BPC (AMSOC) Chronology
1133 AEST (0133Z)	HMAS LARRAKIA	N/A	Event	HMAS LARRAKIA concludes offload of passengers from SIEV 354 and commenced preparing condition report for SIEV 355. HMAS WOLLONGONG reconstitutes in preparation to head west to intercept another contact of interest that is approaching the Australian Contiguous Zone from the west of Christmas Island.	BPC (AMSOC) Chronology: "HMAS LARRAKIA concludes offload of passengers from SIEV 354 and commenced preparing condition report for SIEV 355. HMAS WOLLONGONG reconstituted in preparation to head west to intercept another contact of interest, approaching the ASCZ from west of Christmas Island."	BPC (AMSOC) Chronology
1316 AEST (0316Z)	Vessel	AMSA RCC-A	Phone Call	Twelfth call from vessel is received. Caller provides position update (07 47 37.23 South 105 06 48.56 East). Caller states they are taking on water and have life jackets.	AMSA Log Entry: "From SIEV with 204 POB: 07 47 37.23 [South] 105 06 48.56 [East] Position, people crying? taking water 098821676061749 204 POB, Life Jackets, Yes."	AMSA Log
1345 AEST (0345Z)	AMSA RCC-A	BASARNAS / First Secretary, Jakarta, ACBPS / AMSOC	Email	AMSA RCC-A provides BASARNAS with updated coordinates	AMSA Log Entry: "Vessel in distress WITH 204 POB. To BASARNAS - RCC Australia has just received another telephone call from the vessel you are now coordinating for SAR with 204 POB. Position given at 200310 UTC is 0747 37.23 South 105 06 48.56 East. The call was very broken and hard to understand but RCC Australia has advised that Indonesian [sic] is coordinating this incident and RCC Australia is passing the details to you." First Secretary, Jakarta, ACBPS Log: "Received email from AMSA RCC-R 200342Z JUN 2912 FM RCC AUSTRALIA TO INDONESIAN BASARNAS INFO BPC AMSOC report"	AMSA Log / First Secretary, Jakarta, ACBPS Log / RCC-A Email
1400-1500 AEST (0400-0500Z)	PSIAT	BPC (AMSOC) / AFP / DIAC /	Meeting	Multi-agency discussion regarding maritime people smuggling threats (People Smuggling Operational Group Meeting)	N/A	N/A
1400 AEST (0400Z)	AMSA RCC-A	BASARNAS	Phone Call	AMSA RCC-A notifies BASARNAS that they had sent an email and fax to them with latest positions of the vessel	AMSA Log Entry: "To BASARNAS: Passed you email & fax with latest positions of vessel you are coordinating. 07 47 37.23S 105 06 48.56E Phone Number 6821676061749 Please pass information to them. Thankyou, will pass" Telephone Call Overview: "Confirming BASARNAS has received email from RCC with updated position of vessel in distress. RCC advised they have not called the sat phone as BASARNAS has coord"	AMSA Log / Telephone Call
1408 AEST (0408Z)	BPC (AMSOC)		Document	BPC (AMSOC) task (Customs DASH 8) for surveillance	BPC (AMSOC) Log Entry: "AMSOC Dash 8 Surveillance Plan, Mission"	BPC (AMSOC) Log / Document

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Time	Source	To	Type	Summary of Activity	Original Information	Reference
████ AEST ████	BPC (AMSOC)	████	Voice Call	BPC (AMSOC) task █████ (Customs DASH 8) to undertake surveillance directly west of Christmas Island and then proceed to the location of the possible vessel in distress to conduct covert surveillance.	BPC (AMSOC) Voice Recording █████ JUN 2012	Voice Recording
1447 AEST (0447Z)	████	BPC (AMSOC)	Voice Call	████ (Customs DASH 8) requests confirmation of tasking. BPC (AMSOC) confirms that once possible contact of interest is located (possibly within 20 nautical miles west of Christmas Island) and █████ is subsequently released by HMAS WOLLONGONG, it is to proceed to the vessel in distress to conduct covert surveillance.	BPC (AMSOC) Voice Recording 200447Z JUN 2012	Voice Recording
1517 - 2023 AEST (0515-1823Z)	████	N/A	Surveillance	████ Customs DASH 8) conducts surveillance flight	Dash 8 Post Mission Report █████ 20/06/12	Document
1559 AEST (0559Z)	BPC (AMSOC)	████	Voice Call	████ Customs DASH 8) is tasked to undertake surveillance mission as normal and do a covert relocate to the position of the vessel in distress and await instructions.	BPC (AMSOC) Voice Recording 200559Z JUN 2012	Voice Recording
1712 AEST (0712Z)	BPC (AMSOC)	████	Voice Call	████ Customs DASH 8) advises it has located a vessel in the position provided. BPC (AMSOC) grants approval to █████ to manoeuvre outside of its DSA (Designated Surveillance Area) to conduct covert surveillance on the vessel.	BPC (AMSOC) Voice Recording 200712Z JUN 2012	Voice Recording

Key Events Chronology - SAR 2012/4106

Time	Source	To	Type	Summary of Activity	Original Information	Reference
1715 AEST (0715Z)		N/A	Document	(Customs DASH 8) locates contact of interest in position 0802 South 10506 East in vicinity of last known position of a vessel reportedly to be in distress. The vessel is reported to be underway heading 180 at four knots.	AMSA Log Entry: "CUSTOMS SIGHTING 200715 UTC 08 05 40 South 104 54 12 East heading 180 at 4 knots." BPC AMSOC Log Entry: "Dash 8 - AMSOC: - Dash 8 advise of a COI 145 nm N NW of CI - Position 0802A 10506E - Contact of interest underway with the course 180 at 4 knots - People were sighted on the deck - Surveillance report and photograph of contact of interest provided to AMSOC (photo timed 1740)"	AMSA Log / BPC (AMSOC) Log / Document
1720 AEST (0720Z)	BPC (-IC)	BPC (COMBPC)	Unknown	BPC (-IC) briefs BPC (COMBPC) that AMSA are happy and able to geolocate subject handsets.	BPC (-IC) Log Entry: "Conveyed AMSA was happy and able to geolocate subject handsets."	BPC (-IC) Log
1731 AEST (0731Z)		BPC (AMSOC)	Voice Call	(Customs DASH 8) is tasked to get a clearer image of the vessel possibly in distress - tasked to fly in to 3 miles from the vessel. Images taken covertly 5 miles away from vessel did not provide a clear image. Upon travelling closer, clearer images were able to be taken.	BPC (AMSOC) Voice Recording 200731Z JUN 2012	Voice Recording
1746 AEST (0746Z)		BPC (AMSOC)	Voice Call	(Customs DASH 8) confirms that BPC (AMSOC) have received its images of the vessel possibly in distress. notes that the vessel is quite low in the water. continues to hold covert surveillance position over vessel. Information is to be passed to AMSA RCC-A.	BPC (AMSOC) Voice Recording 200746Z JUN 2012	Voice Recording
1749 AEST (0749Z)	BPC (AMSOC)		Voice Call	(Customs DASH 8) is released from covert surveillance tasking	BPC (AMSOC) Voice Recording 200749Z JUN 2012	Voice Recording
1759 AEST (0759Z)	BPC (COMBPC)	AMSA RCC-A	Email / Document	BPC (AMSOC) advises AMSA (RCC-A) of (Customs DASH 8) observations.	AMSA Log Entry: "From AMSOC 20074005ZJUN12_001.jpg and 20074044ZJUN12_001.jpg including printouts of the .jpg files (FFV Event ID 23) BPC Coast located contact of interest (COI) in position 0802 South 10506 East in vicinity of last known position of a vessel reportedly to be in distress. The vessel was reported to be underway heading 180 at four knots." BPC (AMSOC) Log Entry: "AMSOC - RCC: - RCC informed of contact of interest detected by the Dash 8 - Image and Position of contact of interest provided to RCC"	AMSA Log / BPC (AMSOC) Log / Email / Document
1818 AEST (0818Z)	AMSA RCC-A	BASARNAS	Message	BASARNAS is advised of (Customs DASH 8) observations - vessel with 204 persons on board was in position 0802 South 10506 East at 200715 heading 108 degrees.	AMSA Log Entry: "FW: Vessel in distress with 204 POB. To BASARNAS - RCC Australia has just received further information that the vessel you are coordinating SAR actions for with 204 POB was in position 0802 South 10506 East at 200715 heading 108 degrees."	AMSA Log
1952 AEST (0952Z)	BPC (AMSOC)		Voice Call	BPC (AMSOC) confirms that (Customs DASH 8) has an and that the recorded aircraft track is correct and up to date.	BPC (AMSOC) Voice Recording 200952Z JUN 2012	Voice Recording
2007 AEST (1007Z)	HMAS WOLLONGONG	N/A	Event	HMAS WOLLONGONG intercepts SIEV 356 west of Christmas Island, 7 nm north west.	BPC (AMSOC) Chronology: "HMAS WOLLONGONG intercepts COI1 (SIEV 356) west of Christmas Island 7 nautical miles north west of Christmas Island. SIEV 356 is boarded and then escorted to Flying Fish Cove."	BPC (AMSOC) Chronology
2012 AEST (1012Z)	Vessel in Distress	AMSA RCC-A	Phone Call	Thirteenth call from vessel is received. Caller provides position update and states they are heading to Christmas Island. Notes that there are 206 people on board.	AMSA Log Entry: "Anno?: SIEV? 008 09.13-34 South 105.07 2327 East Calling from sat phone. Don't know? Heading? Christmas Island Speed? Don't know POB: 206 people. Name of vessel? Don't know Vessel-size - colour -wood/metal (call breaking up and audibility 2/10.)"	AMSA Log / Telephone Call
2018 AEST (1018Z)	BASARNAS	AMSA RCC-A	Log Note	BASARNAS advise AMSA RCC-A that they contact the vessel in distress and were coordinating with BAKORMLA and Indonesian Navy.	AMSA Log Entry: "From BASARNAS - We have contacted the phone given by RCC Australia, and we can reach but there was no voice or respond. Until now we have coordinated with Indonesian Maritime Safety Authority (BAKORMLA) and Indonesian Navy. We will give you further information ASAP we get any progress. Thank you SETIONO Duty Officer"	AMSA Log

Key Events Chronology - SAR 2012/4106

Time	Source	To	Type	Summary of Activity	Original Information	Reference
2027 AEST (1027Z)	Vessel in Distress	AMSA RCC-A	Phone Call	Fourteenth call from vessel is received. Very broken call - caller disconnects.	AMSA Log Entry: "From Unknown: Very broken call. Could not understand. Caller hung up."	AMSA Log / Telephone Call
2033 AEST (1033Z)	Vessel in Distress	AMSA RCC-A	Phone Call	Fifteenth call from vessel is received. Caller advises: - The boat is taking on water - They have run out of water - Five days at sea	AMSA Log Entry: "[Mostly inaudible, audibility 1-2/10] from Anee, Where are you heading? Christmas Island. How fast are you going? Request position of vessel. Caller instructed to go outside owing to loud humming noise in background. What is the issue, what is the problem? Our ship is taking water. RCC Australia understands that there are a lot of people onboard and that you require a rescue. Please send ship for us. What is the problem, what is wrong? Your ship is very low in the water? Yes. Your ship is taking water? Yes. Is your motor still running, are you still moving. Our ship is taking water, we have no water [drinking]. RCC Australia asks for phone number before caller hangs up. RCC Australia advises that they will call back."	AMSA Log / Telephone Call
2040 AEST (1049Z)	AMSA RCC-A	RESCUE 251	Phone Call	AMSA RCC-A attempt to call RESCUE 251 (RAAF AP-3C ORION) and are unsuccessful.	Attempt to call RSCU 251	AMSA Log
2049 AEST (1049Z)	Vessel in Distress	AMSA RCC-A	Phone Call	Final (Sixteenth) contact between RCC-A and the vessel. Caller provides the phone number for vessel.	AMSA Log Entry: "SIEV: Phone # 0088 2167 606 1449 749, [Mostly inaudible with loud humming] Are you Anee. What is your phone number? 008821676061749. RCC Australia repeats number and confirms that phone number ends in 749. Caller says something, than "can you please searching". Are we now in Australian waters. RCC Australia advises not in Australian waters [Australian Search and Rescue Region (SRR)]. You are still in Indonesian waters and you need to come further south, you have some way to go. Call ends abruptly."	AMSA Log / Telephone Call
2058 AEST (1058Z)	AMSA RCC-A	Vessel in Distress	Phone Call	AMSA RCC-A attempts to call the vessel but is unsuccessful.	AMSA Log Entry: "To Anee, SIEV 0088 2167 606 1749; 0088 2167 606 1449 - No answer."	AMSA Log
2129 AEST (1129Z)	AMSA RCC-A	BASARNAS	Log Note	AMSA RCC-A pass updated information on the vessel in distress to BASARNAS.	AMSA Log Entry: "To BASARNAS - RCC Australia has received four further telephone calls from a vessel in distress that you are currently coordinating a search and rescue incident for the vessel's position given at 201020UTC was 08 09.13 South 105 07.23 East. They advised their telephone number as 00-8821676061749. They advised that there are 206 people onboard and not 204 people as previously advised. They advised they are still taking water. The call was very broken and hard to understand but RCC Australia has advised that Indonesian BASARNAS is coordinating this incident and that RCC Australia is passing the details to Indonesian BASARNAS. Please advise if you would like RCC Australia to issue a maritime broadcast to shipping on HF DSC and INMARSAT C Safety net in relation to this vessel."	Log Note
2132 AEST (1132Z)	AMSA RCC-A	BASARNAS / BPC (AMSOC)	Email	AMSA RCC-A provides BASARNAS with an updated position and POB figure (206). AMSA RCC-A also provide the vessel's telephone number.	AMSA Log Entry: "To BASARNAS - RCC Australia has received four further telephone calls from a vessel in distress that you are currently coordinating a search and rescue incident for the vessel's position given at 201020UTC was 08 09.13 South 105 07.23 East. They advised their telephone number as 00-8821676061749. They advised that there are 206 people onboard and not 204 people as previously advised. They advised they are still taking water. The call was very broken and hard to understand but RCC Australia has advised that Indonesian BASARNAS is coordinating this incident and that RCC Australia is passing the details to Indonesian BASARNAS. Please advise if you would like RCC Australia to issue a maritime broadcast to shipping on HF DSC and INMARSAT C Safety net in relation to this vessel."	AMSA Log / Email
21 JUNE 2012						
BPC SIEV Arrival Matrix (1750 AEST 20 JUN): Christmas Island / Cocos Keeling Islands - 5 MEDIUM threat ventures						
BPC Assigned Surface Vessels to Christmas Island: HMAS WOLLONGONG and HMAS LARRAKIA						
BPC Assigned Aircraft Surveillance: RAAF AP-3C ORION: Area [REDACTED] CBP: BPC Dash 8: Area [REDACTED] (north and north western bias)						
0025 AEST (14025Z 20 JUN)	AMSA RCC-A	BASARNAS / BPC (AMSOC)	Email	AMSA RCC-A provides the projected route of vessel in distress to BASARNAS and BPC (AMSOC)	BPC (AMSOC) Log Entry: "RCC-AMSOC - Predicted route of vessel in distress position"	Email / BPC (AMSOC) Log

[REDACTED]

Key Events Chronology - SAR 2012/4106

Time	Source	To	Type	Summary of Activity	Original Information	Reference
0047 AEST (1447Z 20 JUN)	AMSA RCC-A	BASARNAS	Log Note	AMSA RCC-A offers to relay a maritime broadcast but are advised by BASARNAS that an Indonesian Navy vessel departed at 1800 AEST (1500G/0500Z) and was proceeding to the search area.	AMSA Log Entry: "Senior-Section, BASARNAS Indonesia: Deployed - 3pm - message confirmed receipt of messages." AMSA Log Entry: "SMC Notes. Confirmed receipt of message by Indonesian BASARNAS officer Sentono. Further faxed copy of predicted route of advance for vessel to BPC at their request. Offered Maritime Broadcast to BASARNAS Indonesia but advised that Indonesian Navy vessel ahead departed at 3:00pm local time and was proceeding to search area." Telephone Call Summary: "RCC call to BASARNAS confirming they received RCC's message regarding vessel in distress. Confirming if TNI have located the boat. BASARNAS has tried contacting the vessel."	AMSA Log / Telephone Call
0222 AEST (1622Z)	HMAS WOLLONGONG	N/A	Log Note	HMAS WOLLONGONG completed night time offload of Pils from SIEV 356 to facilitate its availability for further arrivals/requests for assistance. HMAS WOLLONGONG was subsequently repositioned to [REDACTED] patrol the approaches to Christmas Island whilst completing the condition report for SIEV 356. HMAS LARRAKIA reconstituted [REDACTED] [REDACTED]	BPC (AMSOC) Chronology: "HMAS WOLLONGONG completed night time offload of Pils from SIEV 356 to facilitate availability of WOLLONGONG to respond to further arrival or request for assistance. Hulk of SIEV 356 remained in custody of HMAS WOLLONGONG." BPC (AMSOC) Chronology: "WOLLONGONG positioned to [REDACTED] to patrol the approaches to Christmas Island whilst conducting condition report for SIEV 356. HMAS LARRAKIA reconstituted [REDACTED] [REDACTED]"	BPC (AMSOC) Chronology
0800 AEST (2000Z 20 JUN)	Vessel in Distress	N/A	Event	Vessel overturns (survivor interviews indicate this is the approximate time the vessel overturned)	CI JIG Reports: 1. CI JIG [REDACTED] 2. CI JIG [REDACTED] 3. CI JIG [REDACTED]	CI JIG Reporting

Page 12 of Attachment B has been redacted in full.

Key Events Chronology - SAR 2012/4106

Time	Source	To	Type	Summary of Activity	Original Information	Reference
1143 AEST (0143Z)	BPC (AMSOC)	AMSA RCC-A	Email	NPC (AMSOC) emails the [REDACTED] reporting to AMSA RCC-A.	AMSA Log Entry: "FM BPC - Can the following information please be passed to AMSA for their action: At approximately 0730 AEST a maritime vessel in a position approximately 110 nautical miles north northwest of Christmas Island may be taking on water with persons onboard fearful for their safety."	AMSA Log / BPC (AMSOC) Log / Email
1143 AEST (0143Z)	BPC (AMSOC)	[REDACTED]	Phone Call	BPC (AMSOC) tasks [REDACTED] (Customs DASH 8) to the location of the vessel in distress.	Phone Call	Phone Call
1227 AEST (0227Z)	AMSA RCC-A	BASARNAS	Document	[REDACTED] reporting passed to BASARNAS	AMSA Log Entry: "FW: FW: Information to be passed to AMSA. To BASARNAS - RCC Australia has received the following information on a possible vessel in distress 110 nautical miles north northwest of Christmas Island, Queer. At approximately 0730 AEST a maritime vessel in a position approximately 110 nautical miles north northwest of Christmas Island may be taking on water with persons onboard fearful for their safety. Unquote. RCC Australia has been monitoring the incident that you are coordinating involving 208 POB a vessel that has been travelling south towards Christmas Island at 2 to 3 knots whilst making telephone calls to RCC Australia saying that they are taking water. RCC [Australia] has projected the possible position of this vessel since that last call at 201020 UTC in position 0609.13 South 105 07.23 East and this vessel's position should be approximately 100 to 118 north northwest of Christmas Island at 0730 local Australian Eastern Standard Time which is 202130 UTC Jun 2012 travelling on its historic southerly route at 2 to 3 knots. RCC Australia passes this information as received to your centre for action but believes this is related to AusSAR incident 2012/4106."	AMSA Log

Key Events Chronology - SAR 2012/4106

Time	Source	To	Type	Summary of Activity	Original Information	Reference
1305 AEST (0305Z)	BPC (COMBPC)	BPC (AMSOC)	Log Note	BPC (COMBPC) requests that HMAS LARRAKIA and HMAS WOLLONGONG commence passage [REDACTED] to pre-posture - should their assistance be required.	AMSOC Log Entry: "COMBPC - AMSOC: COMBPC request HMAS LARRAKIA and WOLLONGONG to commence passage [REDACTED] to pre-posture should they be required. Dash 8 aircraft to search the area of interest. RCC Liaison officer to attend AMSOC if possible"	BPC (AMSOC) Log
1305 AEST (0305Z)	BPC (COMBPC)	BPC (AMSOC)	Log Note	BPC (COMBPC) requests the Customs DASH 8 aircraft to search the area of interest.	AMSOC Log Entry: "COMBPC - AMSOC: COMBPC request HMAS LARRAKIA and WOLLONGONG to commence passage [REDACTED] to pre-posture should they be required. Dash 8 aircraft to search the area of interest. RCC Liaison officer to attend AMSOC if possible"	BPC (AMSOC) Log
1310 AEST (0310Z)	BPC (AMSOC)	HQJTF639	Log Note	BPC (COMBPC) relays instructions for HMAS LARRAKIA and WOLLONGONG to commence passage north of Christmas Island HQJTF639 advise that HMAS WOLLONGONG currently has custody of SIEV 356 following disembarkation of P11s. They plan to tie the vessel at the buoy and have Christmas Island authorities monitor it.	BPC (AMSOC) Log Entry: "AMSOC - HQJTF639 - COMBPC instructions relayed to J33 - J33 advised HMAS WOLLONGONG currently has custody of SIEV 356 following the disembarkation of P11s. Will attempt to tie it to a buoy and have CI authorities monitor it."	BPC (AMSOC) Log
1315 AEST (0315Z)	AMSA RCC-A LO	N/A	N/A	AMSA RCC-A liaison officer on site at BPC (AMSOC)	BPC (AMSOC) Log Entry: "AMSA RCC liaison officer on site at AMSOC"	BPC (AMSOC) Log
1321 AEST (0321Z)	[REDACTED]	N/A	Log Note	[REDACTED] Customs DASH 8 departs Christmas Island on planned surveillance and directed to locate earlier identified Contact of Interest (COIs), then proceed to location of possible vessel in distress.	BPC (AMSOC) Chronology: "Customs and Border Protection surveillance aircraft departs CI to conduct surveillance within the vicinity of vessel's last known position."	BPC (AMSOC) Chronology
1333 AEST (0333Z)	AMSA RCC-A	BPC (AMSOC)	Phone Call	AMSA RCC-A request [REDACTED] (Customs DASH 8) for SAR at Christmas Island. BPC (AMSOC) release [REDACTED] COBHAM are subsequently advised.	Phone Message: AMSA RCC-A request Dash 8 for SAR at Christmas Island. BPC (AMSOC) release Dash 8 [REDACTED] COBHAM advised.	Phone Message
1400 - 1500 AEST (0400 - 0500Z)	PSOG	BPC (AMSOC) [REDACTED] AFP / DIAC / [REDACTED]	Verbal Briefing	People Smuggling Operational Group Meeting - Multi-agency discussion regarding status of maritime people smuggling threats and SAR 2012/4106	N/A	Event

Time	Source	To	Type	Summary of Activity	Original Information	Reference
1420 AEST (0420Z)	AMSA LO	AMSA RCC-A	Email	AMSA LO at BPC (AMSOC) advises AMSA RCC-A that the level of concern has increased significantly and requests BASARNAS be contacted.	<p>Sent: Thursday, 21 June 2012 2:20PM To: rcaus@amsa.gov.au Subject: 2012/4106 - Actions required [SEC=IN-CONFIDENCE]</p> <p>Guys, Actions required ASAP with regards above incident (level of concern has increased significantly!!!!):</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Pls contact inmarsat and get them to confirm / deny the last transmission initiated and received by the satphone number 008821676061749 (associated with the above vessel) together with position. 2. Try and ring the above number and advise situation. 3. Once you've ascertained the above info and spoken with me be prepared to contact Basarnas as a matter of urgency - feel free to use the following text as a guide / draft: <p>RCC Australia has a markedly heightened level of concern for the vessel approx 110nm north of Christmas Island (insert latest lat and long with DTG and a drift line projection) and heading towards Christmas Island.</p> <p>Request Basarnas advise as a matter of urgency what aviation and maritime assets have been deployed in response to this potential SAR incident and their estimated time of arrival in the area. The heightened level of concern is due to the fact that RCC Australia has had no contact (no calls received from the vessel) in over six (6) hours, and has been unable to contact said vessel on satphone 008821676061749 during that time. The last communication received indicated that the vessel was taking water and the people were very scared. The lack of communications with this vessel coupled with the indication that the vessel was taking water has resulted in the heightened level of concern and the reason for this signal.</p> <p>For your eyes only BPC Dash e outbound as 1 type due overhead area in approx 15-20 minutes. Please do not delay in acting on items 1 and 2 above. 2 x assets at Christmas with an ETA of approx 4-5 hours minimum. Act may be limited (P3) - will advise. Pls look at merchant assets in general area. I'll ring in about 20-25 minutes.</p> <p>Pls ack this email</p> <p>RESCUE COORDINATION CENTRE CHIEF (AVIATION) RESCUE COORDINATION CENTRE</p>	AMSA Log / Email
1432 AEST (0432Z)	AMSA RCC-A	Vessel in Distress	Log Note	AMSA RCC-A attempts to unsuccessfully contact the vessel in distress for the second time.	AMSA Log Entry: "To SIEV mobile phone 00 88 216 7608 1749: Not available."	AMSA Log
1438 AEST (0438Z)	AMSA RCC-A	Iridium Customer Support	Log Note	AMSA RCC-A attempts to contact Iridium Customer support but are unsuccessful	AMSA Log Entry: "Iridium Customer Support +148 075 281 00 Iridium Customer Support: No answer."	AMSA Log
1453 AEST (0453Z)	BPC (AMSOC)	[REDACTED]	Voice Call	BPC (AMSOC) directs the Customs DASH 8 to track direct to final weigh points and cover existing weigh points with radar. [REDACTED] (Customs DASH 8) advises BPC (AMSOC) that they have been investigating radar contacts and have located the possible vessel in distress. [REDACTED] notes it is a SAR incident.	BPC (AMSOC) Voice Recording 210453Z JUN 2012	Voice Recording
1458 AEST (0458Z)	[REDACTED]	BPC (AMSOC)	Voice Call	[REDACTED] (Customs DASH 8) advises BPC (AMSOC) that the contact of interest has upturned and is now a semi submerged hull with approximately 60-70 people on top of the hull. [REDACTED] provides a latlong of 838 10503.	BPC (AMSOC) Voice Recording 210458Z JUN 2012	Voice Recording
1500 AEST (0500Z)	BPC (AMSOC)	AMSA RCC-A LO	Log Note	BPC (AMSOC) verbally briefs AMSA RCC-A Liaison Officer (located at AMSOC) on Customs DASH 8 observations	BPC (AMSOC) Log: "RCC briefed verbally"	BPC (AMSOC) Log

Key Events Chronology - SAR 2012/4106

Time	Source	To	Type	Summary of Activity	Original Information	Reference
1500 AEST (0500Z)	AMSA LO	AMSA RCC-A	Log note	AMSA RCC-A Liaison Officer at BPC advises that [REDACTED] (Customs DASH 8) has located an overturned vessel with people clinging to the hull at 0838 South 10503 East. HMAS WOLLONGONG and HMAS LARRAKIA are travelling from Christmas Island, en route to the position.	AMSA Log Entry: "From AMSA Liaison Officer at BPC: Vessel located overturned - people clinging to hull 0838 South 10503 East. Dash 8 aircraft holding overhead. ERD managers notified. 2 X BPC vessels from Christmas Island enroute distress position"	AMSA Log
1500 AEST (0500Z)	BPC (AMSOC)	HQJTF639	Log Note	BPC (AMSOC) advises HQJTF639 of Customs DASH 8 observations.	BPC (AMSOC) Log: "AMSOC - JTF639: - Dash 8 observation (1459 AEST) passed to JTF639"	BPC (AMSOC) Log
1500 AEST (0500Z)	Director, BPC (AMSOC)	BPC (COMBPC)	Log Note	Director, BPC (AMSOC) verbally briefs BPC (COMBPC) on Customs DASH 8 observations.	BPC (AMSOC) Log: "Dops - COMBPC - COMBPC brief on Dash 8 observation (as at 1459 AEST)"	BPC (AMSOC) Log
1504 AEST (0504Z)	HMAS LARRAKIA	N/A	Log Note	HMAS LARRAKIA proceeds at best speed to the position of the SAR incident.	HMAS LARRAKIA SHIP LOG: "Max speed to pos'n indicated on chart for COI"	HMAS LARRAKIA Log
1505 AEST (0505Z)	HMAS WOLLONGONG	HQJTF639 / BPC (AMSOC)	Document	HMAS WOLLONGONG Operation Report is released indicating that the Customs Dash 8 had located the vessel and it was capsized. HMAS WOLLONGONG is proceeding at best speed	BPC (AMSOC) Log Entry: "HMAS WOLLONGONG = HQJTF639/BPC - HMAS WOLLONGONG Operations Report advising Dash 8 informed them that vessel has capsized - HMAS WOLLONGONG proceeding at best speed - Has advised HMAS LARRAKIA to do the same - Pos 8838S 10503E"	Document / BPC (AMSOC) Log
1512 AEST (0512Z)	[REDACTED]	N/A	Document	[REDACTED] Customs Dash 8 Sighting Report	BPC (AMSOC) Log Entry: "Dash 8 - AMSOC: - Dash 8 Sighting Report - Many people holding onto debris in water surrounding upturned vessel"	Document
1512 AEST (0512Z)	HQJTF639	BPC (AMSOC)	Log Note	RESCUE 253 (RAAF AP-3C ORION) estimated to be on scene in 2.5 hours. HQJTF639 is currently assessing how many life rafts HQJTF639 assets may be able to deploy.	BPC (AMSOC) Log Entry: "JTF639 - AMSOC: - RAAF maritime aircraft estimated to be on scene in 2.5 hours - Currently assessing how many life rafts 639 assets may be able to deploy"	BPC (AMSOC) Log
1514 AEST (0514Z)	JOC	AMSA RCC-A	Log Note	JOC advises that HMAS WOLLONGONG and HMAS LARRAKIA would be unable to pickup all persons onboard the target vessel. Requests confirmation that AMSA RCC-A was sending a broadcast for merchant vessel response. Requests AMSA RCC-A provide tasking if Australia ends up coordinating incident.	AMSA Log Entry: "HQJOC Joint Command Centre (JCC) Watch keeper advised that the two Australian Customs Patrol Boats (ACPB) would be unable to pickup all persons onboard the target vessel. Requested confirmation that RCC Australia was sending broadcast for merchant vessel response. Request RCC Australia provide tasking if Australia ends up coordinating the incident."	AMSA Log
1515 AEST (0515Z)	HQJTF639	BPC (AMSOC)	Log Note	HQJTF639 estimates HMAS LARRAKIA and WOLLONGONG will be in the vicinity of the SAR incident at approximately 1930 AEST. HQJTF639 advises that two RAAF aircrafts are estimated to arrive in the vicinity of incident in approximately 2 hours (1715 AEST)	BPC (AMSOC) Log Entry: "JTF639 - AMSOC: - HMAS LARRAKIA and WOLLONGONG will be in the vicinity approximately 1930 AEST. - Two RAAF maritime aircrafts estimated to arrive in the vicinity of incident in approximately 2 hours (1715 AEST)"	BPC (AMSOC) Log
1519 AEST (0519Z)	HQJTF639	BPC (AMSOC)	Log Note	HQJTF639 advises BPC (AMSOC) that both RAAF maritime aircrafts are estimated to arrive in the vicinity of incident at approximately 1630 AEST.	BPC (AMSOC) Log Entry: "JTF639 - AMSOC: - RAAF maritime aircraft estimated to be in the vicinity of incident now approximated to be 1630 AEST"	BPC (AMSOC) Log
1520-23 AEST (0520-23Z)	JOC	AMSA RCC-A	Log Note	AMSA RCC-A makes a verbal request to JOC for the two surface and one air assets currently assigned.	AMSA Log Entry: "HQJOC JCC Watch keeper requested that RCC liaise with Indonesian government re: Military assets operating in support of the SAR. RCC Australia made verbal request for two surface and one air asset currently assigned. Hardcopy "Request for Defence Assistance" to follow."	AMSA Log
1522 AEST (0522Z)	JOC	Unknown	Log Note	An AP-3C ORION aircraft en route to Townsville is tasked to divert to Darwin to assist with the SAR.	JOC Log Entry: "AP-3C en route to Townsville as part of DP SOLANIA, diverted to Darwin to assist in SAR."	JOC Log

Key Events Chronology - SAR 2012/4106

Time	Source	To	Type	Summary of Activity	Original Information	Reference
1522 AEST (0522Z)		BPC (AMSOC)	Voice Call	Customs DASH 8 advises there are bodies hanging onto debris approximately 5 miles in radius and merchant vessels CAPE OCEANIA and WSA DRAGON are nearby. CAPE OCEANIA has offered to assist. BPC (AMSOC) updates (Customs DASH 8) with ETA of RESCUE 253 (RAAF AP-3C ORION) and confirms is to continue to search for survivors.	BPC (AMSOC) Voice Recording 210522Z JUN 2012 BPC (AMSOC) Log Entry: "BPC Dash 8 - AMSOC: - Merchant vessel Cape Oceania has responded to Dash 8 aircraft and awaiting authorisation from AMSA to assist"	Voice Recording
1523 AEST (0523Z)	AMSA RCC-A	BASARNAS	Message	AMSA RCC-A requests BASARNAS to provide information on any assets en route to the SAR incident and advises that AMSA RCC-A has issued a mayday relay broadcast to shipping.	AMSA Log Entry: "AUSSAR 2012/4106 - VESSEL WITH 206 PERSONS ONBOARD RCC AUSTRALIA HAS RECEIVED A REPORT FROM A SURVEILLANCE AIRCRAFT THAT THIS VESSEL HAS OVERTURNED IN POSITION 08 38S 105 03E AT 210500UTC. AS THIS POSITION IS STILL WITHIN THE INDONESIAN SEARCH AND RESCUE REGION, REQUEST BASARNAS JAKARTA ADVISE IF THEY HAVE ANY ASSETS ENROUTE FOR THIS PREVIOUSLY ADVISED INCIDENT YOU ARE COORDINATING.. REQUEST HARDCOPY CONFIRMATION FROM BASARNAS JAKARTA OF RECEIPT OF THIS URGENT MESSAGE. PLEASE RESPOND IN ENGLISH. RCC AUSTRALIA HAS ISSUED A MAYDAY RELAY BROADCAST TO SHIPPING. PLEASE ADVISE ANY OTHER ASSISTANCE YOU REQUIRE FROM RCC AUSTRALIA."	AMSA Log
1525 AEST (0525Z)	RESCUE 461	AMSA RCC-A	Log Note	RESCUE 461 (AMSA Dornier) passes flight and transit times to AMSA RCC-A. Attempting to organise three relays instead of two.	AMSA Log Entry: "From R461: flight and transit times passed to RCC Australia. Will try to take three relays instead of two."	AMSA Log
1526 AEST (0526Z)	AMSA RCC-A	BASARNAS / BPC (AMSOC)	Email	AMSA RCC-A advise BASARNAS that are releasing broadcasts to shipping for assistance.	BPC (AMSOC) Log Entry: "RCC - AMSOC - Copy of message sent to BASARNAS - AUSSAR 2012/4106 vessel with 206 people onboard"	Email / BPC (AMSOC) Log
1529 AEST (0529Z)	AMSA RCC-A	LES / BPC (AMSOC) / JOC / BASARNAS	Message	AMSA RCC-A request Local Earth Station (LES) setup a distress relay for 1 hour intervals to be transmitted to vessels located in the Pacific and Indian Oceans	AMSA Log Entry: "MAYDAY RELAY FM RCC AUSTRALIA 210529Z JUN 2012" BPC (AMSOC) Log Entry: "RCC - AMSOC: Distress Relay Request" Document ID 10805730 - DISTRESS 2012/4106 Document ID 16868032 - DISTRESS RELAY AUSSAR 2012/4106	AMSA Log / Message
1530 AEST (0530Z)	JOC	Unknown	Log Note	HMAS LARRIKA and WOLLONGONG are dual force assigned to the SAR incident.	JOC Log Entry: "HMAS LARRIKA and WOLLONGONG dual force assigned for SAR"	JOC Log
1530 AEST (0530Z)	PSIAT	First Secretary, Jakarta, ACBPS	Phone Call	PSIAT advises First Secretary, Jakarta, ACBPS of overturned vessel observations.	First Secretary, Jakarta, ACBPS Log Entry: "Learned of capsizing from PSIAT officer (TP) when calling about a separate item. Obtained available details."	First Secretary, Jakarta, ACBPS Log
1534 AEST (0534Z)	LES	Indian Ocean	Broadcast	The first distress relay is broadcast	AMSA Log Entry: "IOR: Distress Call to Area: [0]8[00] South 105 [00] East 180 - DISTRESS 2012/4106"	AMSA Log
1534 AEST (0534Z)		BPC (AMSOC)	Log Note	Customs DASH 8 advises their Prudent Limit of Endurance (PLE) is	BPC (AMSOC) Log Entry: "Dash 8 aircraft advises they will be PLE"	BPC (AMSOC) Log
1537 AEST (0537Z)	First Secretary, Jakarta, ACBPS	AMSA RCC-A	Phone Call	AMSA RCC-A advises First Secretary, Jakarta, ACBPS of the vessel capsizing.	First Secretary, Jakarta, ACBPS Log Entry: "Called AMSA RCC. Put on to Mika. Understood early assessment is that event relates to the vessel claiming distress the days previous with 200+ embarked. Assessment based on position and previous track/speed. Understood response was P3 overhead in ~1 hr. P3 had 4 life rafts. Endurance over target est 4-5hrs. Location is approx 110-120nm from sw Java. I was encouraged to pass all information to all relevant stakeholders. I advised yet to see any current SITREPS and requested coordinates in writing (email) so I may pass and ensure nil transcription issues (use copy pasta on BBarry). Was advised details would be sent to my email."	First Secretary, Jakarta, ACBPS Log
1537 AEST (0537Z)	BPC (AMSOC)	AMSA RCC-A	Document	Images of survivors sent to AMSA RCC-A from BPC (AMSOC)	AMSA Log Entry: "Mission - Survivors in water."	AMSA Log / Email

Key Events Chronology - SAR 2012/4106

Time	Source	To	Type	Summary of Activity	Original Information	Reference
1540 AEST (0540Z)	MV WSA DRAGON	AMSA RCC-A	Log Note	Merchant Vessel WSA DRAGON responds to broadcast.	AMSA Log Entry: "From Master WSA Dragon [call sign] D5AX9 [sat phone] 773 232 941 0816 South 10524 East 30 miles 14 knots 146 metre container ship. Responding and proceeding to position at best speed."	AMSA Log
1542 AEST (0542Z)	AMSA RCC-A	BASARNAS	Document	AMSA RCC-A requests approval for Australia SAR assets to operate within the Indonesian Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ).	AMSA Log Entry: "To OASARNAS - RCC Australia is currently involved in SAR operations for vessel with 206POB in distress in position 0938 South 10503 East, north northwest of Christmas Island. With reference to the memorandum of understanding (MOU) between Australia and Indonesia, regarding cross border SAR missions, paragraph 4.6 requires that Indonesia give approval for Australian SAR assets to operate within the Indonesian air Defence Identification zone (ADIZ) refer to paragraph 4.6 below: "4.6 Search Units will not enter an ADIZ until approval is notified by the appropriate RCC." Noting that the Indonesian ADIZ begins approximately 25 nautical miles north of Christmas Island, RCC Australia requests permission for SAR aircraft to operate within the Indonesian ADIZ. These assets will be a combination of Australian civilian and defence aircraft, details of which will be forwarded when available, which may include aircraft from the Royal Australian Air Force P3 Orion. Search operations are planned to commence as soon as possible."	AMSA Log / Email
1545 AEST (0545Z)	BPC (AMSOC)		Voice Call	BPC (AMSOC) advises [REDACTED] (Customs DASH 8) that two patrol boats are travelling to the scene as well as aircraft RESCUE 253 (RAAF AP-3C DRAGON). BPC (AMSOC) receives on endurance update from [REDACTED] and requests on update on whether [REDACTED] have spoken to RESCUE 253 about de-confliction. BPC (AMSOC) also advise that a distress message has been sent out to all ships within the area of the vessel in distress.	BPC (AMSOC) Voice Recording 210545Z JUN 2012	Voice Recording
1548 AEST (0548Z)	AMSA RCC-A	BPC (AMSOC)	Log Note	AMSA RCC-A request release of [REDACTED] (Customs DASH 8) aircraft in support of SAR [REDACTED] subsequently released.	BPC (AMSOC) Log Entry: "RCC- AMSOC: - Request release of BPC Dash 8 in support of SAR 2012/4106 - Dash 8 released to RCC for above purposes"	BPC (AMSOC) Log
1551 AEST (0551Z)	BPC (AMSOC)	BPC SIEV SITREP NOTIFICATION MAIL GROUP	Message	BPC (AMSOC) releases SITREP 1: Vessel in distress, 110nm NW of Christmas Island	Sent: Thursday, 21 June 2012 15:51 To: [BPC SIEV SITREP NOTIFICATION] Subject: Vessel in distress, 110nm north-west of Christmas Island: SITREP 1, as at 1530 AEST, Thursday 21 June 2012 (SEC-IN-CONFIDENCE) Vessel in distress, 110nm north-west of Christmas Island: SITREP 1, as at 1530 AEST, Thursday 21 June 2012 1. At approximately 1458 AEST today, a Customs and Border Protection Dash 8 surveillance aircraft detected a vessel in distress approximately 110nm north-east of Christmas Island. 2. There were approximately 40 people visible. 3. RCC Australia is coordinating a response. 4. No further information is available at this time. 5. This SITREP contains information about ongoing BPC operations and is provided to you under Section 16 of the Customs Administration Act 1985 for the purpose of your agency's functions. The information must not be further circulated within your agency except on a need-to-know [REDACTED] and must not be disseminated to a third party without the prior permission of BPC. Manager Operations Border Protection Command Australian Customs and Border Protection Service	BPC (HC) Log / Email
1551 AEST (0551Z)	BPC (AMIFC)	BPC (AMSOC)	Log Note	BPC (AMIFC) advises BPC (AMSOC) of the revised arrival time of RAAF maritime aircraft - ETA 1630 AEST	BPC (AMSOC) Log Entry: "AMIFC- AMSOC: Revised arrival time of RAAF maritime aircraft to the vicinity of the incident is 1630 AEST"	BPC (AMSOC) Log

Key Events Chronology - SAR 2012/4106

Time	Source	To	Type	Summary of Activity	Original Information	Reference
1613 AEST (0613Z)	AMSA RCC-A	JOC	Document	AMSA RCC-A releases a formal request for military assistance for two surface and one air asset.	AMSA Log Entry: "Request for Military Assistance - RCC Australia has been advised by a Customs aircraft that a foreign fishing vessel with possibly 206 persons onboard has capsized in position 08 38 South 105 03 East at 210500 UTC. Position is approximately 115 nautical miles north northwest of Christmas Island within Indonesian SRR. Request any surface or aircraft assets that may be able to assist. RCC Australia is at present assisting BASARNAS Jakarta who hold coordination of this incident. An Australian Customs Dash 8 aircraft is at present involved the incident and a merchant vessel WSA Dragon is due position 210740 UTC."	AMSA Log / Document
1613 AEST (0613Z)	First Secretary, Jakarta, ACBPS	AMSA RCC-A	Phone Call	AMSA RCC-A requests First Secretary, Jakarta, ACBPS to travel to BASARNAS to assist with operational coordination.	First Secretary, Jakarta, ACBPS Log Entry: "Called AMSA RCC (Craig). Provided details of second SAR matter. Advised I did not have information yet re coordinates for current SAR. Was advised email has been sent by AMSA, should be received soon. AMSA RCC requested I travel to BASARNAS to assist with operational coordination. I agreed, subject to BASARNAS accepting this."	First Secretary, Jakarta, ACBPS Log
1616 AEST (0616Z)	MV CAPE OCEANIA	AMSA RCC-A	Log Note	Merchant vessel Cape Oceania responds to incident. Estimated time of arrival 1945 AEST (0945Z)	AMSA Log Entry: "To Cape Oceania/VRPY8: winds southeast at 30 knots. 270 metre Bulk carrier, 43 nautical miles from incident position at 0904 South 10538 East - steaming 12 knots; ETA 0945 UTC."	AMSA Log
1616-1625 AEST (0616-1625Z)	First Secretary, Jakarta, ACBPS	AMSA RCC-A	Phone Call	First Secretary, Jakarta, ACBPS contacts BASARNAS and advises they are of situation (including coordinates) and made arrangements for a meeting.	First Secretary, Jakarta, ACBPS Log Entry: "Contacted BASARNAS, advised of the situation incl coordinates and made arrangements for meeting. BASARNAS welcomed the meeting and advised they would conduct operational planning."	First Secretary, Jakarta, ACBPS Log
1617 AEST (0617Z)	AMSA RCC-A	First Secretary, Jakarta, ACBPS	Email	RCC-A advises First Secretary, Jakarta, ACBPS of coordinates of SAR incident and requests he liaises with BASARNAS to ascertain actions taken/being taking.	First Secretary, Jakarta, ACBPS Log Entry: "Re: Received email from AMSA RCC Re: Re: Coordinates of overturned vessel are 08 38S 105 03E. This information has been passed to Basarnas. There are people clinging to the overturned vessel and people in the water clinging to debris. Request you liaise with Basarnas and ascertain what affirmative action they have taken/are taking. We have tasked 2 aircraft, 2 patrol boats and a merchant vessel at this stage. Thanks for your assistance."	First Secretary, Jakarta, ACBPS Log / Email
1618 AEST (0618Z)	BPC (AMSOC)		Voice Call	<p>Customs DASH 8 advises:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Merchant vessel CAPE OCEANIA is not responding - Merchant vessel WSA DRAGON is travelling towards the SAR incident with an ETA of approximately 2 hours - 48 people are visible on the overturned hull and many others are in the water; - They have sent photos to BPC (AMSOC) <p>BPC (AMSOC) advises [redacted] to contact AMSA RCC-A. Tasks [redacted] to stay on top of the vessel.</p>	BPC (AMSOC) Voice Recording 210619Z JUN 2012	Voice Recording
1630 AEST (0630Z)	RESCUE 253	N/A	Log Note	RESCUE 253 (RAAF AP-3C ORION) on-station in search area.	<p>JOC Log Entry: "SEALION 57 air-station in search area"</p> <p>BPC (AMSOC) Log Entry: "DEFENCE - HQJTF639: - Advising RAAF AP-3C was on task 1630"</p>	JOC Log / BPC (AMSOC) Log
1635 AEST (0635Z)	MV JPO VULPECULA	AMSA RCC-A	Log Note	Merchant vessel JPO VULPECULA responds to incident. The vessel indicates that they are 57 nautical miles away from incident and proceeding to the area. They advise they have no fast rescue boat.	AMSA Log Entry: "Master JPO VULPECULA/ABRW6 advises 57 nautical miles away proceeding to area. VL 265m LOA Container vessel - no Fast Rescue Boat."	AMSA Log

Key Events Chronology - SAR 2012/4106

Time	Source	To	Type	Summary of Activity	Original Information	Reference
1642 AEST (0642Z)	YMEN AeroRescue	AMSA RCC-A	Log Note	AMSA RCC-A is advised that 4 large and 4 small life rafts are available at Essendon Airport, VIC	AMSA Log Entry: "4 large life rafts (56 kg) and 4 small life rafts (23.5 kg) available from YMEN AeroRescue."	AMSA Log
1647 AEST (0647Z)	AMSA RCC-A	BPC (AMSOC)	Log Note	BPC (AMSOC) are advised that the following vessels have confirmed they are responding to the incident: - Merchant vessel WSA DRAGON - Merchant vessel JPO VULPECULA - ETA 1930 AEST - Merchant vessel CAPE OCEANIA - ETA 1947 AEST	BPC (AMSOC) Log Entry: RCC-AMSOC: - The following merchant vessels have confirmed they are responding to the incident: - Merchant Vessel WSA DRAGON - Merchant Vessel JPO VULPECULA - estimated time of arrival 1930 AEST - Merchant Vessel CAPE OCEANIA estimated time of arrival 1947 AEST	BPC (AMSOC) Log
1650 AEST (0650Z)	AMSA RCC-A	BPC (AMSOC)	Phone Call	AMSA RCC-A advises BPC (AMSOC) that WSA DRAGON will be first merchant vessel on scene at approximately 1730 AEST. (0730Z).	BPC (AMSOC) Log Entry: "RCC - AMSOC: - WSA DRAGON will be first merchant vessel on scene at approximately 210730Z JUN"	BPC (AMSOC) Log / Phone Message
1654 AEST (0654Z)		BPC (AMSOC)	Voice Call	Customs DASH 8) unsuccessfully attempts to contact BPC (AMSOC)	BPC (AMSOC) Voice Recording 210654Z JUN 2012	Voice Recording
1654 AEST (0654Z)	CN AUSTRALIA	HMAS WOLLONGONG / HMAS LARRAKIA / JOC	Document	Chief of Navy force assigns HMAS WOLLONGONG and HMAS LARRAKIA to CJOPS for SAR tasking	BPC (AMSOC) Log Entry: "CN - FORCE ASSIGNMENT: - Chief of Navy force assignment HMAS WOLLONGONG and HMAS LARRAKIA to CJOPS for SAR tasking"	Document / BPC (AMSOC) Log
1658 AEST (0658Z)	BPC (AMSOC)		Voice Call	BPC (AMSOC) advises Customs DASH 8) that Merchant Vessel WSA DRAGON will be on scene at 1730 AEST (0730Z). Customs DASH 8) advises they are in communications with WSA DRAGON, and the other two merchant vessels.	BPC (AMSOC) Voice Recording 210658Z JUN 2012	Voice Recording
1703 AEST (0703Z)	RESCUE 253	N/A	Message	RESCUE 253 (RAAF AP-3C ORION) deploys the first Air Sea Rescue Kit (ASRK) (contains two life rafts)	ADF Op RESOLUTE PURPLE 5557 - 21 JUN 12 CH1 Message: "At 210703Z, one air sea rescue kit (ASRK) was deployed in position 0839S 10504E."	ADF Message

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Time	Source	To	Type	Summary of Activity	Original Information	Reference
1730 AEST (0730Z)		AMSA RCC-A	Log Note	Customs DASH 8 departs for refuelling of Christmas Island.	AMSA Log Entry: "CUS22 advised on station this time. No further sightings. ETA YPM 0830Z, 60min turnaround, ETD YPM 0930Z, back on station 1030 UTC for approx 1hr. Must be back on the ground at YPM by 1200Z. Will take departure now (0730Z) to expedite refuelling YPM and therefore allow best handover with SELN57 before they depart. Also best opportunity for daylight vectoring of merchant vessels once they arrive on scene.	AMSA Log
1730 AEST (0730Z)	MV WSA DRAGON	N/A	Phone Call	Estimated time of arrival of Merchant Vessel WSA DRAGON	BPC (AMSOC) Log Entry: "RCC - AMSOC: - WSA DRAGON will be first merchant vessel on scene at approximately 210730Z JUN"	Phone Message
1733 AEST (0733Z)	RESCUE 253	N/A	Message	RESCUE 253 (RAAF AP-3C ORION) deploys the second ASRK (contains a further two life rafts)	ADF Op RESOLUTE - 21 JUN 12 CH1 Message: "Second ASRK would also be dropped in similar location. The second ASRK was dropped at T210733Z in location 083850S 1050340E."	ADF Message
1736 AEST (0736Z)		BPC (AMSOC)	Voice Call	Customs DASH 8 advises BPC (AMSOC) that they are heading back to refuel and will then return to task. ETA at Christmas Island is 0815Z/1815AEST.	BPC (AMSOC) Voice Recording 210736Z JUN 2012	Voice Recording
1740 AEST (0740Z)	BPC (AMSOC)		Voice Call	BPC (AMSOC) advises Customs DASH 8 that they will be sending a brief from AMSA RCC-A for the next task	BPC (AMSOC) Voice Recording 210740Z JUN 2012	Voice Recording
1740 AEST (0740Z)	First Secretary, Jakarta, ACBPS	AMSA RCC-A	Phone Call	First Secretary, Jakarta, ACBPS confirms current location and the status of the SAR incident with AMSA RCC-A	First Secretary, Jakarta, ACBPS Log Entry: "Called AMSA RCC. Confirmed location of incident and understood approx 110nm from CI and approx 110 from Java. Flagged that AMSA RCC should consider where recovered persons would be transferred to and Indonesian mechanics would need to kick in should MVs (or other) bring alive/deceased to Indonesia. Understood that MV 1 was due on location in 15min and MVs 2 and 3 due over next 1-2hrs."	First Secretary, Jakarta, ACBPS Log
1810 AEST (0810Z)		N/A	SIM	Customs Dash 8 lands at Christmas Island for refuelling	BPC (AMSOC) Log Entry: "Dash-8 landed at Christmas Island to refuel"	Event / SIM
1841 AEST (0841Z)		BPC (AMSOC)	Voice Call	Customs Dash 8 requests an update on any changes to the tasking brief from AMSA RCC-A. BPC (AMSOC) advises they will speak to the AMSA RCC-A Liaison Officer to find out.	BPC (AMSOC) Voice Recording 210841Z JUN 2012	Voice Recording

[REDACTED]

Key Events Chronology - SAR 2012/4106

Time	Source	To	Type	Summary of Activity	Original Information	Reference
[REDACTED]						
1914 AEST (0914Z)	[REDACTED]	N/A	SIM	[REDACTED] Customs Dash 8) departs Christmas Island following refuelling	BPC (AMSOC) Log Entry: "Dash 8 departed Christmas Island after refuelling"	Event / SIM
1920 AEST (0920Z)	HMAS WOLLONGONG	N/A	Log Note	HMAS WOLLONGONG arrives on scene.	JDC Log Entry: "HMAS WOLLONGONG and LARRAKIA on scene with WOLLONGONG appointed OSC" BPC (AMSOC) Log Entry: "HMAS LARRAKIA and WOLLONGONG in area of incident" HMAS WOLLONGONG Ship Log: "1820(G) - Ship Positioning for SAR - recovering persons in water"	JDC Log / BPC (AMSOC) Log / HMAS WOLLONGONG Log
1922 AEST (0922Z)	VH-FMG	Unknown	Log Note	Additional life rafts are loaded onto VH-FMG (Civilian Aircraft) for delivery to Christmas Island	AMSA Log Entry: "Life rafts from AeroRescue Perth loaded and delivered to VH-FMG for transport to Christmas Island."	AMSA Log
[REDACTED]						

Key Events Chronology - SAR 2012/4106

Time	Source	To	Type	Summary of Activity	Original Information	Reference
1629 AEST (0929Z)	HMAS LARRAKIA	N/A	Log Note	HMAS LARRAKIA obtains initial visual on upturned hull.	HMAS LARRAKIA SHIP LOG: "Visual gained of upturned hull, pos'n 08 36.715 104.59.95E"	HMAS LARRAKIA Log
1937 AEST (0937Z)	Fit Lt. Fulton, P3	AMSA RCC-A	Log Note	Fit Lt. Fulton, P3 advs that merchant vessel WSA DRAGON has recovered 8 people and confirmed 215 people were originally onboard.	AMSA Log Entry: "P3 def DN: [REDACTED] sea boat damaged - eight POB recovered survivors climb 215 on board (MB)"	AMSA Log
1944 AEST (0944Z)	[REDACTED]	N/A	Log Note	[REDACTED] (Customs DASH 8) ETA on scene	AMSA Log Entry: "[REDACTED] advised departed YPMX 0922 UTC with ETA on scene 0944Z"	AMSA Log
1945 AEST (0945Z)	MV CAPE OCEANIA	N/A	Log Note	Merchant vessel CAPE OCEANIA ETA on scene	AMSA Log Entry: "To Cape Oceania/VRP19: winds southeast at 30 knots. 270 metre Bulk carrier, 43 nautical miles from incident position at 0904 South 10538 East - steaming 12 knots; ETA 0945 UTC."	AMSA Log
1956 AEST (0956Z)	BASARNAS	AMSA RCC-A	Fax	AMSA RCC-A receives a fax from Indonesian BASARNAS requesting transfer of coordination to AMSA RCC-A.	AMSA Log Entry: "Fax received from Indonesian BASARNAS requesting transfer of coordination to RCC Australia."	AMSA Log
2041 AEST (1041Z)	RESCUE 251	N/A	Log Note	RESCUE 251 (RAAF AP-3C ORION) departs Darwin	JOC Log Entry: "RESCUE 251 (RAAF AP-3C ORION) departs Darwin"	JOC Log
2106 AEST (1106Z)	[REDACTED]	AMSA RCC-A	Log Note	[REDACTED] (Customs DASH 8) on task	AMSA Log Entry: "CUS 22 [REDACTED] reports now on task and maintaining A015, [REDACTED] in use. SELN57 now off task [REDACTED] able to extend on station by 30 min to 211145Z. In communications with the five x surface vessels. Reported that surface craft are picking up many survivors, however there are several deceased already onboard vessels. SELN57 may have numbers."	AMSA Log
2107 AEST (1107Z)	RESCUE 253	N/A	Log Note	RESCUE 253 (RAAF AP-3C ORION) off-station, recovered to Learmonth.	JOC Log Entry: "SEALION 57 off-station, recovered to LEARMOUTH"	JOC Log
2111 AEST (1111Z)	AMSOC (BPC)	OPC SIEV NOTIFICATION MAIL GROUP	Message	BPC (AMSOC) releases SITREP 2: Vessel in distress, 110nm NW of Christmas Island	<p>Sent: Thursday, 21 June 2012 21:11 To: [BPC SIEV SITREP NOTIFICATION]; CCC [AG]; Subject: Vessel in distress, 110nm north-west of Christmas Island: SITREP 2 [SEC=UNCLASSIFIED]</p> <p>Vessel in distress, 110nm north-west of Christmas Island: SITREP 2, as at 2100 AEST, Thursday 21 June 2012 1. At approximately 1650 AEST today, a RAAF Maritime Patrol Aircraft under the coordination of RCC reached the vessel in distress approximately 110nm north-east of Christmas Island. The aircraft subsequently dropped two kits containing four life rafts.</p> <p>2. The RAAF Maritime Patrol Aircraft, along with a Customs and Border Protection Dash 8 surveillance aircraft, are providing aerial surveillance in assistance to the recovery operation.</p> <p>3. Three merchant ships, responding to requests for assistance from AMSA, are currently aiding in the recovery of people from the vessel.</p> <p>4. HMAS Wollongong and HMAS Larrakia are also in the vicinity of the vessel and are currently conducting recovery operations.</p> <p>5. No further information is available at this time.</p> <p>6. This SITREP contains information about ongoing BPC operations and is provided to you under Section 16 of the Customs Administration Act 1985 for the purpose of your agency's functions. The information must not be further circulated within your agency except on a need-to-know [REDACTED] and must not be disseminated to a third party without the prior permission of BPC.</p> <p> Director Governance and Command Support Border Protection Command Australian Customs and Border Protection</p>	AMSA Log / Email
2115 AEST (1115Z)	RESCUE 253	N/A	Log Note	RESCUE 253 (RAAF AP-3C ORION) released from scene	AMSA Log Entry: "FM A Fisher ADF - Sealion 57 released from scene. Resc 251 ATD DN 211041, Resc 252 avail ex DN 212300 if required"	AMSA Log

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Time	Source	To	Type	Summary of Activity	Original Information	Reference
2132 AEST (1132Z)		AMSA RCC-A	Log Note	Customs Dash 8 advises handover with RESCUE 253 (RAAF AP-3C ORION) complete and three merchant vessels are en route to the scene.	AMSA Log Entry: "CUS22 advised handover with SELN57 complete. Three merchant vessels enroute to the scene. Reported overturned hull position and 6 x survivor sightings (all within a 1 nautical miles radius of a position 105T at 2.2 nautical miles from the hull, SELN57 operating not above 500ABL providing overwatch and comms relay. happy to operate down to A015, and possibly A010 available on task until 0750Z."	AMSA Log
2140 AEST (1140Z)		AMSA RCC-A	Log Note	advises AMSA RCC-A that there is a total of 110 survivors and 3 deceased. Customs Dash 8 is off task.	AMSA Log Entry: "FM Adrian CW 22 off task with update on persons recovered. HMAS WOL - 55 Surv & 1 Deceased HMAS Lara - 16 Surv & 2 Deceased Cape Oceania - 4 Surv & Nil Deceased WSA Dragon - 8 Surv & Nil Deceased JPO Vulpecula - 27 Surv & Nil Deceased and 2 with injuries with survivors becoming irate with crew wanting to be taken to Aust. Sign on 220400 ex YPM" JOC Note: "HQJOC believe the number of survivors for HMAS Wollongong should read 54 (and that one of the merchant vessels had an additional passenger). There has been earlier dialogue regarding this between Defences and DIAC - without previous resolution. I understand that there was some overlap between offloading the last of the merchant vessels (Dragon) and the first of the passengers to come off Wollongong."	AMSA Log / JOC Note
2150 AEST (1150Z)	HMAS WOLLONGONG	N/A	Log Note	HMAS WOLLONGONG is released from SAR tasking by AMSA RCC-A to proceed to Christmas Island for transfer of survivors.	HMAS WOLLONGONG Ship Log: "1850 - Released from SAR tasking by RCC Australia to proceed to Christmas Island for transfer of survivors."	HMAS WOLLONGONG Log
2155 AEST (1155Z)	N/A	N/A	Log Note	Merchant vessels WSA DRAGON, JPO VULPECULA and CAPE OCEANIA are released from task to land survivors at Christmas Island. HMAS LARRAKIA is tasked to remain on scene (as On Scene Commander (OSC)) to conduct further SAR.	AMSA Log Entry: "HMAS WOLLONGONG RELEASED FROM TASK TO LAND SURVIVORS AT CHRISTMAS ISLAND. MERCHANT VESSELS WSA DRAGON/D5AX9, JPO VULPECULA/ABRW5, CAPE OCEANIA/VYRPS RELEASED FROM TASK TO LAND SURVIVORS AT CHRISTMAS ISLAND. HMAS LARRAKIA TASKED TO REMAIN ON SCENE TO CONDUCT FURTHER SAR OPS UFN."	AMSA Log
2221 AEST (1221Z)	AMSA RCC-A	BASARNAS	Message	AMSA RCC-A accepts coordination for SAR incident. Confirms that 110 people have been rescued. Requests advice on whether Indonesian vessel is heading for SAR and its estimated arrival.	RCC AUSTRALIA HEREBY ACCEPTS COORDINATION FOR THE SEARCH AND RESCUE INCIDENT INVOLVING THE UPTURNED UNIDENTIFIED DISTRESS VESSEL: SMC RCC JAKARTA MR. KETUT PARWA, WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT RCC AUSTRALIA. RCC AUSTRALIA REQUESTS BADAN SAR NASIONAL CONTINUE TO ASSIST WITH FACILITATING FLIGHT APPROVAL AND ACCESS FOR SEARCH AND RESCUE TASKED AIRCRAFT TO ACCESS SEARCH AREA. FURTHER DETAILS TO BE ADVISED. RCC AUSTRALIA CAN CONFIRM THAT 110 PEOPLE HAVE BEEN RESCUED TO DATE. SURVIVORS RESCUED HAVE INDICATED THAT 215 PEOPLE WERE ON THE VESSEL PRIOR TO BEING UPTURNED. MANY RESCUED PEOPLE ARE INJURED AND ARE NOW BEING TRANSPORTED TO CHRISTMAS ISLAND BY AUSTRALIAN WARSHIP AND THREE MERCHANT VESSELS. ONE AUSTRALIAN WARSHIP REMAINS ON SCENE AS OSC AND CONTINUES WITH RECOVERY. REQUEST ADVICE ON WHETHER INDONESIAN VESSEL IS HEADING FOR SEARCH AREA AND ADVISE RCC AUSTRALIA OF ESTIMATED TIME OF ARRIVAL. PLEASE ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THIS MESSAGE	AMSA Log / Email
2227 AEST (1227Z)		N/A	Log Note	Customs DASH 8 off task - landed at Christmas Island	BPC (AMSOC) Log Entry: "Dash 8 off task - landed at Christmas Island"	BPC (AMSOC) Log
2237 AEST (1237Z)	HMAS WOLLONGONG	N/A	Log Note	HMAS WOLLONGONG and the three merchant vessels depart the area to take survivors to Christmas Island. HMAS WOLLONGONG reports: - HMAS WOLLONGONG - 54 survivors embarked - JPO VULPECULA - 27 survivors embarked - CAPE OCEANIA - 4 survivors embarked - WSA DRAGON - 8 survivors embarked	BPC (AMSOC) Log Entry: "HMAS WOLLONGONG and the three merchant vessels depart the area to take survivors to Christmas Island. Reported that: - HMAS WOLLONGONG has 54 survivors - JPO VULPECULA (cargo vessel) has 27 survivors embarked - CAPE OCEANIA (bulk carrier) has 4 survivors embarked - WSA DRAGON (cargo vessel) has 8 survivors embarked"	BPC (AMSOC) Log
2341 AEST (1241Z)	AMSA RCC-A	BASARNAS	Phone Call	AMSA RCC-A verbally confirm with BASARNAS that AMSA RCC-A has coordination responsibility	TELECON BASARNAS through interpreter - confirmed RCC Australia has incident coordination	AMSA Log

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Time	Source	To	Type	Summary of Activity	Original Information	Reference
2342 AEST (1242Z)	AMSA RCC-A	BPC (AMSOC)	Log Note	RESCUE 481 (AMSA Damier) departs Christmas Island after refuelling - estimates time on task to be 0010 until 0140 AEST	BPC (AMSOC) Log Entry: 'AMSA (Sedman) - AMSOC - Verbal advice that AMSA OCPNIER departed Christmas Island after refuelling and transit from mainland - Estimated time on task 0010 until 0140	BPC (AMSOC) Log
2353 AEST (1353Z)	BPC (AMSOC)	BPC SIEV SITREP NOTIFICATION GROUP	Message	BPC (AMSOC) releases SITREP 3: Vessel in distress, 110nm NW of Christmas Island	<p>Sent: Thursday, 21 June 2012 23:53</p> <p>Subject: Vessel in distress, 110nm north-west of Christmas Island: SITREP 3 [SEC=UNCLASSIFIED]</p> <p>Vessel in distress, 110nm north-west of Christmas Island: SITREP 3; as at 2330 AEST, Thursday 21 June 2012. At the request of the Indonesian search and rescue authority (BASARNAS), RCC are now the coordination lead for the on-going search and rescue.</p> <p>2. At approximately 2237 AEST this evening, HMAS Wallongong, accompanied by two of the merchant vessels assisting in rescue efforts at the request of AMSA, departed the search area for Christmas Island.</p> <p>2. Indications are that the three vessels are collectively carrying 106 people rescued from the search area.</p> <p>3. HMAS Larrakia remains in the search area and is continuing recovery operations.</p> <p>4. An AMSA Damier aircraft is on station and assisting with the search and rescue.</p> <p>5. A RAAF Maritime Patrol Aircraft is expected on station at approximately 0100 AEST, 22 June 2012, to provide aerial surveillance in support of the search and rescue.</p> <p>6. No further information is available at this time.</p> <p>7. This SITREP contains information about ongoing BPC operations and is provided to you under Section 16 of the Customs Administration Act 1985 for the purpose of your agency's functions. The information must not be further circulated within your agency except on a need-to-know basis and must not be disseminated to a third party without the prior permission of BPC.</p> <p> Director Governance and Command Support Border Protection Command Australian Customs and Border Protection</p>	AMSA Log / Email
22 JUNE 2012						
0008 AEST (1408Z 21 JUN)	RESCUE 481	AMSA RCC-A	Log Note	RESCUE 481 (AMSA Damier) on task	AMSA Log Entry: 'On Task report from RSCU481 #10 (20124106C,55493)'	AMSA Log
0021 AEST (1421Z 21 JUN)	RESCUE 481	AMSA RCC-A	Log Note	RESCUE 481 (AMSA Damier) advises civilian aircraft VH-FMG on task	AMSA Log Entry: 'On Task relay report from FM6 provided by RSCU481 #14'	AMSA Log
0027 AEST (1427Z 21 JUN)	RESCUE 481	AMSA RCC-A	Log Note	RESCUE 481 (AMSA Damier) deploys life raft	AMSA Log Entry: 'Equipment Drop report from RSCU481 #10 (20124106C,55493)'	AMSA Log / Document
0038 AEST (1438Z 21 JUN)	First Secretary, Jakarta, ACBPS	AMSA RCC-A	Phone Call	First Secretary, Jakarta, ACBPS receives update from RCC-A.	First Secretary, Jakarta, ACBPS Log Entry: 'Called AMSA RCC Recovered 110 alive. Number of deceased recovered (NFI). Numerous other deceased sighted, not recovered. Number of injured. 1 warship on scene.'	First Secretary, Jakarta, ACBPS Log
0050 AEST (1450Z 21 JUN)	RESCUE 251	Unknown	Log Note	RESCUE 251 (RAAF AP-3C ORION) on station	JOC Log Entry: 'RESCUE 251 (RAAF AP-3C ORION) on station'	JOC Log
0115 AEST (1515Z 21 JUN)	RESCUE 481	AMSA RCC-A	Log Note	AMSA Damier RSC481 (AMSA Damier) off task	AMSA Log Entry: 'Off Task report from RSCU401 #31 (20124106C,55493)'	AMSA Log
0124 AEST (1524Z 21 JUN)	HQJTF639	BPC (AMSOC)	Log Note	HQJTF639 advises that AP-3C ORION has detected a foreign fishing vessel (FFV) with approximately 20 persons on board in the area of the incident. HMAS LARRAKIA is investigating if this FFV has any rescued survivors onboard.	BPC (AMSOC) Log Entry: 'HQJTF639 - AMSOC: HQJTF639 advises that AP-3C ORION has detected a FFV with approximately 20 people onboard in the area of the incident. HMAS LARRAKIA is investigating if this FFV has rescued survivors from the SAR.'	BPC (AMSOC) Log
0130 AEST (1530Z 21 JUN)	VH-FMG	N/A	Log Note	VH-FMG (Civilian Aircraft) off task	AMSA Log Entry: 'Plan for current search assets in area is at 211530UTC is for R481 and FM6 to depart area to allow R481 clear airspace to conduct search.'	AMSA Log

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Time	Source	To	Type	Summary of Activity	Original Information	Reference
0206 AEST (1602Z 21 JUN)	AMSA RCC-A	LES / BPC (AMSOC) / JOC / BASARNAS	Message	AMSA RCC-A request Local Earth Station (LES) update the distress relay message and relay it at 4 hour intervals to vessels located in the Pacific and Indian Oceans	Document ID 16e68039 - UPDATE OF DISTRESS 2012/4106	Message
0207 AEST (1607Z 21 JUN)	HQJTF639	BPC (AMSOC)	Log Note	HQJTF639 advises that HMAS LARRAKIA is investigating the reported FFV and found six fishermen, no SAR survivors.	BPC (AMSOC) Log Entry: "HQJTF639 - AMSOC: HQJTF639 advises that HMAS LARRAKIA is investigating the reported FFV and found six fishermen, no SAR survivors."	BPC (AMSOC) Log
0215 AEST (1615Z 21 JUN)	BPC (AMSOC)	SIEV SITREP NOTIFICATION MAIL GROUP	Email	BPC (AMSOC) releases SITREP FOUR	BPC (AMSOC) SITREP FOUR	Email
0301 AEST (1701Z 21 JUN)	VH-MQY	N/A	Log Note	VH-MQY (Civilian Aircraft) estimated time of arrival with second crew. Aircraft has no further tasking and is to return to Port Hedland.	AMSA Log Entry: "VH-MQY (H25B) transported 2nd PH crew to YPM. ETA YPM 211701UTC. RET to PH. No further tasking."	AMSA Log
0344 AEST (1744Z 21 JUN)	AMSA RCC-A	JOC	Log Note	AMSA RCC-A release SITREP 1. AMSA RCC-A has tasked four merchant vessels - the container vessel MARGARET RIVER BRIDGE, the bulk carrier CONTI SELENT, the general cargo vessel BBC ICELAND and gas carrier GASCHEM PACIFIC, to relocate to the SAR area for 22 June search operations.	SITREP ONE - released 220526 AEST JUN 2012	Defence ANNEX E / SITREP
0400 AEST (1800Z 21 JUN)	RESCUE 251	JOC	Log Note	RESCUE 251 (RAAF AP-3C ORION) off-station, recovering to Learmonth.	JOC Log Entry: "RESCUE 251 off-station, and recovered to LEARMONTH at 220650 AEST"	JOC Log
0720 AEST (2120Z 21 JUN)	HMAS WOLLONGONG	JOC	Log Note	HMAS WOLLONGONG arrives at Christmas Island for offload of 54 survivors, including two critically ill patients, and one deceased	JOC Log Entry: "HMAS WOLLONGONG arrived at CI, offloaded survivors. Including two critically ill patients and one deceased"	JOC Log
0749 AEST (2140Z 21 JUN)	JOC	AMSA RCC-A	Log Note	JOC advise they are talking to HQJTF639 to release assets. They confirm that there are two naval vessels at Christmas Island.	AMSA Log Entry: "HQ JOC passed talking to NQRCOM looking at release of assets now." Confirm 2 naval vessels at CI."	AMSA Log
0820 AEST (2220Z 21 JUN)	RESCUE 252	JOC	Log Note	RESCUE 252 (RAAF AP-3C ORION) departs Darwin	JOC Entry: "RESCUE 252 (RAAF AP-3C ORION) departs Darwin and was on-station in search area at 1255 AEST"	JOC Log
0836 AEST (2236Z 21 JUN)	HMAS LARRAKIA	AMSA RCC-A	Log Note	HMAS LARRAKIA advises that merchant vessels MARGARET RIVER BRIDGE and CONTI SELENT would assist HMAS LARRAKIA with the search.	AMSA Log Entry: "CO LARRAKIA contacted RCC to discuss start of search, MV MARGARET RIVER BRIDGE and CONTI SELENT would assist LARRAKIA with visual search in East/West Search legs. Overnight LARR reported sighting two deceased and four empty L/Ralls. The 14 Survivors were discussed, the 4 injured were described as stable. Also discussed crew fatigue and the return of survivors to CI. CO LARRAKIA indicated that the vessel was capable of staying out in the search area all day. They only had one operational rib and priority remained recovery of survivors. RCC Aust requested LARR re-check L/Ralls if possible."	AMSA Log
0905 AEST (2305Z 21 JUN)	HMAS WOLLONGONG	N/A	Log Note	HMAS WOLLONGONG commences survivor/deceased offload at Christmas Island.	HMAS WOLLONGONG Ship Log: First offload commenced	HMAS WOLLONGONG Log
0950 AEST (2350Z 21 JUN)	HMAS LARRAKIA	BPC (AMSOC) / JOC / HQJTF639	Document	HMAS LARRAKIA reports it is on scene with two merchant vessels. It is still waiting on AMSA RCC-A's search plan. In the meantime, HMAS LARRAKIA has directed both merchant vessels.	BPC (AMSOC) Log Entry: "HMAS LARRAKIA OPREP 006: - On scene with 2 merchant vessels - MV MARGARET RIVER BRIDGE and MV CONTI SELENT - HMAS LARRAKIA still waiting on RCC search plan - HMAS LARRAKIA directed both merchant vessels as above, a search plan in the interim"	BPC (AMSOC) Log
1011 AEST (0011Z)	RESCUE 481	AMSA RCC-A	Log Note	RESCUE 481 (AMSA Dornier) on task	AMSA Log Entry: "Dn Task report from RSCU401 #12 (20124106Q,55498) "	AMSA Log
1135 AEST (0135Z)	BPC RCC-A LO	BPC (AMSOC)	Email	BPC (AMSOC) RCC-A Liaison Officer releases SITREP 1 to BPC (AMSOC).	BPC RCC LO SITREP 1	Email

[REDACTED]

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Time	Source	To	Type	Summary of Activity	Original Information	Reference
1157 AEST (0157Z)	BPC RCC-A LO	BPC (AMSOC)	Email	BPC (AMSOC) RCC-A Liaison Officer releases SITREP 2 to BPC (AMSOC).	BPC RCC LO SITREP 2	Email
1217 AEST (0217Z)	BPC RCC-A LO	BPC (AMSOC)	Email	BPC (AMSOC) RCC-A Liaison Officer releases SITREP 2 - Update to Search Plan - to BPC (AMSOC).	BPC RCC LO SITREP 2 - Update to Search Plan	Email
1220 AEST (0220Z)	BPC RCC-A LO	BPC (AMSOC)	Email	BPC (AMSOC) RCC-A Liaison Officer releases SITREP 3 to BPC (AMSOC).	BPC RCC LO SITREP 3	Email
1241 AEST (0241Z)	RESCUE 481	AMSA RCC-A	Log Note	RESCUE 481 (AMSA Dornier) off task	AMSA Log Entry: "Off Task report from RESCU481 #2 (20124108D,55498) "	AMSA Log
1255 AEST (0255Z)	RESCUE 252	N/A	Log Note	RESCUE 252 (RAAF AP-3C ORION) on-station	JOC Log Entry: "RESCUE 252 (RAAF AP-3C ORION) departs Darwin and was on-station in search area at 1255 AEST "	JOC Log
1332 AEST (0332Z)	BPC RCC-A LO	BPC (AMSOC)	Email	BPC (AMSOC) RCC-A Liaison Officer releases SITREP 5 to BPC (AMSOC).	BPC RCC LO SITREP 5	Email
1351 AEST (0351Z)	BPC RCC-A LO	BPC (AMSOC)	Email	BPC (AMSOC) RCC-A Liaison Officer releases SITREP 6 to BPC (AMSOC).	BPC RCC LO SITREP 6	Email
1400 - 1500 AEST (0400 - 0500Z)	PSOG	AMSA / BPC (AMSOC) / [REDACTED] AFP /DIAC / [REDACTED]	Verbal Briefing	People Smuggling Operational Group Meeting - Multi-agency discussion regarding status of maritime people smuggling threats and SAR 2012/4106	N/A	Event
1415 AEST (0415Z)	BPC RCC-A LO	BPC (AMSOC)	Email	BPC (AMSOC) RCC-A Liaison Officer releases SITREP 7 to BPC (AMSOC).	BPC RCC LO SITREP 7	Email
[REDACTED]						
1451 AEST (0451Z)	BPC RCC-A LO	BPC (AMSOC)	Email	BPC (AMSOC) RCC-A Liaison Officer releases SITREP 8 to BPC (AMSOC).	BPC RCC LO SITREP 8	Email
1506 AEST (0506Z)	RESCUE 253	JOC	Log Note	RESCUE 253 (RAAF AP-3C ORION) departs Learmonth.	JOC Log Entry: "RESCUE 253 (RAAF AP-3C ORION) departs LEARMONTH. On-station in search area at 1800K"	JOC Log
1523 AEST (0523Z)	BPC RCC-A LO	BPC (AMSOC)	Email	BPC (AMSOC) RCC-A Liaison Officer releases SITREP 9 to BPC (AMSOC).	BPC RCC LO SITREP 9	Email
1551 AEST (0551Z)	VH-URR	AMSA RCC-A	Log Note	VH-URR (Civilian Aircraft) advises it has completed its search task.	AMSA Log Entry: "VH-URR completed all legs - lots of debris sighted and a shark - no bodies sight"	AMSA Log
1554 AEST (0554Z)	BPC RCC-A LO	BPC (AMSOC)	Email	BPC (AMSOC) RCC-A Liaison Officer releases SITREP 10 to BPC (AMSOC).	BPC RCC LO SITREP 10	Email

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Time	Source	To	Type	Summary of Activity	Original Information	Reference
1600 AEST (0600Z)	RESCUE 252	JOC	Log Note	RESCUE 252 (RAAF AP-3C ORION) off-station	JOC Log Entry: "RESCUE 252 off-station"	JOC Log
1619 AEST (0619Z)	BPC RCC-A LO	BPC (AMSOC)	Email	BPC (AMSOC) RCC-A Liaison Officer releases SITREP 11 to BPC (AMSOC).	BPC RCC LO SITREP 11	Email
1657 AEST (0657Z)	BPC RCC-A LO	BPC (AMSOC)	Email	BPC (AMSOC) RCC-A Liaison Officer releases SITREP 12 to BPC (AMSOC).	BPC RCC LO SITREP 12	Email
1700 AEST (0700Z)	HMAS WOLLONGONG	N/A	Log Note	HMAS WOLLONGONG arrives back on scene.	AMSA Log Entry: "Commander of HMAS Wollongong advise arrived on scene. He will proceed to handover with HMAS Larrakia and assume on scene commander. Master expressed interest in releasing at least two merchant vessels. RCC Australia acknowledged and left decision to on scene commander." HMAS WOLLONGONG Ship Log: "On Scene - proceeding to location of HMAS LARRAKIA."	AMSA Log / HMAS WOLLONGONG Log
1706 AEST (0706Z)	AMSA RCC-A	Unknown	Log Note	AMSA RCC-A is advised that merchant vessel ICELAND is available for day three search	AMSA Log Entry: "BBC ICELAND AVAILABLE FOR DAY THREE SEARCH OPERATIONS"	AMSA Log
1725 AEST (0725Z)	HMAS WOLLONGONG	N/A	Log Note	HMAS WOLLONGONG assumes on scene commander (OSC) role.	HMAS WOLLONGONG Ship Log: "Arrived on scene commander for SAR."	HMAS WOLLONGONG Log
1725 AEST (0725Z)	BPC RCC-A LO	BPC (AMSOC)	Email	BPC (AMSOC) RCC-A Liaison Officer releases SITREP 13 to BPC (AMSOC).	BPC RCC LO SITREP 13	Email
1753 AEST (0753Z)	BPC RCC-A LO	BPC (AMSOC)	Email	BPC (AMSOC) RCC-A Liaison Officer releases SITREP 14 to BPC (AMSOC).	BPC RCC LO SITREP 14	Email
1800 AEST (0800Z)	RESCUE 253	N/A	Log Note	RESCUE 253 (RAAF AP-3C ORION) on station in search area	JOC Log Entry: "RESCUE 253 departs LEARMONTH. On station in search area at 1800K."	Log Note
1857 AEST (0857Z)	HMAS WOLLONGONG	AMSA RCC-A	Phone Call	HMAS WOLLONGONG advises HMAS LARRAKIA did not locate any survivors in the life rafts.	HMAS WOLLONGONG were advised about possible assistance from Indonesian Navy Vessels. Discussed release of 2 of 4 MVs on scene at last light. It was confirmed that LARRAKIA had investigated all rafts with reported sightings of survivors, NO SURVIVORS were located in any of the rafts. LARR now returning to Christmas Island.	AMSA Log / Phone Message
1902 AEST (0902Z)	BPC RCC-A LO	BPC (AMSOC)	Email	BPC (AMSOC) RCC-A Liaison Officer releases SITREP 15 to BPC (AMSOC).	BPC RCC LO SITREP 15	Email
1908 AEST (0908Z)	AMSA RCC-A	VH-KFB	Log Note	VH-KFB (Civilian Aircraft) tasked to pick up two life rafts at Essendon VIC (instead of VH-RCA).	AMSA Log Entry: "Tasked VH-RCA to land at YSSY then proceed to YMEN to pick up Life rafts, then proceed to Port Hedland, overnight, then to YPXQ."	AMSA Log
1909 AEST (0909Z)	HMAS LARRAKIA	JOC	Log Note	HMAS LARRAKIA commences passage to Christmas Island	JOC Log Entry: "HMAS LARRAKIA commences passage to CI"	JOC Log
1938 AEST (0938Z)	VH-FMG / VH-TGG	AMSA RCC-A	Log Note	VH-FMG (Civilian Aircraft) and VH-TGG (Civilian Aircraft) released from task and returning to Learmonth	AMSA Log Entry: "VH-FMG (GLEX) advised they have finished search. Released from task, also advised that VH-TGG (GLEX) has finished search. Also released from task. Both returning to YPLM."	AMSA Log
1956 AEST (0956Z)	RESCUE 481	AMSA RCC-A	Log Note	Alternative crew for RESCUE 481 (AMSA Dornier) sign on	AMSA Log Entry: "RESCUE 481 2nd crew sign for a 0845 UTC dep."	AMSA Log
1958 AEST (0958Z)	BPC RCC-A LO	BPC (AMSOC)	Email	BPC (AMSOC) RCC-A Liaison Officer releases SITREP 16 to BPC (AMSOC).	BPC RCC LO SITREP 16	Email

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Time	Source	To	Type	Summary of Activity	Original Information	Reference
2040 AEST (1040Z)	RESCUE 253	Unknown	Log Note	RESCUE 253 (RAAF AP-3C ORION) off-station and is to recover to Learmonth	JOC Log Entry: "RESCUE 253 off-station and is to recover to LEARMONTH"	JOC Log
2051 AEST (1051Z)	RESCUE 481	AMSA RCC-A	Log Note	RESCUE 481 (AMSA Dornier) on task	AMSA Log Entry: "On Task report from RSCU481 #10 (20124106E,55513) "	AMSA Log
2127 AEST (1127Z)	RESCUE 481	AMSA RCC-A	Log Note	RESCUE 481 (AMSA Dornier) off task	AMSA Log Entry: "Off Task report from RSCU481 #2B (20124106E,55513) "	AMSA Log
2157 AEST (1157Z)	AMSA RCC-A	ZK-KFB	Log Note	ZK-KFB (Civilian Aircraft) tasking cancelled (no additional life rafts from Essendon, VIC obtained)	AMSA Log Entry: "ZK-KFB CNL ux EN due to sufficient ACFT already tasked and surface vessels on scene."	AMSA Log
2356 AEST (1356Z)	BPC RCC-A LO	BPC (AMSOC)	Email	BPC (AMSOC) RCC-A Liaison Officer releases SITREP 17 to BPC (AMSOC).	BPC RCC LO SITREP 17	Email
23 JUNE 2012						
0133 AEST (1533Z 22 JUN)	AMSA RCC-A	BASARNAS JOC AMSOC 92WG	Email	Aircraft movements for 23 June are distributed to response agencies	Aircraft movements for 23 June	Email
0135 AEST (1535Z 22 JUN)	AMSA RCC-A	RESCUE 253	Log Note	RESCUE 253 completed 100% of their search and rescue and is en route to Learmonth	RSCU 253 completed 100% of their search and is en route to YPLM	Log Note
0438 AEST (1836Z)	BPC (AMIFC)	BPC (AMSOC) HQJTF830	Email	HMAS LARRAKIA has completed the transfer of survivors to Christmas Island.	See SITREP in email sent 0436 AEST	Email
0641 AEST (2041Z 22 JUN)	RESCUE 471	AMSA RCC-A	Log Note	RESCUE 471 departs the mainland - ETA 0947 AEST.	RESCUE 471 departed 0641 AEST 23 June - ETA 2347Z	Log Note
0857 AEST (2257Z 22 JUN)	RESCUE 254	JOC	Log Note	RESCUE 254 (RAAF AP-3C ORION) departs Learmonth for the search area.	JOC Log Entry: "RESCUE 254 departed LEARMONTH for search area. On station at 1300K"	JOC Log
1115 AEST (0115Z)	AMSA RCC-A	BPC (AMSOC)	Email	AMSA RCC-A confirm that [REDACTED] (Customs DASH 8) is released from SAR operations	Email Overview: AMSA RCC-A confirm that [REDACTED] (Customs Dash 8) is released from SAR operations	Email
1159 AEST (0159Z)	RESCUE 461	AMSA RCC-A	Log Note	RESCUE 461 (AMSA Dornier) on task	AMSA Log Entry: "On Task report from RSCU461 #12 (20124106F,55543)"	AMSA Log
1300 AEST (0300Z)	RESCUE 254	JOC	Log Note	RESCUE 254 (RAAF AP-3C ORION) arrives on-station	JOC Log Entry: "RESCUE 254 departed LEARMONTH for search area. On station at 1300K"	JOC Log
1338 AEST (0338Z)	RESCUE 481	AMSA RCC-A	Log Note	Alternative crew for RESCUE 481 (AMSA Dornier) sign on	AMSA Log Entry: "RSCU481 2nd crew sign on @ 222200 UTC for next days search"	AMSA Log
1400 AEST (0400Z)	AMSA RCC-A	Unknown	Document	AMSA RCC-A release SITREP THREE: 120 NM of CHRISTMAS ISLAND	AMSA RCC-A SITREP THREE: 120 NM of CHRISTMAS ISLAND	Document
1423 AEST (0423Z)	VH-TGG	AMSA RCC-A	Log Note	VH-TGG (Civilian Aircraft) provides update on observations to RCC-A	AMSA Log Entry: "VH-TGG ADZ body shape sighted (S/H 74 rop) Weather at time of Observation was Wind 120/20, S/S 1, Cld Bkn 2000, Viz 10 nautical miles, Swell 0.5m"	AMSA Log
1425 AEST (0425Z)	RESCUE 461	AMSA RCC-A	Log Note	RESCUE 461 (AMSA Dornier) off task	AMSA Log Entry: "Off Task report from RSCU461 #63 (20124106F,55543)"	AMSA Log
1530 AEST (0530Z)	AMSA RCC-A	VH-RCA	Log Note	VH-RCA (Civilian Aircraft) tasked to be on scene at 1530 AEST 23 JUN 2012.	AMSA Log Entry: "Tasked VH-RCA to plan on being on scene 230530Z. They will plan depart YBRM 230200Z, refuel YPXM, search, refuel YPXM, search up to 1-1.5 hrs, then return to YPPH. Estimate 1.5 hrs YBRM-YPXM Estimate 3.0 hrs YPXM-YPPH Due to accepting RCC tasking, they had to cancel a charter that had been originally scheduled for 23 June. This incurred a charge of between \$1000-\$2000. We will cover this cost. VH-RCA will include it as a misc. charge."	AMSA Log

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Time	Source	To	Type	Summary of Activity	Original Information	Reference
1604 AEST (0604Z)	HMAS LARRAKIA	AMSA RCC-A	Log Note	HMAS LARRAKIA arrives back on scene	AMSA Log Entry: "HMAS WOLLONGONG were contacted regarding BPC report that HMAS LARRAKIA was back on scene. They had not had communications with the vessel, however, they confirmed they were expected."	AMSA Log
1639 AEST (0639Z)	RESCUE 461	AMSA RCC-A	Log Note	RESCUE 461 (AMSA Dornier) in operation (unclear when on task)	AMSA Log Entry: "Report received from RSCU461 initially set to Doñito"	AMSA Log
1848 AEST (0840Z)	RESCUE 254	AMSA RCC-A	Log Note	RESCUE 254 (RAAF AP-3C ORION) off task	AMSA Log Entry: "RESCUE 254 is off task 230840 UTC enroute YPLM."	AMSA Log
1856 AEST (0856Z)	RESCUE 461	AMSA RCC-A	Log Note	RESCUE 461 (AMSA Dornier) off task	AMSA Log Entry: "RSCU461 off task with ETA YPKM 0922 UTC. P3 RSCU254 has already departed."	AMSA Log
1858 AEST (0858Z)	VH-RCA	AMSA RCC-A	Log Note	VH-RCA (Civilian Aircraft) off task	AMSA Log Entry: "VH-RCA off task 230858 UTC Completed up to Waypoint 24 ETA YPPD 232231 UTC They have enough crew duty to fly YPPD-YSSY, but cannot go via YPPH. Request that the observers be transported to YPPH via RPT. VHRCA has a previously scheduled charter on Monday and would incur significant cost (passed on to AMSA) if they have to cancel. In order to meet crew duty requirements for charter, they need to be back in Sydney this evening (to allow 24hrs off duty for flight crew prior to Monday scheduled charter)."	AMSA Log
2015 AEST (1015Z)	AMSA RCC-A	BPC (AMSOC) / JOC	Log Note	AMSA RCC-A suspend SAR operations	Information from SITREP FOUR and FINAL.	Defence ANNEX AC / SITREP
2044 AEST (1044Z)	AMSA RCC-A	LES / BPC (AMSOC) / JOC / BASARNAS	Message	AMSA RCC-A request Local Earth Station (LES) to cancel the distress relay message	Document ID 16886135 - DISTRESS 2012/4106	Message
2045 AEST (1045Z)	HMAS WOLLONGONG	N/A	Log Note	HMAS WOLLONGONG is released from SAR tasking - recovered 8 deceased."	HMAS WOLLONGONG Ship Log: "Released from SAR tasking - recovered 8 deceased."	HMAS WOLLONGONG Log
2215 AEST (1115Z)	BPC (AMSOC)	SIEV SITREP NOTIFICATION MAIL GROUP	Email	BPC (AMSOC) release SITREP FIVE (FINAL)	SITREP FIVE (FINAL): 110nm NW of CI SITREP FIVE (FINAL) as at 2200 AEST Saturday 23 June 2012	Email
2226 AEST (1226Z)	AMSA RCC-A	BASARNAS / AMSOC / JOC / AFP / JAKARTA	Email	AMSA RCC-A release SITREP FOUR (FINAL)	AMSA RCC-A SITREP FOUR (FINAL)	Email
2306 AEST (1306Z)	ADF	N/A	Log Note	ADF confirms that HMAS LARRAKIA and WOLLONGONG are released from SAR tasking and are to revert to previous command arrangements.	N/A	Defence ANNEX AD / Document
24 JUNE						
1131 AEST (0131Z)	HMAS WOLLONGONG	Unknown	Note	HMAS WOLLONGONG transfers eight deceased to Christmas Island and commences reconstitution / de-contamination. HMAS LARRAKIA remains in the search area for an additional three hours.	JOC Entry: "WOLLONGONG transferred 8 deceased to CI and commenced reconstitution / de-contamination. LARRAKIA conducted three hour search from first light in vicinity of the hull search area." HMAS WOLLONGONG Ship Log: "Embarked pusher barge - AFP decontamination commenced."	JOC Log / HMAS WOLLONGONG Log
2224 AEST (1224Z)	HMAS LARRAKIA	Unknown	Note	HMAS LARRAKIA transfers six deceased to Christmas Island and commences reconstitution / de-contamination.	JOC Entry: "LARRAKIA transferred six deceased to CI, commenced reconstitution and decontamination."	JOC Log